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Preface
Ten years ago, in my freshman year as a Law student, my uncle José Carlos,
aged 38, passed away in a hospital because of a thrombosis in the pulmonary
artery. When he was admitted to the hospital, he was diagnosed with pleurisy of
an unknown origin. In the autopsy it was found out that the pleurisy was a
symptom of the thrombosis, and that the reason why the thrombosis had
developed was because of a low level of the enzyme creatinine in his body. If
the diagnosis would have been more thorough, that lack would have been
identified and the right medical treatment could have been carried out, saving
his life. However it is very rare that the level of that enzyme is so low before a
mature age. Therefore, the doctors did not regard it as a probable cause. After
the passing of my uncle, the family was in shock, puzzled, unable to assimilate
all of the technical medical jargon, and doubting whether or not that tragedy
could have been avoided. Besides the terrible emotional shock, his wife and
three daughters faced the consequences of loss of financial support, payment of
mortgages and other burdens that could have been alleviated, if compensation
could have been obtained. Since the beginning of my legal studies, this tragedy
made me want to know more about the field of inedical liability, to better
understand the paper-thin borderline ( Brazier) between medical negligence and
medical mishap. Thus, this book is also a special tribute to my uncle- heus miser
frater adhempte mihi ( Catullus).
Many people in several countries have helped me, supported me, taught me and
comforted me during the "making of' this book. I start by thanking my
promotores, Maurits Barendrecht and Marco Loos. Without their constant and
thorough involvement, this book would never have arrived to a safe haven. In
addition, they were friends and confidents in times of need. I also wish to thank
Prof. mr. W. H. van Boom; Prof mr. M. S. Groenhuijsen; Prof. mr. I. Giesen;
Prof. mr. C. J. J. M. Stolker and Prof. mr. G. E. van Maanen for taking part in
the evaluation commission. [n the first phase of the evaluation they provided me
wíth extensive and thorough feedback, which was an immense contribution to
the end result of the book. I also wish to thank them for their patience regarding
the successive delays in the evaluation procedure.
Still in the "mentors" category, I wish to thank two colleagues and friends who
were always there to teach me and help me develop my skills as a researcher:
Andrea Pinna and André Pereira. I learned a great deal from them.
Also, I am very thankful to several colleagues. From the University of Coimbra
[ wish to thank in particular Prof Sinde Monteiro, Prof. Guilherme de Oliveira,
Dr. Almeno de Sá, Maria Manuel Veloso and Ana Luísa Riquito, as well as to
all of the staff of the Centre for Biomedical Law and the library for their help
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and support. Amongst my colleagues of the "Study Group on the European Civil
Code" I want to thank especially Prof. Chris Jansen, Prof. Gullermo Palao
Moreno, Prof. Ewoud Hondius; Prof Martijn Hesselink; Dr. Jacobien Rutgers;
Dr. Viola Heutger, Carlos Nóbrega, John Dickie, Odavia Bueno Diaz, Manola
Scotton, Muriel Veldman, Christoph Jeloscheck, Giorgios Arnokouros, Aneta
Wieworovska, Hanna Sivesand, Roland Lohnert and Stephanie v. Gulijk. In the
"Shifrs in Government" project my special thanks go to the brilliant
econometrist and strategist Ruud Hendricks and to Albert Verheij. In the
Department of Private Law of the University of Tilburg my gratitude goes to
everybody. It would be impossible to thank everybody individually, however I
feel the need to personalise my thanks to some people. I wish to thank Jeanine
Leytens, who was always there to help me since my first day at work. Special
greetings also to Karin Ammerlaan (Vicky), Corrie van Zeeland, Peter
Kamminga and Paolo Balboni.
My friends were always there for me, helping me with tips and comments,
boosting my morale, sometimes even feeding me in the more stressful
occasions. My special thanks to Rui Jorge, Juliano, Sofia, Pedro Patrício, Joáo
Pedro, Chico, Joaquim, Joca, Manel, Ricardo, Rodrigo, Pedro Ribeiro, Paco,
Pia, Nemanja, David, Fernando, Maribel, Michael Bryan (always very helpful
with the issues related to the English language) Laura, Cláudia and Rosário.
Also special thanks to my cousin Ana and to Ísis.
[ also wish to thank my other half Ljupka, companion of soul and heart, who has
helped me restlessly in the revision and editing of this book and who has
suffered the most with the "end of thesis" humour shifts and stress. Kyxna, me
CQKa.1f!
From my nearest family, my thanks to my grandmother Edite, who taught me
how to read and write. Also thanks to my late grandparents José and Zulmira.
Finally, my biggest gratitude goes to my loving parents, Rui and Eloísa to whom
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med-i.cine NOiJN: la. The science of diagnosing, treating, or preventing disease and
other damage [o the body or mind. b. The branch of this science encompassing
treatment by drugs, diet, exercise, and other nonsurgical means. 2. The practice of
medicine. 3. An agent, such as a drug, used to treat disease or injury. 4. Something
that serves as a remedy or corrective: medicine for rebuilding the economy; measures
that were harsh medicine. Sa. Shamanistic practices or beliefs, especially among
Native Americans. b. Something, such as a ritual practice or sacred object, believed
to control natural or supernatural powers or serve as a preventive or remedy.
ETYMOLOGY: Middle English, from Old French, from Latin medicina, from
feminine of inedicinus, of a doctor, from medicus, physician. See medical.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition, 2000.
1 HistoricalOverview
1.1 Medicine and the Law in Antiquity
Medical treatment is an omnipresent fact in human societies and medicine is a
very old science. Since ancestral ages, the law took a keen interest in the quality
of treatment and the consequences of adverse events arising from medical
treatment.
In the dawn of the ages, the first known written codifications of mankind, to be
found in Mesopotamia, already provided for the accountability of physicians.
The Ur-Nammu Code, ca. 2050 b.c. established monetary compensation for
medical injury', while in the Code of Hammurabi, ca. 1700 b.c., two provisions
on the liability of physicians can be found: one establishing the reward for a
successful surgery, the other imposing loss of limb for the doctor causing the
death of a patient:
"~215. If a physician makes a large incision with an operating knife and cures,
he shall receive ten shekels in money.
~218. [f a physician makes a large incision with the operating knife, and kills,
his hands shall be cut off'2.
In Roman law, an action for medical liability could result either from contract or
tort under the Lex Aquilia de Damno. Medical malpractice and witchcraft were
severely repressed by the Lex Cornelia de Sicariis et Veneficiis (81 b.c.).
I Nemec ( 1968), I .
2 Translation ofL.W. King. URL: httpaleawc.evansville.edu~anthologylhammurabi.htm
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Several provisions in the Corpus luris Ciuilis address questions related to
medical liability: D. IX, 2,7,8 to D. [X, 2,9,2.
1.2 Medicine and the Law in the Middle Ages
During the high Middle Ages, there existed two main trends in how the law
addressed medical malpractice. When comparing the most important legal
repositories of the 5`h Century a.d., while the Lex Romana Visigothorum
provided for a talionic retribution of inedical malpractice, the Lex Salica opted
for the monetary compensation ofsuch injuries (wergeld).
Another striking legal construction of the Middle Ages were the Welsh
codifications of King Hywel Dda in the 10`h century that established, the first
system of schedules for compensation of personal injury, attributing a set price
for each part of the body, the most valued of all being the tongue'. This was
called galanas. The whole kindred of the tortfeasor was liable for the payment
of galanas. The compensation, according to the Venedotian Code (mid 13`~
Century), could reach the amount of 63 cows for the death of a freeman and 252
cows for the death of a chieftain. This codification also vested upon doctors the
duty to testify as experts in personal injury cases.
Also noteworthy is the liability regime for medical injury in the Jus Vetus
Uplandicum in Sweden (1295), which provided for a system of remedies,
whereby the tortfeasor had to provide the medical care of three surgeons to the
aggrieved party'.
1.3 The end of the sacred art
However, for a long period in history, medical Iiability5 was largely intertwined
with criminal law and the religious exactions of the Middle and Modern Ages.
Likewise, medicine was still for a long time trapped in the mantle of its divinity:
a responsibility related to a religious ministry substantiated in Western European
culture by the Hippocratic oath, a"Silent Art"6.
As medicine shifted from being an art towards becoming a science, and its
practitioners ascended from the status of quasi-priesthood or quasi-witchcraft, as
Renaissance, Illumination and Encyclopaedism dissipated the mists of
obscurantism, the art of the caduceus became respected as a science.
3 Nemec ( 1968), 4.
4 Nemec ( 1968), 6.
5 Throughout this dissertation 1 avoid to employ the term "liability" insofar as the injury is
not yet qualified as faulty. Scandinavian Law distinguishes between ansvar (liability,
linked to fault) and ersáltnrng (compensation, regardless of establishment of faulQ.Cf.
Pichler (1994), 27.
6 Oliveira (1999), 91.
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Introduction
The development of inedicine brought mankind an improvement in the quality
of life, extended its average life span, envisaged the cure or relief for many
illnesses and trod great steps in the repair of injury suffered by persons. Such
was the magnitude of the progress of inedicine that citizens of developed
countries began to believe that there is indeed a cure possible for all ailments
they might suffer. As medicine became more advanced, effective and
technologically sophisticated, and as welfare societies became widespread, the
activity level of treatment providers increased exponentially. As a result,
mishaps became more frequent and the magnitude of their consequences higher.
Thus, issues related to the quality of health care reached the spotlight of public
opinion and public pressure'.
Likewise, in recent years, several scandals involving mass personal injury cases
related to healthcare provision sounded the alarm bell for pubic scrutiny of the
risks of modern medicine. Examples are the handicaps caused by Thalidomide"
and other drugs, or the case ofblood derivates contaminated by HIV or B~C type
Hepatitis virusesy.
Medical treatment nowadays has a vast potential to prevent, cure and relieve
illness and injury, if treatment proceeds smoothly. However, there are risks
involved in medical treatment: when it goes wrong, the patient can suffer serious
personal injury, illness and even death. The consequences of a medical mishap,
regardless of its negligent or accidental nature, can be dramatic for the patient,
causing her and her family a substantial decrease in the quality of life.
2 The Current Situation of Medical Liability
2. I Public scrutiny of Medicine and Increasing Litigiousness
Issues related to medical liability are increasingly in the spotlight of public
opinion. Until the middle of the 20th Century, claims for compensation of
medical malpractice were rare, and addressed by general tort, contract or
criminal law. However, in recent decades, healthcare providers became targeted
by malpractíce lawsuits more often, and public concern about the quality of
healthcare increased widely.
7 Lahti (1994), 209; Penneau (1996), 1; MerrylSmith 2001, 1.
8 Thalydomide, anti-emetic drug sold in the 1950's and 1950's to inhibit morning sickness
in pregnant women, was found in 1961 to be teratogenic in foetal development. Atound
8000 children worldwide were afiected, having developed serious handicaps. In
Germany a settlement in 1970 compensated 2800 victims in the amount of 110 Million
DEM. Cf. http:~lwww.wikipedia.corr~wikil"fhalidomide; Lambert-Faivre (2000), 783.
9 KennedylGrubb (2000), 1644; Lambert-Faivre (2000), 737.
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Danzon compared the growth of inedical malpractice in some common law
countries in the 1970's and 1980's. Claim frequency had an annual growth of
IOo~o in the USA, 90~o in Canada and 180~o in the United Kingdom. Claims
severity (the average of indemnity on all claims that are paid) escalated annually
by 190~o in the USA and in Canada and by 170~o in the UK. Insurance premiums
increased by more than 20a~o in the USA, by 230~o in Canada and by 390~o in the
United Kingdom'o.
Since the 1980's, some literature mentions in an alarming tone a phenomenon
known as the "medical malpractice litigation crisis", which allegedly is
becoming increasingly widespread throughout the world". This phenomenon
reached its peak in the USA. This "crisis" triggered an increase in the amount of
insurance premiums and influenced several reforms in many states of the USA
and other countries. However, recent research has lowered the alarm tone of the
"malpractice crisis". For instance, according to a study carried out by Black et
al., the number of claims and monies paid for the settlement of inedical
malpractice claims between 1990 and 2002 in the American state of Texas were
mostly stable or observed a minor change, with no correlation with the increase
of insurance premiums in that state. According to this study, "the rapid rise in
insurance premiums that sparked the crisis may reflect, in significant part,
insurance market dynamics rather than changes in claim outcomes", linked to a
modest rise in the claims frequency rate'Z. Irrespective of the magnitude of the
rise in claims for compensation of treatment injury, several factors can be linked
to the shifts in the patient-healthcare provider relationship".
Technical evolution. One of these factors is the technical evolution that occurred
in the practice of inedicine. The increased use of sophisticated technological
devices in contemporary medicine on the one hand raised the efficiency of
medical treatment, but on the other hand increased the risks of technological
nature that can potentially affect patients.
Democratisation of the access to healthcare. The welfare state and prosperity in
developed countries made path for the universal access of citizens to healthcare.
10 Danzon (1990), 48.
11 Danzon (1990); Manuel (2001).
12 Black et aL (2005). The study uses the public database of closed medical malpractice
claims in the state of Texas. The study pointed out that the number of large paid claims
(over USS25,000) was roughly constant in the analysed period. The number of small
paid claims declined. The payout per large paid claim increased by an estimated 0.1"~0
(insignificant) - 0.5"~0 (marginally significant) per year. )ury awards increased by an
estimated 2.5"~0 (insignificant) - 3.6"~0 (barely significant) per year. Litigation costs per
large paid claim rose by 4.2-4.So~o per year. Real total cost per large paid claim,
including litigation costs, rose by 0.8-1.2a~o per year.
13 For a deep analysis of these factors, cf Cascào (2004), 98; Castelletta (2002), 2; Conde




This fact contributed to the augmentation of activity levels, and as such to the
increase of risks. In correspondence to an expanded universe of patients, a
limited number of healthcare professionals, equipment and installations
remained. Likewise, the govemance of healthcare systems and hospitals
nowadays faces novel challenges.
The inter-subjective character of contemporary medicine. In our time, medical
treatment is largely carried out by several healthcare professionals working in
teams. Doctors of different specialties, as well as nurses, anaesthetists,
pharmacists, technicians, medics, etc. work together in contemporary medical
practice. Unsurprisingly, problems related to communication, articulation and
horizontal and vertical work sharing do emerge and significantly increase the
risks of inedical treatment for the patient. Equally, responsibilities regarding the
administration of hospitals, clinics and the healthcare system must be shared
between managers, administrative staff, healthcare economists and citizens.
Even though this inter-subjective and multidisciplinary feature of modern-day
medicine immensely contributes to the effectiveness of inedícal treatment, the
complexity of those interpersonal relations can be the cause of inedical adverse
events'y.
Emergence of patients' and consumers' rights. The paternalistic Hippocratic
paradigm was replaced by the paradigm of autonomy of the patient, who is now
a consumer of a service that must be carried out impeccably. The doctor is no
longer regarded in awe as someone invested with the holy power of healing.
Nowadays he is seen as an ordinary person, who studied very hard to acquire
and perfect his professional skills, and who uses those skills in order to receive
remuneration. However, the doctor is a human being, and as such, he might fail
while carrying out treatment, because to err is human.
Changes in the mentality of patients. While resignation, fatalism and timidity
traditionally characterised the mentality of patients, especially in Southern and
Eastern Europe, nowadays we observe these people as being more conflictive,
individualistic and demanding. Patients become more aware of their rights and
how to enforce them, and patients' associations began to come into existence
and to take an active stance in promoting a patients' interests agenda, in
particular regarding quality of services and safety standards in healthcare. The
increasing "compensation awareness" leads more patients to consider redress for
medical adverse events they have suffered15.
14 Laufs and Uhlenbruck (1999), 872; Merry and Smith (2001), l8; Vincent and Reason
(1999), 50.
IS Giesen (]988), 685.
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Endemic social, economic or legal factors: the American example. Some other
localised factors can contribute to the rise of inedical malpractice litigation.
Northern Americans are known to have a more conflictive, competitive and
litigious culture and society when compared to Europeans. The following
aspects of the judicial system contribute to inducing the escalation of
malpractice claims: trial by jury, exaggerated damages awards, exemplary and
punitive damages1ó, and the widespread practice of the contingency fee (quota
litis) by attorneys.
Those patients can file a malpractice claim without having to pay initial legal
representation fees. It might happen that their case impresses the jury, which
will likely be tempted to decide based on emotiveness instead of reason. As
such, patients are usually given inflated compensation awards (damages and
punitive damages), and only afterwards, if they prevail in the lawsuit, will they
have to pay legal representation fees". However, the net amount of
compensation will be significantly reduced by the fees charged by the attorney,
usually as steep as to cover the half of the awards. The risk is borne by the
attomey, who will advance all the provisions for legal fees and expertise costs,
and therefore attorneys are very careful in the choice of the claims they accept to
sponsor'". These elements combined can allure patients discontent with the
healthcare service to litigation, or tempt greedy citizens to try to obtain
unjustified benefits.
2.2 A challenge to liability law
These factors present a challenge to legal systems, which to a large extent still
use the traditional tools of liability law, and can experience myopia while trying
to understand and cope with the complexity of treatment-related injury in
contemporary times. Conde19 argues that: "The complexity of the causes
highlights the need to address the problem from different angles. At the same
time, it demands the effort of all the persons and institutions involved in
healthcare: the healthcare providers, the administration, the judiciary, the
consumer and patient associations, the media, the patients and in particular
society as a whole". Medical liability law is nowadays changing at a fast pace in
order to cope with the mutations in medicine, society and legal science of our
days.
16 Manuel (2001), 19; Sloan et aL (1997), 66.
17 Rustad~ICoenig (2002), 54.
18 Brazier (2003), 176
I9 Conde (1994), I5.
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3 What can go wrong in medical treatment?
3.1 Complexiry of treatment injury
Compensation of personal injury caused by medical treatment is usually a
complex issue, and as such, a simplistic approach to treatment-related damage is
not accurate. Many times several different factors concur to the materialisation
of the so-called iatrogenic damage~o.
Medical treatment cannot always cure the patient, and the difference between a
purely fortuitous adverse event and a negligent act, is located in a grey area with
unclear borderlines that are "paper-thin" in the eloquent adjective used by
Brazier21. Different shadows and grey areas exist between a fortuitous adverse
event, a preventable adverse event, and a preventable and negligent adverse
event.
The Harvard Medical Practice Study and the report of the American Institute of
Medicine have categorised the different types of accidents in medical treatment
in a very precise manner. This study defines an error as "the failure of a
planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of
a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning)", while an adverse event
is defined as"an injury caused by medical management rather than the
underlying condition of the patient". Adverse events, according to this study are
said to be preventable when they can be attributed to error. In addition, negligent
adverse events "represent a subset of preventable adverse events that satisfy
legal criteria used in determining negligence (i.e., whether the care provided
failed to meet the standard of care reasonably expected of an average physician
qualified to take care ofthe patient in question)"Z2.
As such, an analysis of the compensation of treatment injury must categorise the
different factual basis of personal injury deriving from medical treament, as well
as the different species of risks involved in treatment.
Illustration: The case of Dr. Yogasakaran. In a case from New ZealandZ', several
causes contributed to the decease of the patient. The setting for the catastrophe:
the inherent risk of administration of anaesthetics; the fact that all of the
elements of the surgery team had already abandoned the surgery theatre against
the protocols and sound best practice and a drug that was misplaced in the
wrong shelf in the surgery theatre. The trigger: Dr. Yogasakaran, a tired
anaesthetist who was facing an urgent unexpected adverse reaction of the
20 Damage caused by medical trea[ment. Literally means "caused by a doctor" also referred
to as treatment related damage or injury.
21 Brazier (2003), 241.
22 Brennan et al. (1991 a); Kohn et al. (2000), 28.
23 R.v.Yogasakaran [1990], 1 NZLR 399. Cf. MerrylSmith ( 2001), 12.
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patient, and who had to take a crucial decision in haste. All these circumstances
contributed to the decease of the patient and to a delicate liability problem. Dr.
Yogasakaran was criminally convicted of manslaughter and held liable in tort.
Illustration: The Vincristine cases. The infamous well-known vincristine cases
are considered to be one of the "air crashes" in NHS Hospitals in the UK.
Vincristine is a cytotoxic drug used in chemotherapy that must be administered
intravenously. Inthrathetical (spinal) administration of this drug causes the
agonising death of a person. At least 14 incidents with the same contours have
happened in the UK since 19752a. In this series of accidents, a vast array of
factors contributed to the recurrent intrathetical (spinal) administration of this
drug instead of intravenous, resulting in the excruciating death of patients~s.
3.2 Diagnosis mishaps
Incorrect or unnecessary diagnosis is a frequent factual basis of treatment
injuryZL. [n order for defective diagnosis to become grounds for liability in most
systems, there must be an essential mistake in the diagnosisZ', in non-conformity
with the professional standard of care, as this clinical phase will determine the
course of the whole treatment. In addition, unnecessary diagnosis methods can
lead to disproportionate risk takingZ".
Illustration: Unnecessary diagnosis. In the English case Maynard v. West
Midlands RHA, according to the doctor's diagnosis, the patient most likely
suffered from tuberculosis. However, the doctors ascertained the remote chance
of a very serious illness, Hodgkin's lymphoma. They thus carried out an
examination surgery, mediastinoscopy, which involved considerable risks. One
of these risks (paralysis of the vocal chords) materialised. The most probable
diagnosis (tuberculosis) was right, and the court deemed the examination carried
out unnecessary and disproportionate-9.
Illz~stration: Diagnosis accident. In the French case Bianchi, the patient was
submitted to an examination, arteriography. There were slight, yet serious risks
24 According to Heinrich's ratio, it can be extrapolated that by each incident reported, 300
near misses occur.
25 Cf Chapter 4 (1).
26 Lambert-Faivre (2000), 680; Penneau (1996), 25. In Scandinavian Patient Insurance
Schemes Dufwa (1997), 70; Erichsen (2001), 3~8; Hellner (1985), 709; Oldertz (1989),
24.
27 Penneau (1996), 23.
28 Gehrlein (2000); Penneau (1996), 23; BGH NJW 1996, 1589; BGH NJW 1992, 2962;
BGH NJW 1988, 1513. In Scandinavian no-fault Patient Insurance Schemes, defective
diagnosis is one of the access criteria to compensation under the scheme: cf. SPL ~6.3,
FPL ~2; Oldertz ( 1989), 24; Hellner (1985), 709; Dufwa (1997), 70.
29 Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [ 1985] 1 All ER 635 (HL).
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attached to that diagnostic technique. Regrettably, one of those risks
materialised, and the patient became paralysed'o.
3.3 Choice of the therapeutic method or mishap during its execution
The choice of the therapeutic method, and a mishap during its execution are
conditions that may result in medical injury to patients. This is often the case
when surgery is carried out or when pharmaceutical drugs are prescribed".
When drugs are administered, as seen above in the Vincristine cases,
deficiencies in labelling, storage and manipulation of the pharmaceutical
products are frequently the factual basis of treatment related injury.
Illustration: injury suffered as a result of choice of therapeutic method. In the
most famous English case about medical negligence, Bolam v. Friern HMC, the
patient fractured a hip while undergoing electro-convulsive therapy. Had the
patient been physically restrained, or administered a relaxant drug, that injury
would not have occurred12. The precedent set by this case established the
standard of care for the acts of a physician, and also laid down which criterion
should the court employ to benchmark compliance with the said standard of
care. The scale, according to this decision, consists of the support of the
therapeutic method chosen from a reasonable stream of professional opinion,
irrespective of that stream of professional opinion being the most correct or
representative of the class"
Illustration: cemented prosthesis with equivalent alternative. In a Danish case, a
patient suffering from progressive osteoarthritis in his hip underwent un-
cemented hip replacement surgery. In the aftermath, the patient suffered intense
pain in his thigh. An X-ray examination revealed reaction around the hip
prosthesis. The patient was then submitted to a new surgery to replace the
existing prosthesis by a cemented one".
3.4 Insuffrcient surveillance
Omissions in the surveillance and monitoring of patents are frequent
circumstances that can lead to medical treatment accidents. A common variety
of insufficient surveillance occurs in post-surgical situations, in particular when
anaesthetics are employed. The anaesthetist was under a duty to monitor the
patient during a certain time after surgery ended". Inadequate monitoring of the
30 Avis Bianchi, CE, Assemblée, 9 Avril 1993, req. n. 69336.
31 Lambert-Faivre (2000), 680; Penneau (1996), 22; Gehrlein (2000), 43.
32 Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118.
33 More details on this case can be found below on page 45.
34 Cementeret hofteprotese med ligevaerdigt alternativ, 95-1452 1996 Arsb. For more
details on this case, see below on page 53.
35 Lambert-Faivre (2000), 80; Gehrlein (2000), 58.
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patient in such a circumstance is an omission that can result in death or serious
injury to the patient.
A recurrent situation where insufficient surveillance results in accidents involves
psychiatric ward patients who commit suicide because of failures in their close
watch. As an example, 81 patients committed suicide by hanging in NHS
Hospitals in the United Kingdom between April 1996 and April 1998"
3. 5 Defective Input
Use of defective eguipment, instruments, devices and products. Defective
material input such as the use of inadequate equipment, instruments, devices and
medical products (drugs, vaccines, biologic products, such as blood derivates,
tissues, organs, etc.) frequently contributes to the occurrence treatment
accidents.
In contemporary medical treatment, the interaction between human and high-
tech factors present specific risks of a technological nature, and these are often
the factual source of inedical accidents". Though such equipment enhances the
effectiveness of inedical techniques, there is a chance that a fortuitous
mechanical risk materialises and injures the patient.
Hospital Acquired Infections. Hygiene in premises where treatment is carried
out can also contribute to injury to patients. Deficient hygiene conditions
increase the probability that hospital-acquired infections will affect patients.
These also known as nosocomial infections and are endemic in hospital
premises. Such infections present a significant risk to patients. It is estimated
that in France 40 000 personal injury incidents a year are attributed to hospital
acquired infections, resulting in 18 000 deaths, twice the toll caused by road
accidents. In the UK, 90~0 of NHS patients subside to this category of infections,
resulting in 1 billion GBP a year losses to the NHS'"
Common hospital acquired infections are sepsis and lung infections caused by
the following pathogenical agents: MRSA-Methyciline Resistant Staphylococus
Aureus (which has a very high mortality rate and is the highest priority in
infection prevention policies), Streptococus pneumoniae, Moraxella catarrhalis,
Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherrichia colii, Enterococcii sp., Pseudomonae sp.,
Candida sp., and Legionella sp.
36 CMO (2000), 31.
37 CMO ( 2000), 26; Viney ( 1997), 108.
38 BannisterBegglGillespie ( 2000), 416; Kouchner ( 2002); Lambert-Faivre (2003), 779.




Another frequent origin of adverse events in medical treatment is linked to the
organisation of the hospital services. Flawed layout and design of premises, poor
allocation of resources, coordination and supervision of staff, may increase the
risks that personal injury is caused to patients39.
The awareness of the contribution of organisational factors to treatment injury,
as well as the trend towards first-line liability of hospitals is growing in
England'o, in Germany (the doctrine of Organisationsverschulden)" in
Portugal'z, in Spain" and in The Netherlands"'
In fact, it is frequent that systemic or root errors, related to the organisation and
management of a treatment-providing organisation lead to adverse events.
Usually, several health care professionals of different specialties are involved in
medical treatment. Several insufficiencies in communication, coordination,
hierarchy, delegation and supervision may occur, leading to an increased risk of
accident"5.
Illustrations of organisational mishaps. In a French case, the hospital was held
liable because of administrative mistakes, such as the failure to forward a letter
from the doctor attending the patient to the hospital physician in charge of that
patient~.
In another French case, a young woman due to deliver was forced to wait for
one whole day before being examined by a doctor, irrespectíve of the
pathological symptoms she presented".
In yet another French case, the hospital was held liable for failure to transfer the
patient to a better-equipped hospital within a reasonable span of timeye.
39 It is worth recalling the aforementioned R v. Yogasakaran [1990] 1 NZLR 399 case, or
the Vinchristine tragedy.
40 In the report An Organisation with a memory, CMO (2000), a change in organisational
culture is proposed.
41 BGH NJW 1983, 1374; Gehrlein (2000), 23;Geiss~Greiner (1999), 41; Katzenmeier
(2002), 13; LaufslUhlenbruck (1999), 883.
42 STA 1710611997, AD XXXVII, 436, 436; Cascáo (2004), 102.
43 STS 3.1.90, CA, Sala 3a, Sección Sa, Repertorio Aranzadi no 154; STS 14.6.91, CA, Sala
3a, Sección 4a, Repertorio Aranzadi no 5115~91; STS 22.11.92, CA, Sala 3a, Sección 48,
Repertorio Aranzadi no 8844~91, cf Fidalgo (1994), 139.
44 BW 7:462.
45 CMO (2000); Gehrlein (2000), 52; Kohn et aL (2000); Leape (1999), 22; MerrylSmith
(2001), 10; Tabouteau (2002), 220; Vincent~Reason (1999), 42. This issue is further
developed in cf. Chapter 4.
46 CE, Ep6ux Pichery, 11101~1980, Receuil Lebon, 890.
47 CE, Mme. Nogueira, 25I07I1986, Receuil Lebon, 705.
48 CE, Centre Hospitalier de Reims, 28I05~1971, Receuil Lebon, 418.
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In a Portuguese case, the hospital was held liable because of the following
reasons: lack of reanimation specialists; bad coordination between the admission
and transportation services, making the patient wait for admission during five
hours in a cold garage. These factors led to the death of the patient49.
3.7 New treatment technigues and medical research
Novel technologies, techniques and methods that are not yet fully mastered can
present increased risks that patients may suffer medical injury, as the
consequences and possible side effects are still not fully known. In a French
case, Arrêt Gomez, the patient became paraplegic due to the materialisation of
an unknown risk of a novel spine correction techniqueso
4 The key players and their interests in the medical liability context
4.1 The Patients
A patient is the physical person who benefits from healthcare treatment. Either
in the situation of pretending to have or actually having an illness or other
ailment cured or mitigated, a regular check-up in the context of preventive
medicine, or an opération d'agrément51 it is in the interest of patients to be
treated in a humane, professional and standards compliant way.
If patients suffer personal injury related to medical treatment, they will want to
be able to evaluate the quality ofthe treatment, i.e., to know what has happened,
and why it has happened. They are then in a particularly vulnerable situation, as
they feel isolated and victimised. Likewise, it is in their best interests that they
will receive adequate compensation for their losses, throughout a swift, certain
and inexpensive procedure, where they will not be double victimised`Z.
4.2 The Healthcare Professionals
Healthcare professionals (physicians, dentists, psychiatrists, nurses, pharmacists,
etc.) are the physical persons skilled and qualified to carry out medical
treatment. In some situations, they will engage in individually applying
49 STA 17I0611997, AD XXXVII, 436, 436; Casc~o (2004), 102.
50 CA Lyon, 21I12~1990, arrêt Gomez.
51 Surgery that is not necessary from a strictly medical point of view, but is rather a
consequence of the preferences of the patient, such as aesthetical surgery, circumcision,
castration or transgender surgery.
52 Chambre des Représentants de Belgiquel Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegen-
woordigers, Auditions sur les aléas therapeuthiques et la responsabilité médicalel
Hoorzitingen over de therapeutische risico's en de medische aansprakelijkheid, Doc. 52,
1052I001, 27~04I2004, 67; Julia (1997), 100.
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treatment to the patient (a general practitioner giving a consultation to a patient
in his practice). In others, they are a part of a team, often multidisciplinary, who
provides treatment to the patient. This can happen in an autonomous,
independent way, but more often within the framework of a treatment-providing
organisation (a clinic, or a hospital). Healthcare providers are bound to perform
treatment in a humane, professional and standards compliant fashion57.
If personal injury is caused to a patient in relation to the treatment performed by
a healthcare provider, that professional's interests will be to defend his
professional reputation and to prevent the financial consequences of the result of
the liability claim: the payment of compensation to the patient (if not insured) or
to the insurer in case of recourse. Other financial consequences that collide with
the interests of the professionals are the aggravation of the price of the policy;
refusal of the insurer to insure, especially in high-risk medical specialities. This
would preferably from the professional's point of view, succeed according to a
swift, certain, inexpensive and thorough procedure.
When liability criteria are too stringent, the professionals can be tempted to
engage in defensive medicine. Defensive medicine is pictured by Tabouteau as a
healthcare defence consisting of professional nonchalance, unnecessary
precaution, bureaucratic overindulgence, dissipation of resources and lack of
encouragement to engage in scientific research and therapeutic innovation5' S5
4.3 Treatment Providing Organisations
These institutions, like hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, asylums, have an
organised structure in order to provide treatment to patients. In some countries
these are mostly public institutions (France, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom,
Nordic Countries) integrated in national scale public healthcare network, a
national healthcare service, while in others they will be predominantly private
(Germany, The Netherlands)5~.
The interests of public and private healthcare providing institutions usually
coincide: their main goal is to provide standards compliant treatment according
to an efficient organisational planning. However, while public or charity
institutions will strive to provide the best treatment possible according to the
financing they receive, private institutions have ín addition a lucrative scope.
As regards liability issues, hospitals and clinics will be seriously concerned with
aggravation of insurance premiums and the reputation of the institution in
53 Standards demanded and enforced by regulation existent in all countries, professional
self-regulation, disciplinary law, criminal law and liability law.
54 Tabouteau (2002), 139.




competitive healthcare markets. Likewise, it is an important concern for these
organisations whether or not they are the accountable contractual party or not, as
well as whether or not they are held vicariously liable for the acts of its agents.
The problems emerging from the contribution of individual and organisational
factors to the occutrence of adverse events, and the importance of that
contribution to the prevention and compensation of inedical injury, are one of
the central questions of this books'.
4.4 Insurance Companies
Insurance companies are active and powerfulSR players in medical liability. They
operate in the healthcare markets in two positions. On the one hand they issue
third party professional insurance policies to healthcare professionals and
activity policies to institutions providing medical treatment, in order to cover
damages emerging from their activity. On the other hand, they issue medical
care insurance policies to physical persons, covering healthcare expenses.
Insurers are very concerned with the efficiency of the medical liability system.
Their interests are better satisfied by clear, predictable rules, together with a
transparent claims adjudication and healthcare statistics system, enabling them
to adequately analyse and calculate the risk factor and to set the price of the
policies, as well as in the reduction of tertiary costs"
However, factors related to insurance market dynamics can decisively influence
medical practice insurance premiums. Black et al. point out several market
factors that can put the insurance and reinsurance industry to stress. First of all,
general economic factors such as the slowness of the stock markets and the low
interest rates have an impact on the financial health of the insurers. Secondly, a
general increase in natural and man caused catastrophes increases the stress on
insurance markets. Finally, some market factors affect medical practice
insurance in particular. For instance, the potential liabilities of the insurers
stretch through many years in the future. There are also development risks
related to changes in medical technology and public expectations. In addition,
insurance companies covering medical practice are often undiversified (they
deal exclusively in the health-care sector) and the insurance market non-
57 Cf. in particular Chapter 4.
58 For instance, Bernard Kouchner, former French Minister of Health denounced the savage
lobbying and blackmailing of insurance companies as of the French medical liability
reform. Cf Kouchner(2002).
59 Chambre des Représentants de BelgiquelBelgische Kamer van Volksvertegen-
woordigers, Auditions sur les aléas therapeuthiques et la responsabilité
médicale~[-Ioorzitingen over de therapeutische risico's en de medische aansprakelijkheid,




competitive~. These failures in insurance markets can significantly affect the
insurance premiums and have an impact on the compensation system.
Insurers are very strong key players in the arena of inedical liability, as they are
the main payers of compensation and a very influential lobby, capable of
imposing-or blocking-a reformb'.
4.5 Social Security
The welfare state is a hallmark for all the members of the European Union,
though its extent and efficiency tend to vary from state to state. This is the so-
called "European Social Model"~2. The role of social security is multiple in the
context of inedical treatment related injury.
First of all, in some countries, the state itself takes over the charge of providing
universal access to healthcare to its citizens, by its own means. In many
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Scandinavian countries, Portugal
or Spain, the state has a network of hospitals and clinics universally covering its
population, often free of charge to patíents. On the other hand, the welfare state
will absorb throughout social security some of the financial consequences of
personal injury emerging from medical treatment, throughout early retirement
and disability pensions.
The compensation of personal injury in welfare states has several levels. A first
level of protection is provided by social security, and often it is the only form of
compensation that an injured patient obtains, as only a minority of injured
patients obtains compensation from liability lawb'. An injured patient is normally
entitled to compensation from social security irrespective of fault of a treatment
provider and irrespective of the cause of the injury~. Liability law acts at a
second level. According to Faure and Hartlief, social security (unlike liability
law) typically provides compensation for loss of income and healthcare
expenses irrespective of the cause of the illness or disability, having as an
objective guaranteeing the existence of the affected person (Existenzsicherung),
according to solidarity amongst citizens, and an idea of redistributive justiceó5
However, the amount of damages awarded by social security is very limited,
notmally covering only pecuniary loss, in particular expenses related to
subsequent medical treatment and loss of revenue~`.
60 Black et al. (2005), 39; Faure in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 53.
61 Kouchner (2002); Lambert-Faívre (2004), 825.
62 Art. 34 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
63 Faure in DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 70; MarkesinislDeakin (2003), 47.
64 Faure in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 67.
65 Faure and Hartlief in Magnus (2003), 230; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 351.
66 Faure in Dute~F'aurelKoziol (2004), 67; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 373.
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Thus, the interests of social security, under financial stress by demographic and
budgetary factors, in the medical liability context consist of a maximum spread
of the financial costs of the medica( accident throughout the several players
involved. This presumes an efficient and far-reaching liability system. Another
interest of social security agencies lies with the rationalisation of expenses and
the possibility to recover the payment paid to the patient if she obtains
compensation from another source (collateral source offset). If insufficient
protection of patients is afforded by the liability system, the financial effort of
social security increases, financially affecting the public in general, who
finances the social security system by workman's contributions or by taxes. In
the words of Atiyah, if the wrongdoers do not pay the costs of accidents, the
public at large will pay these indirectlyó7. However, this may also be a reason for
medical malpractice claims to rise, as the claim culture can be stimulated by
insufficiencies in social security coverage.
Social security has a substantial role, and is one of the foremost payers of the
costs of inedical injury, and one of the players that ís more prone to policy
considerations.
5 Method and systems analyzed
S.1 The emergence of Medical Law
From a historical point of view, the law promoted accountability for defective
dispensation of inedical treatment since its very early roots, as can be witnessed
by the history of the relations between law and medicine.
Medical liability was originally addressed by conventional instruments in tort
law, criminal law and administrative law. In 1936, for the first time in a
European country medical liability was considered as a contractual IiabilityRe,
and nowadays, that perspective is dominant in most European countriesó9
Contemporary medical law is much dífferent than it was in the beginning of the
20th century, mainly due to the shifting factors evidenced before. The problems
became more complex, as complex became the nature of the medical art. Issues
like the aforementioned Thalidomide scandal, HIV contaminated blood, the
doctrine of informed consent, wrongful birth and wrongful life actions changed
forever this field of the law.
67 Atiyah (1997), 108.
68 Arrêt Dr. Nicholas c~époux Mercier, Cass.lre civ., 20I05~1936.
69 This is not the case however in EnglandNVales, where most liability claims are targeted
against the NHS, and a contractual relationship between the patient and the NHS is not
recognised, and in Scandinavian countries, where a contractual relationship is not
recognised. Cf Chapter 3.
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They sprung its development and contributed to the conceptual autonomy of a
"new" field of law: medical law, also known as healthcare law, which includes
topics such as bioethics, end of life situations, abortion, patients' rights, clinical
trials and quality of the healthcare system.
Medical law is nowadays a multidisciplinary field, receiving input from
biomedical sciences, economy, sociology, philosophy and psychology. [t is also
horizontal, having repercussion on many fields of the law: private law,
constitutional law, administrative law and criminal law. Until recently, it has had
a piece mail method. Nys identifies several factors, such as the relatively recent
nature of this novel field of the law, language differences, lack of workforce,
and the fact that it is not usually considered as a field of the law with cross-
border implications, as the causes to this generalised lack of systematic, in the
classical comparative law sense ofthe word'o.
In this dissertation, I tackle only with issues related to compensation of inedical
mishaps, an issue connected with both the problems of patients' rights and
quality of the healthcare system.
5.2 The Research Questions and the three models analysis
The preliminary research question of this dissertation consists of ascertaining
how medical injury is compensated in European countries. During my research I
have identified three different trends in the compensation of treatment related
injury in the law of different European countries.
Firstly, there is the traditional negligence-based approach, where treatment
injury is only compensated if, and insofar, the treatment provider acted in breach
of the duty of care owed to the patient, which means that he acted in a faulty
fashion. This model exists in most countries in Europe and the World.
An alternative model emerged in the seventies in Sweden, and spread eventually
to other Nordic countries. In these systems, the patient is able to receive
compensation regardless of any fault committed by the treatment provider,
throughout a dedicated insurance scheme. The model manifests itself in Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, though some features change between
the several systems.
A third model results from the gradual reform ofthe law on medical liability that
took place in France during the second half of the 20~h Century influenced by the
case law of the higher courts. This acquis of small shifts in the compensation of
medical adverse events was eventually codified and enhanced by the enactment
of the Loi du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des patients e à la qualité du
70 Nys (2001), 329.
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système de santé". In this third model, adverse events are split, on the one hand,
between those that can be attributed to faulty treatment injury, and that are
addressed by the traditional negligence approach; and on the other hand non-
faulty accidents of extreme seriousness, which are compensated by a special
fund. An administratively organised claims handling and alternative resolution
of disputes mechanism, backs the system. A similar legal device is in
parliamentary debate in neighbouring Belgium72.
The main research question of this thesis is thus to identify which of these
models, if any, is more adequate to compensate personal injury emerging from
medical treatment.
The answer to this question will result from the balance of the advantages and
disadvantages of the several models, identification of the arguments they
present, which contribute to the discussion, and finally their analysis and
benchmarking according to an evaluation grid. The evaluation grid used to
benchmark the three systems covers three different dimensions. First of all, the
systems are analysed according to the impact of the compensation procedure on
the satisfaction of patients and healthcare providers, as well as its effects on the
quality of the patient-healthcare provider relationship. The second evaluation
dimension consists of how well does the system achieve the aim of preventing
treatment injury. Finally, the third dimension assesses the costs of the
compensation system, their structure and how they are distributed. Each
dimension is sub-divided in more concrete criteria". The conclusion contains
blueprints for reform of the liability system.
5.3 The Research Method and Choice ofpositive national legal systems
Some arguments, situations and empirical and legal studies, are universal and
common, regardless of the system where they were developed. De Cruz uses this
method in his book on Comparative Healthcare Law", opting for this approach
instead of an exhaustive study of a set of systems.
Faithfully following the more traditional method of comparative law, the ideal
choice would be to choose one system that could be included in each ofthe three
models, for instance EnglandlWales or Germany for the traditional model,
Sweden for the Nordic model, and France for the "third way" model, and
thoroughly analysing those three systems. I have decided not to do adhere too
strictly to this method. One reason for this decision consists of the fact that I
71 Loi no 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002.
72 Chambre des Représentants de Belgique~ Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegen-
woordigers, Auditions sur les atéas therapeuthiques et ta responsabitité
médicale~Noor-itingen over de therapeutische risico's en de medische aansprakelijkheid,
Doc. 52, 1052I001, 27~04~2004, 67.
73 Cf Chapter 6 (2).
74 Cruz (2001), preface.
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opted to steer my research towards achieving practical results and present a good
perspective of the problems analysed without indulging into methodological
stainlessness. As Zweigert and Kátz point out, comparatists are
"unembarrassed" about their methodology, as it is still at an experimental stage,
and systematic writing about the methods of comparative law does not abound75.
Siems argues that the methodology of Comparative Law is open, and that the
particular method to be used depends upon the goals of one's own comparative
research'b.
Another factor was the influence of my legal education in Portugal, and the
methods of legal research in Portugal and other Southern European countries.
Because Portugal ís a small country, obviously the internal offer ofcase law and
literature is not big enough to enable research or decisions on novel, complex
issues. As such, arguments and sources to anchor legal research or legal
decisions are obtained from foreign sources. In addition, I obtained a vast trove
of useful information from many different legal systems due to the networking
possibilities offered by globalisation and the contemporary legal research
environment. On the one hand due to my activity as a reporter to the treatment
chapter of the Principles of European Services Contracts Law", and on the other
hand from the literature sources on Medical Law, mainly the European Journal
of Medical Law and Medicine and the Law, where extensive and valuable troves
of information on healthcare law in Europe could be gathered. Similarly, the
publications of the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law provided me
with vast and priceless research material'". Many systems provide very useful
arguments, and sacrificing such information would be disappointing.
Of an important ancillary role throughout this research was the input of
empirical data. While evaluating the complexity and the distinctiveness of injury
emerging from treatment injury in hospitals, the empirical analysis of how
organisational and human factors correlate in the causation of mishaps
developed by Reason" and Leape80 were priceless and reflected in the outcomes
of this book. The ups and downs experienced by healthcare systems in the
prevention and compensation of inedical injury were also an equally important
contribution to this research"'. Finally, statistical evidence was broadly used
about trends in liability claims, severity of claims, aggregate costs,
administrative costs, patients compensated, damages awarded, etc. This
information is very important so that the extent of the challenges faced by the
75 Zweigert and Kótz (1998), 33.
76 Siems (2005), 23.
77 PESCL (2005).
78 In particular Faure~ICoziol (2001); Magnus (2003); KochRCoziol (2003) and
Dute~FaurelKoziol (2004).
79 Reason (1990); Reason (1997).
80 Leape (1999); Leape (2001).
81 CMO (2000); Kohn et aL (2000); Brennan et aL (1991).
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prevention and compensation of inedical injury can be fully understood, as well
as the risks present in blueprints for reform. I must however highlight the
reserves that the use of empirical and statistical evidence poses, due to the
disparateness and reliability of available data arrayse'. The data originates from
different sources, and is obtained through different methodologies. Exact and
comprehensive data from the Scandinavian countries was easily obtained.
However, data from other countries is based on projections and extrapolations
carried out by academic studies or governmental reports, and are often limited to
specific periods. Sometimes, the lack of transparency and publicity, or the
dispersion of sources, makes the process of obtaining exact data difficult or
impossible"'.
[n addition, I believe that such an argument-based approach, regardless of the
origin of the argument (legal system, economics, empirical and statistical data,
psychology, sociology, organizational science) instead of the thorough
systematic analysis of legal rules is on the one hand more interesting for the
reader, be her an academic, a policy-maker or a practitioner, while on the other
hand it reduces the complexity~. This approach also provides for a wider vault
of arguments for the analysis of the three models, and helps in formulating the
conclusions of the thesis. My opinion is that the benefits of this approach
outweigh the risks of the anathema ofthis book being considered as a product of
Auslandsrechtskunde.
As such, I focus on the law of EnglandlWales and Germany while describing the
negligence model. The main reasons leading to the choice of these two systems
is their scale and the projection they have in the international scene. In addition,
this choice allows for the analysis of the perspectives of two different legal
families: common law and Roman-Germanic law.
While describing the no-fault Nordic systems, I exclude Norway and Iceland,
whose schemes are on the one hand too recent, and on the other hand too similar
to other Nordic constructions. Though the systems are similar, I devote more
attention to the Swedish, as it was the pioneer, and to the Danish, a"second
generation scheme", where literature and travaux préparatoires helped ín
systematising the model and solved some misgivings of the Swedish
construction. These two Nordic systems, together with the Finnish, are presented
together, as although they differ in some details; their similarities allowed me to
make a joint description and analysises
82 Siems (2005), 5.
83 Cf Chapter 5 (4,3). On the obstacles of obtaining data in the iJK, cf Fenn et al. (1994),
389.
84 Siems (2005), 22.
85 Griinefeld (2002), 65.
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France was chosen to depict the third model. French law deviated progressively
from the negligence system in the 1980's and 1990's by introducing several
obligations of result on treatment providers in case of use of defective
instruments, materials and products, hospital-acquired infections, and as wel) by
imposing treatment providers a duty to compensate patients for some serious
medical adverse events irrespective of fault~. This deviation sets it apart not
only from the negligence model- but also from the Nordic styled no-fault patient
insurance model, due to its specificities87. The codification of this case law, as
well as the introduction of a non-adversarial claims handling procedure by the
Loi du 4 mars 2002 contributed to stabilise this model. Occasional attention is
given to Belgium, where the adoption of a French-styled compensation model is
being contemplated by the legislature, a fact that confirms the portability of the
model. However, a caveat concerning the analysis of this model in this book is
linked to the novelty of some of its features, the impact of which cannot be
observed in practice and cannot yet be supported by facts and empirical studies.
Despite this caveat, I nevertheless decided to include the analysis of this model
in this book, due to several reasons. First of all, the French legal system is
traditionally considered to be one of the most representative legal systems in
Europe. Second, it is in the particular field of inedical liability, a very creative
legal system, and this creativity led to a very original legal regime in the field of
compensation of inedical adverse events. Due to these reasons, I decided that the
original, novel and promising French "third way" between negligence and no-
fault models should not be left out of this research, even if the "law in action"
cannot yet validate the virtues of the "law in books".
Finally, exceptionally, some facts, cases, empirical studies and legal solutions
are obtained from other jurisdictions, where they are particularly relevant.
6 Synopsis of the Thesis
After this general introduction, this book follows with chapter 2, which
describes the main features of the three different models of compensation of
injury emerging from medical treatment in European countries: negligence
based liability (the most orthodox), no-fault patient insurance (Scandinavian
countries) and intermediate systems (France). In chapter 3, I proceed by
explaining the requisites that the injury suffered by the patient must meet so that
compensation can be awarded.
The following chapter, chapter 4 explains why and how errors and accidents
lead to medical injury and how these can be prevented. Chapter 5 focuses on
86 Cf Chapter 3.
87 Of the opinion that the French system of compensa[ion of treatment accidents is a no-
fault compensation system: Dute in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 444.
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how medical injury is compensated, the nature of damages suffered by the
patient, the method by which they are calculated and awarded, as well as which
are the costs involved in adequately compensating patients.
In the last chapter, I present my conclusion by evaluating how well the different
models compensate medical injury. Finally, I highlight the need for reform, and





1 What is a negligence system?
1.1 Description ofNegligence Systems
Negligence based liability demands the existence of a duty of care of the
treatment provider vis-à-vis the patient, the breach of that duty, a link of
causation between treatment and the injury and damages'.
The cornerstone of a negligence system consists of the requisite that some fault
was committed, and the execution oftreatment fell below a standard of care set
by the law2.
1.2 Main Features ofNegligence Systems
Though some procedural aspects vary from country to country, some generic
aspects of negligence systems can be retained. The presentation of the
negligence model, a model that benefits from the fact of being the most solidly
established and having the deepest roots, will be somewhat critical in order to
highlight the need for its reform.
Fault as the threshold of Liabiliry. Fault is the threshold of negligence systems.
Fault consists of the failure to meet a certain standard of care expected from the
treatment providers, i.e. performing treatment in non-conformity with the
accepted standards of current medical practice leges artis. The patient must
prove fault, causation and damages. This topic will be further developed in
Chapter 3.
Adversarial Procedure. These requisites of liability will more than often be
evaluated by a court of law in a lawsuit, in an adversarial way. The procedure is
often lengthy, costly and strenuous. According to Brahams, "Litigation in
medical disputes (...) is by nature an expensive, protracted obstacle course
where the injured party must try to pursue the stronger, fitter one and convince a
judge that his injury was caused by negligence. The parties are usually locked
into a struggle for many years at enormous cost (...) In the result, few injured
patients receive compensation, and those who do have to wait for many years
1 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 74.
2 Jourdain (2002), 87; Laufs~tlhlenbruck ( 1999), 853; Penneau (1996), 22.
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becoming more and more embittered with the system that produces such
unfairness"'.
Typically, negligence claims are addressed by a court of law, throughout an
adversarial procedure, having the patient or her legal representative the standing
to sue, and the healthcare professional(s) andlor the institution providing
healthcare the standing to be sued.
Quite often, the civil claim for damages is connected to criminal prosecution of
the healthcare professional involved, and in some countries administrative courts
entertain jurisdiction over claims involving public hospitals".
1.3 Prevention
In negligence systems, prevention traditionally means deterrence. The healthcare
professionals and hospitals have an incentive ( the threat of enforcement of
liability) to execute medical treatment according to the standard of care set by
the law. A distinction can be made between specific and general deterrence.
While the first category regulates precisely the risky actions by regulating them
and imposing a sanction for their breach; general deterrence provides indirect
incentives for the potential injurers, which will face the financial consequences
of liability if they engage in sub-standard degrees of cares.
According to an economic analysis of the law, the injurer will have to internalize
the costs of the accident insofar as they exceed the costs of preventionb.
According to Faure, "the foresight of being held liable ex post will induce the
healthcare provider ex ante to take efficient care"'.
The deterrent effect exists at both the individual and the institutional level. At




In France, the compensation criterion was different in administrative and civil case law.
The decisions of Arrêt Gomez, Cour Administrative de Lyon, 21~12~1990; Arrêt Bianchi,
CE, 914~1993 and Arrêt Hópital Joseph Imbert d'Arles; CE 3I11~1997 all of them issued
by adminis[rative courts, extended compensation of treatment injury [o medical mishaps
involving the materialisation of exceptional risks resulting in extremely serious injury
The civil jurisdiction did not extend compensation to such a wide extent. Cf Lambert-
Faivre (2000), 716; Viney (1997), ]81; Penneau (1996), 122 suggested the separation of
the civil claim from criminal procedures, as well as the unification of the compensation
criteria in the civil and administrative jurisdictions. Though the Loi du 4 mars 2002
relative aux droits des maladies et à la qualité du système de santé trod a step towards the
latter suggestion, it is unpredictable how
Cassation and the Consei! d'Élat.
5 Atiyah~Cane (1999), 361.
the case law will evolve in the Cour de
6 The Learned Hand rule of United States v. Carroll Towning Co. 159 F.2nd 169 (2nd
7
Cir. 1947).
Faure in DutelFaure~lCoziol (2004), 7.
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aggrieved patient as treatment fell below the standard of care owed to the
patient, that practitioner, as well as her peers will have an incentive to execute
medical treatment according to the standard of care set by the law".
In addition, deterrence can also be observed at the institutional level, as hospitals
will have incentives to minimize risks linked to organizational factors and
defective input, in order to escape liabilityv.
2 What is a no-fault system?
2.1 Definition of No-Fault Systems
In a no-fault system, the patient can be compensated for serious, preventable or
unendurable treatment related injury, throughout a swift, inexpensive non-
adversarial claim settlement procedure. Mann defines it as system "which will
relatively rapidly provide for substantial restoration of expected income or other
appropriate financial compensation for those who have suffered severe,
prolonged iatrogenic injury not due to negligence"'o.
2.2 Origin ofNo-Fault Systems
Sweden was the pioneer in the adoption of a no-fault compensation system in
order to reinforce patients' rights regarding the compensation of inedical injury.
Compensation was particularly difficult to obtain due to the stringent standards
of proof of the law on torts (skadestándslagen"). In 1975, the
Landstingsfórbundet (Association of the local counties, which are in charge of
the administration of health-care) organised a first voluntary no-fault patient
insurance scheme. It was a success, and ín 1996 it was enacted as a statute'`.
Whereas in the 1970's, before the reform, only an average of ten patients per
year received compensation, in 1975, first year after the reform, 1014 patients
obtained compensation under the no-fault patient insurance scheme". The most
important objective of the reform was to significantly expand access of injured
patients to compensation.
8 Olsen (1999), 1029.
9 Cf Chapter 4 (4).
10 Mann ( 1989), 5.
11 SkadestL (1972:207).
12 Patientskadelag (SOU 1996:799). Cf Wendel in Dute~Faure~ICoziol ( 2004).




The voluntary scheme was eventually enacted in the form of statute", and
eventually similar reforms were carried out in other Scandinavian countries:
Finland15, Denmark1ó, Iceland and Norway". A similar no-fault patient insurance
compensation system has been implemented in some Austrian Lánder1e.
2.3 Main Features ofNo fault Systems
Culpa Neutral Access Criteria. One of the cardinal ideas of the Scandinavian
No-Fault schemes is that the patient's right to compensation is culpa neutral, i.e.
it does not require that the injury resulted from fault of healthcare professionals
andlor treatment providing institutions19. The main principle to qualify an injury
as eligible for compensation relates to the preventability of that injuryZo, though
injury sustained by the patient that is disproportionate to the predictable
magnitude ofthe rísks involved can be exceptionally compensated".
Non-Litigious Settlement of Claims. Another cornerstone of Scandinavian No-
Fault schemes consists of the fact that compensation is covered by an insurance
system funded by the treatment providersZ~. Claim settlement is adjudicated
according to a dedicated non-adversarial, non-judicial procedure, processed by
an impartial third party. The procedure is swift: for instance, in Sweden 900~0 of
the claims are settled within six monthsZ'. In Denmark the normal claims
processing time is six months2a. The procedure is gratuitous25 and normally does
not demand the intervention ofattorneysZb.
14 The current statute is Patientskadelag (1996:799), henceforth cited as SPL (Swedish
Patient [nsurance Law). Cf Dufwa (1997), 57; Grilnfeld (2002), 65; Oldertz (1989), 14.
1S Potilasvakuutuskeskusyhdistyksen s~~ntit Nr. S8S~1986, henceforth cited as FPL
(Finnish Patient Insurance Law). Cf Mikkonen (2001), 347; Lahti (1994), 209.
16 Lov om Patientforsikring, Lov nr 367 af 616~1991, henceforth cited as DPF (Danish
Patient lnsurance Law). Cf Erichsen (2001), 355; Eyben (2002), 15.
17 Icelandic Act on Patient Insurance no. l 1112000; Norwegian Lov I5. juni 2001 nr. 53 om
erstatning ved pasientskader mv. (pasientskadeloven). I will not focus on these two
schemes, for the following reasons: both the schemes are quite recent and as such, there
is no visible information yet regazding their outcomes; the Icelandic scheme is very
similaz to the Danish Scheme: Grunfeld (2002), 66. As such, I prefer to investigate the
older, tested and documented schemes. For more on the Norwegian system and its
impact so far, cf. Jerstad (2002), 681.
18 ~27a KAKuG. Cf Koch and Koziol in Dute~FaurelKoziol, (2004).
19 Erichesen (2001), 355; Grunfeld (2002), 65; Pichler (1994), 27; Hellner (1985), 27.
20 Cf. Chapter 3 (3).
21 Cf. Chapter 3 (4).
22 Grunfeld (2002), 65; Dufwa (1997), 65.
23 Dute in Du[e~FaurelKoziol (2004), 462.
24 httpa~uk.patientforsikringen.dklProcedure.
25 Grunfeld (2002), 65, 67; Pichler (1997), 177; Lahti (1994), 210; ~11 (b) FPL; ~14 (8)
DPL.
26 Mikkonen (2001), 348.
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The aggrieved patient or his bereaved family can choose whether to file a
lawsuit with the court of law entertaining jurisdiction based on tort law, or
present a claim to the Patient Insurance AssociationZ'.
If the patient decides to bring forth his claim under the umbrella of the Patient
Insurance, the procedure is quite simple2e. In a first phase, the injured patient (or
the bereaved family entitled to damages emerging from his death) fills in a form
describing the injury suffered, the identification of the treatment provider or
hospital that allegedly caused the injury, and the supposed date when treatment
took place". This claims initiation form is eventually submitted to the Patient
Insurance Association, though it can also be handed in to the hospital where
treatment took place, as in most Nordic hospitals there is a patients'
ombudsman.
After receiving the claims initiation form, the Patient Insurance Association will
investigate the claim ex o~cio. This is the second phase of the procedure. The
Patient Insurance Association will in particular secure and obtain all relevant
medical files and information from the hospital and healthcare providers
involved in the treatment'~. As an example, in Denmark this phase of the
procedure takes approximately two to three months".
The third phase of the procedure consists of the decision ofthe Patient Insurance
Association, whether or not the claim is eligible for compensation under the
conditions of the Patient Insurance Scheme, or in other words, whether or not
the access criteria to compensation are satisfied. In this phase, the Patient
Insurance Association will resort to its panel of experts and will require
additional external forensic expertise if necessary". As an example, in Denmark
this phase lasts an average ofthree months".
A decision from the Patient Insurance can be appealed to a Patient Insurance
Appeals Board, where experts, as well as representatives from the insurance
companies federated in the Patient Insurance Association, patient associations;
27 Pichler (1997), 177; Brahams (1989). In Denmark however, the direct access to the
regular courts of law is not possible under the DPL, as a claim under the patient
insurance scheme is compulsory Cf. Pichler (1997), 223; KrenchelBroberg (1995).
28 For an extensive analysis of the procedure, cf Pichler (1994), 423 ff.
29 Claims initiation forms can be obtained from the following URLs:
~httpaluk. pat ientforsi kri ng. dklpubl icldokumentedanmelde 1 sedpdt~~o20engelsklENG"~o20
Skemao~o20Patienten.pdfl for Denmark and ~httpa~www.vakes.filpvk~pvkpdUlomake-
ruotsi.pdf5 for Finland and ~http:llwww.lof-forsakring.corr~pdf~skadeanmalan2005.pdt5
for Sweden.
30 The Patient Insurance Association has a right to secure and obtain all relevant
information: DPL ~ 17 ( ] ); FPL ~5 (d); ~ 12.
31 httpaluk.patientforsikringen.dklProcedurel




magistrates and delegates of the government are represented". The decisions of
the Patient Insurance Appeals Board are in practice binding"
An appeal of the decision of the Appeals Board to a court of law is possible, but
rare'~. According to Pichler, the possibility of access to a court of law afforded
by the Patient Insurance laws is merely symbolical. In fact patients who did not
succeed to obtain compensation under the facilitated standards of proof afforded
by the Patient Insurance scheme, hardly stand a chance of obtaining
compensation under the law of torts before a court of law, due to the unusual
stringency of the standard ofproof'.
In Sweden between 1975 and 1986, 990 decisions (2,460~0 of all decisions) were
appealed to the Patient Insurance Appeals Board, of which 5 were appealed to
arbitration, where 1 patient won. Between 1975 and 1991, 2440 decisions
(4,140~0 of all decisions) were appealed to the board, of which 33 were brought
to arbitration, six of which were won by patients. In Finland an average of 1000
decisions of the Patient Insurance Association are revíewed by the Appeals
Board per annum. In addition, between 1987 and 1999, 20 patients a year
appealed from a decision of the Patient Insurance Appeals Board to a court of
law'".
Between 1975 and 1986, 5 claims were brought in tort to a court of law, though
the number of lawsuits rose to 35 in the period between 1975 and 1991. In these
claims, the patient won in 300~0 of the cases39. Though these figures are still not
expressive enough as to compromise the system, this numbers can show a
growing trend of discontent vis-à-vis the system.
Prevention. The incentives to accountability of the deterrent aspect of the
negligence liability system do not exist in Scandinavian systems, neither at the
individual level (professionals are shielded from liability) nor at the institutional
level (insurance premiums are not experience rated)'o.
34 Denmark: ~ 15 DPL; Erichsen (2001), 368; Finland: ~ 11 FPL; Mikkonen in
Dute~FaurelKoziol (2004), 189; Sweden: Espersson (2000), 7; Pichler (1997), 221.
35 Decisions are formally binding in Finland and Denmark. They aze not formally binding
(utlátende): advisory) in Sweden, but it never happened that its decisions were not
followed by the insurers. It must be no[ed, that the possibiliry of appeal to an azbitration
court, whose decisions are binding, was designed in order to address any poten[ial refusal
to follow the decision, Pichler (1997), 221.
36 In Denmark to the High Court: DPL ~16; in Finland to the Helsinki city court or the
court of the domicíle of the patient: Mikkonen in Dute~Faure~Koziol (2004), 190; In
Sweden arbitration tshould take place before access to a court of law: Pichler (1994),
451.
37 Pichler (1994), 454.
38 Mikkonen (2001), 352.
39 Danzon (1994b), 457.
40 Danzon (1994b), 457.
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In Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance systems, compensation of injury
emerging from medical treatment does not depend upon the establishment of
fault. As such, healthcare professionals, as they are shielded from liability and
no longer face a conflict of interests between their duties vis-à-vis the patient
and their fear of being blamed, have incentives to cooperate more intensely with
the investigation of the facts and circumstances that led to the injury.
Prevention throughout risk management is adopted by Scandinavian no-fault
patient insurance. This form of clinical transparency and organisational culture
can allow for the acquisition of crucial information that can foster the
establishment of good clinical governance: drafting of guidelines, solution of
systemic and latent errors, and establishment of safeguards in order to prevent
similar damage from affecting patients in the future".
3 The French Dualistic Model of Compensation
3.1 French law before the 2002 reform
The obligation of ineans as the default obligation of the treatment provider. The
compensation of inedical injury in France before the 2002 reform was quite
complex. First of all, the liability regime traditionally follows two different legal
regimes - civil law and administrative law - depending upon the private or
public nature of the healthcare provider, each enforced by its own jurisdiction.
[n the civil law regime liability is considered to be of a contractual nature. The
treatment provider is considered to be under an obligation de moyens, i.e., a duty
not to cure the patient, but to give him a conscious, careful treatment according
to the actual status of inedical science'Z. If the treatment provider breaches this
duty, he is deemed negligent (faute). In the public law regime, the standard of
care is similar, though usually the hospital institution is liable (faute de service),
exceptionally a member of the staff, acting with gross negligence, can be held
personally liable (faute détachable du service)"'.
The patient bore the burden of proof of faute and of the link of causation
between treatment and the injury. Causation had to be established with
certainty", though patients could obtain partial compensation in case of an
uncertain causal link under the doctrine ofperte d'une chance de guérison ou de
survie"
4l Grunfeld (2002), 67; Dufwa (1997), 58; Erichsen ( 2001), 356; Oldertz ( 1989), 28; Lahti
(1994), 210; Mikkonen (2002), 1 18; Cascào ( 2004), 103. On this point, cf Chapter 4.
42 Arrêt Mercier, Cass. Civ. 20~OSI1936, D.P. 1936 1, 88.
43 Arrêt Pelletier, T.C. 3I07I1873, Rec. Lebon, 1873, 113.
44 Galand-Carval in Faure~Koziol ( 2001).
45 Lambert-Faivre ( 2004).
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Treatment provider bound by an obligation of result in some circumstances. The
development of the French system for compensation of inedical injury was
based in several shifts that gradually reformed the system by introducing limited
changes, and imposing obligations of result on the treatment provider. This was
the case of the presumptíon of fault (obligation de sécurité médicale) in case of
vaccination accidents~; the presumption of fault (obligation de sécurité
médicale) of the hospital for nosocomial infections, leading to liability for the
hospital unless it proved the infection was caused by an external cause"; the
presumption of fault (obligation de sécurité médicale) if there is an abnormal
functioning of the hospital services, or an organisational mishap"; the specific
compensation fund for contaminated blood (1991)d9.
In addition, the treatment provider was under a duty to compensate patients,
regardless of fault, in case of serious adverse events provided that: i) an
exceptional risk of treatment materialised; ii) the injury had an iatrogenic origin
and iii) the damage was of extreme seriousness5".
These case law shifts, while slowly changing the regime of compensation and
expanding the access of patients to compensation for medical injury, eventually
became a complex, confusing and uncertain regulation, especially due to the
double jurisdiction (civil and administrative, each with its own legal regime)".
3.2 The French system after the 2002 reform
Fault and Solidariry. Nowadays, after the changes operated by the Loi du 4 mars
2002 relative aux droits des maladies et à la qualité du système de santé, a
dualistic system for the compensation of injury emerging from medical
treatment was put into operation.
While fault-based liability is default, some injuries are compensated irrespective
of fault.
The main aims of the reform were: fostering healthcare democracy, improving
the quality of the healthcare system and improving the system of compensation
of injury emerging from medical treatments~. The mechanisms for the
implementation of the latter aim are the simplification and acceleration of
46 Ar;êt Dejoux, C.E. 7~03I1958, Rec. CE. 1958, 153.
47 Administrative liability: arrêt Cohen, C.E. 9I12~1988, Rec. C.E. 1998.431; Civil liability:
arrêt Bonnici, Cass. Civ. lére, 21~OSI1996 , D. 1997, 287.
48 Arrêt Bailly, ]4I06~1991, C.E., R.C.A. 1991, 300 (Administrative liability).
49 Loi du 31 décembre 1991.
50 Administrative liability Arrêt Gomez, T.A. Lyon, 28~06I1989, J.C.P. 199L1L21698;
Arrêt Bianchi, C.E., 9I04I1993, J.C.P., 1993.II.22061.
51 Jourdain (2002), 88; Castelletta (2002), 108. Cf Chapter 3.
52 Laude (2002), 3.
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compensation procedures, claims handling, and unification of the criteria
entitling patients to compensations'.
Side by side with fault-based liability, there is a collective compensation of
treatment accidents and hospital-acquired infections, where it is not necessary to
establish fault, according to the principle of solidarity (Principe de la Solidarieté
Nationale)" throughout a non-litigious dispute resolution procedure"
The Procedure. In the initial phase of the procedure, a regional commission of
conciliation and compensation (Commission régionale de conciliation et
d'indemnisation des accidents médicaux, des affections iatrogènes et des
infections nosocomiales) is seized by the aggrieved patient or, in case of death
ofthe patient, by the bereaved relatives~.
The commission, after evaluating the injury with the help of a board of experts,
verifies whether the injury sustained by the patient is eligible for compensation
under the principle of solidarity57, where fault does not need to be established.
Besides deciding which is the applicable liability regime, this recommendation
of the commission, to be handed out within a term of six monthsSH, also focuses
on the circumstances, causes, nature and extent of the injury59.
If the injury qualifies for the exceptional regime of compensation under the
principle of solidarity, the national office for compensation of treatment
accidents (ONIAM: Office national d 'indemnisation des accidents médicaux,
des affections iatrogènes et des infections nosocomiales) offers the patient a
settlement for full compensation of the injury`~. If the patient disagrees with the
terms of the settlement, she can appeal from that recommendation to a court of
lawb'.
However, the commission may consider that the injury is not eligible for
compensation under the principle of solidarity, but instead, a healthcare
professionaló2 or a treatment-providing organisation is responsible for the injury
under the fault principle~'. In this case, the insurer of the healthcare professional
53 Laude (2002), 6.
54 L. 1142-1 III Code de la Santé Publique. For more detaíls about the procedure, cf.
Penneau (2002), 124 ff.
55 L. I 142-4 ff Code de la Santé Publique.
56 L. 1 142-7 Code de la Santé Publique. Cf. Lambert-Faivre (2004), 707.
57 The access criteria to compensation under this principle is explained in Chapter 3.
[njuries eligible for compensation under the principle of solidarity are those that are
serious and disproportionate relatively to the treatment performed and the healthcare
status of the patienL Cf L. I 142. I.II Code de la Santé Publique.
58 This [erm is considered very optimistic by Lambert-Faivre (2004), 713.
59 L. I 142-8 Code de la Santé Publique.
60 L. 1142-17 Code de la Santé Publique.
61 L. 1 142-20 Code de la Santé Publique.
62 Acting in Ihe framework of her individual practice.
63 L. 1142-14 Code de la Santé Publique.
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or the treatment-providing organisation is obliged to present the aggrieved
patient a settlement proposal for the full compensation of damages within four
months~'. If the patient accepts the offer of the insurer, the claim is settled, and
the insurer must reimburse the ONIAM of the costs of expertise. If the patient
does not accept it, the patient has a right to seize a court of law. In that case, if
the patient prevails in the lawsuit, the insurer is in addition condemned in a
punitive fee of up to 15a~o of the settlement to the ONIAM. Should the insurer
not present a settlement proposal to the patient, or refuse to do so, the ONIAM
will compensate the patient and have a recourse action against the insurer. In
this case, if the ONIAM prevails in the lawsuit, the insurer is in addition
condemned in the aforementioned punitive fee of up to 15oIo of the amount of
compensationb'
If the recommendation of the commission is not favourable to the compensation
of the injury, neither on grounds of the principle of solidarity, nor on grounds of
the principle of fault, the patient's only choice is to bring a lawsuit to the court
that entertains jurisdiction. This can be an administrative court in case of
treatment performed in the framework of a public treatment-providing
organisation, or a judicial court in case of an independent liberal professional or
a private treatment-providing organisation~`.
Institutional Liability. It is also important to stress an important feature of the
French System. Under the doctrine of faute de service, it is the treatment-
providing organisation, not the individual healthcare professional that is,
normally, the only first-line liable partyh'.
Only exceptionally can a healthcare professional, acting in the framework of a
hospital or clinic, be held personally liable. Just if the fault incurred by the
healthcare professional is very hefty and of exceptional seriousness, can the
healthcare professional be personally held liableb".
Prevention. The French model combines two approaches to prevention. While
maintaining institutional accountability and, to some extent, individual
accountability by maintaining a system of incentives related to the principle of
fault, it creates good conditions for a preventive strategy based on risk-
managementby.
64 L. 1142-14 Code de la Santé Publique.
65 L. I 142-IS and 1142-16 Code de la Santé Publique.
66 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 713.
67 Unless the healthcare professional acts in the framework of his liberal activity. Cf.
Lambert-Faivre (2004), 722.
68 This is the doctrine offaute détachable du service. Cf. Arrêt Pelletier, T.C., 30I071] 873,
Rec. Lebon, 1873, I 13; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 723.
69 Art. L. 1414-1 Code de la Santé Publique.
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3.3 The Belgian Dossier
The Belgian legislature is currently debating a draft statute that proposes the
implementation of a compensation system following the footsteps of the French
model'o. The draft proposes a dualistic compensation system very similar to the
French model.
4 Follow-up
Now that the main features and the procedural aspects of the models analysed
were presented, the next chapter explains the access requisites of entitlement to
compensation.
70 Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaat, Proposition de loi organisant 1'indemnisation des
accidents médicaux sans faule médicale~ Wetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van
medische ongevallen aonder medische fout 3-21311; 19~09I2003; Sénat de
BelgiqueBelgische Senaat, Proposition de loi organisan! la réparation des accidents
thérapeuliques~Wetsvoorste! tot vergoeding van de schade veroorzaakt b~





In order to ascertain entitlement to compensation awards for treatment related
injury, there is a set of tests to verify whether the injury suffered by the patient is
eligible for compensation. These tests consist of conformity with certain criteria
that qualify the injury as compensable.
Entitlement criteria vary according to the systems. In negligence systems, the
aggrieved patient will have in particular to prove fault and causation. In no-fault
systems, causation and preventability (avoid ability in the Scandinavian
terminology) ofthe injury are the key criteria.
2 Standard of Care
2.1 Breach of Duty ofCare
In negligence systems, the basic benchmark of compensation is fault. In
England, this consists ofbreach ofa duty of care owed to the patient. The breach
ofthis duty consists of non-conformity with a standard of care established by the
law. The existence of a duty of care, the breach of that duty (lack of conformity
with a standard of care set by law) and a link of causation are the elements
"which together make up any successful negligence claim"'.
2.2 The Standard of Care in the Common Law
In England, the duty of care is benchmarked by the "standard of the ordinary
skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill"Z. This is an
objective standard: "The standard of care is objective and impersonal in the
sense that it eliminates the personal equation and is independent of the
idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question"'.
The Bolam test does not demand that the professional employ his best efforts,
but just the ordinary skill of an average practitioner. Thus, the treatment
provider will not be held liable insofar as he acted "in accordance with a practice
1 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 74.
2 McNair J. in Bolam v. Friem H.M.C. [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586.
3 Lord MacMillan at 457 in Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [ 1943] AC 448.
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accepted as proper by a responsible body of inedical men skilled in that
particular area (...) a men is not negligent merely because there is a body of
opinion that would take a contrary view"`.
In this case, the patient, Mr. Bolam underwent electroconvulsive therapy in a
psychiatric hospital. He fractured a hip, as he was neither strapped to the chair
nor under anaesthetics. While one reputed body of professional opinion
acknowledged that procedure in accordance with generally accepted medical
practice, another equally reputed body of opinion held that the patient should
have been strapped, which would have prevented the ínjury. According to the
stream that was eventually accepted, strapping the patient or administering him
muscle-relaxing drugs would have reduced the efficiency of treatment. The jury
retumed a verdict favourable to the defendants.
The court decided that there is no negligence insofar as a respectable stream of
medical opinion, even if it is an infrequent view, agrees with the manner
treatment was carried outs. This meant that, in English law, traditionally the
courts followed the opinion of inedical evidence provided by expertise,
discarding negligence whenever expertise would substantiate that a respectable
stream of inedical opinion would uphold the treatment under scrutiny~.
This doctrine was further upheld in further case law, in the sense that the
preference of the judge for one stream, deemed by her as more reasonable than
the other, would not be enough to qualify a certain treatment as negligent,
irrespective of the statistical expression of that stream of inedical opinion'. This
is criticised, as "experts may blind themselves with expertise"e. This author
considers that treatment providers should be held liable for failure to take
precautions against risks known to the profession, or reasonable risks.
A shift in the case law did not happen before the 1998 leading case Bolitho v.
City and Hackney Health Authoriry, when a reasonability test was introduced to
ascertain the standard of care, irrespective of the scrutinized treatment being
upheld by an accepted stream of inedical opiniony. Thus, expertise can be now
overruled, if the court decides that treatment, in spite of being executed
4 Bolam v. Friern H.M.C. [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586. The doctrine of Bolam was confirmed
by further case law: Whítehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267, [1981] 1 WLR 246
(HL); Maynard v West Midlands RHA [1985J 1 All ER 635. Cf Kennedy~Grubb (2000);
Brazier (2003), 144; Grubb in MarkesinislDeakin (2003), 314.
5 Bolam v. Friern H.M.C. [1957J 1 WLR 582, 586.
6 Brazier (2003), ]46.
7 Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 634; De Freitas v. 0'Brien [1993] 4
Med. L.R. 281, CA; Sidaway v. Royal Betlehem Hospital [1984] 2 WLR 778, CA.
8 Montrose (1958), 259.
9 Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1998J AC 232, HL.
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according to generally accepted practice, unreasonably and unnecessarily puts
the patient to risk'o
The criterion in Ireland is similar to the English one, though the court is not
bound by medical expertise, as was the case in England before the doctrine of
Bolitho".
2.3 The Standard of Care in Civil Law Countries
In German law, the standard of care (Sorgfaltsmaf3stab)'Z of a treatment provider
states that he must act like a competent, wise and sensible qualified treatment
provider, carrying out treatment in conformity with currently accepted medical
science and practice (Stand der Wissenschaft und Technik), according to the
underlying specific circumstances of the case". A treatment provider is held
liable insofar as it committed a treatment error (Behandlungsfehler). A treatment
error is equivalent to a breach of standard of care which is objective
(Gruppenfahrlássigkeit). According to this standard, the treatment provider must
act according to the care, skills and abilities expected from its profession. The
standard is that of an average treatment provider of that field, acting according
to accepted medical practice (Stand der medizinischen Wissenschaft)". The
standard ofcare is evaluated in court with the help of inedica] expertise15.
This definition contains two elements: a subjective element that consists of the
duty of the treatment provider to act as a competent, wise and reasonable
professional and an objective element related to the standards of inedical science
and practice. Katzenmeier identified a trend in German Law in the last 30 years
towards privileging the objective element while ascertaining the breach of the
duty of care due to the patient. This author points out that it simplifies claims
procedure, because the test of breach of the duty of care consists thus of the
compliance of the treatment provider with professional regulation, standards,
protocols and good practices' ~.
The standard of care in medical liability is understood in a similar manner in
other Civil Law countries in Europe".
10 KennedylGrubb (2000), 441; Brazier (2003), 149.
l l Daniels v. Heskin [1954] IR 73; Dunne v. National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91;
[1989] ILRM 735; cf. Tomkin~-Ianafin (1995), 72.
12 Cf ~276 BGB.
13 Gehrlein (2000), 32; Katzenmeier (2002), 272; Laufs~Uhlenbruck ( 1999), 852.
14 Cf. Gehrlein 2000, 32; Laufs~Uhlenbruck 1999, 854.
IS BGH NJW 1999, 1778; BGH NJW 1999, 863; BGH NJW 1995, 776.
16 Katzenmaier (2002), 277.
17 GREECE [Foundedaki (1996), 182; Art. 330 and 914 Greek Civil Code; Art. 8 Greek
Consumer protection Law 225 U1994; Art. 24 A.N. 156511939]; SPAIN [STS 11 March
1991, RJ 1991, 2209]; [TALY [Art. 117612 Codice Civile; Alpa (1999), 19; Vincenzo
(2000), 1173; Fortino (1985), 42]; Austria [~1299 ABGB; Reischauer in Rummel
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2.4 Modulation of the Standardof Care
The standard of care can be modulated in light of experience or circumstances.
A specialist healthcare provider is bound by a more stringent standard of care18,
though normally inexperience is not a valid defence". Inexperienced healthcare
providers are expected to follow the standard of care of a reasonable and
experienced doctor. However, everybody commits mistakes while learning, and
the training of healthcare providers benefits society as a whole, and patients in
particular. It can thus be questioned whether inexperienced healthcare
professionals should really be expected to comply with the general standard of
care"'. Problems often occur with the supervision of interns21. In addition,
circumstances such as emergency treatment or environmental issues can lower
the standard of care.
The failure to meet the standard of care may be founded on different factual
bases, like failing to attend the patient, errors in diagnosis, communication with
other professionals, errors in treatment23.
3 Avoid ability (Preventability) of Treatment Injury
3.1 Culpa neutral entitlement criteria
Scandinavian no-fault Patient Insurance Schemes do not require the breach of
the duty of care (fault) to be established as a requisite for compensation. A
distinctive feature of these systems is that they are culpa neutra123.
They do not however compensate all personal injuries sustained by the patient in
connection to medical treatment. In principle, only preventable (avoidable)
iatrogenic injuries are covered, i.e., those caused by diagnosis or treatment
Kommentar ad ~1299]; THE NETHERLANDS [Art. 7:453 Burgerlijk Wetboek; HR 9-
11-1990, NJ 1991, 26 (5peeckaertlGradener)]; PORTUGAL [Art. 48712 and 79912
Código Civil; STA 17I06193, A.D. XXXVII, 436; MonteiroNeloso (2001), 176;
DiaslMonteiro (1984), 23; Dias (1996), 29; Gaspaz (1978), 346].
18 Giesen (2000), 96; KennedylGrubb (2000), 418; Gaspar (1978), 346; MonteiroNeloso
(2001), 176; Lord Scarman in Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635;
Defreitas v. O'Brien [1985]; BGH NJW 1998, 814; BGH NJW 1991, 1535; BGH NJW
1996, 779; BGH NJW 1987, 1479; BGH NJW 1984, 6SS; O'Donovan v Cork CC [1967]
IR 173 (Irish Supreme Court).
19 Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1987] QB 730, [1986] 3 All ER 801.
20 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson's dissent in Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1987] QB 730,
[ 1986] 3 All ER 801.
21 The vincristine cases such as R. v. Prentice and another, R. v. Adomako, R. v. Holloway
[ 1993] 4 All ER 935; CMO (2000), 2S; MenylSmith (2001), 18.
22 KennedylGrubb (2000), 425.
23 Pichler (1994), 27.
48
Access Criteria
itself, not those caused by the illness itself or its not7rtally predictable
developmentZ'.
In addition, minor injuries are not covered by the scheme, as there is a bagate(le
threshold of seriousness of injuries redress able by the schemeZS. Other
restrictions may apply, such as compensation of physical injury only (e.g.
excluding psychical injury)Z~, or the exclusion of injury caused by
pharmaceutical drugsZ'.
Section 6 of the Swedish Patient Insurance Act sets the access criteria to
compensation-8. In Denmark these can be found in ~2 of the Danish Patient
24 ~6 ( I) SPL; ~2 (1) FPL; ~ 1(1) DPL; Grilnfeld (2002), 68.
25 In Sweden those injuries causing 30 days of working incapacity, those causing 10 days
of extension of hospitalisation, those causing irreversible damage, and those causing the
death of the patient. The threshold is 700 SKR (76.29 Euro). Cf Pichler (1994), 375. In
Finland ~3 FPL contains a general clause establishing that minor injuries are not to be
covered by the scheme. The threshold was set casuistically at 500 FIM (84.1 Euro). Cf.
Pichler (1994), ibidem. In Denmark, ~5 (2) DPL sets the bagatelle injury threshold at 10
000 DKK (1346 Euro). The threshold was 20 000 DKK (2692 Euro) before the 1999
amendment of the DPL. The bagatelle threshold is much higher (around 17 times more)
than in the other Scandinavian schemes, and that disproportion was criticised. Cf.
Erichsen (2001), 359; Pichler (1994), ibidem; KrenchelBroberg (1995). Cf Chapter 5
(3).
26 ~ 1(1) DPL; Erichsen (2001), 359.
27 ~7 (2) SPL. Such injuries are subject to a dedicated no-fault pharmaceutical insurance
scheme.
28 "Compensation is paidfor personal injury to patients if the injuries wilh preponderanl
probability were caused by (1) examination, care, lrealment or similar measure provided
[hat the injury could have been avoided eilher by a different performance oj[he chosen
procedure or by choosing some other available procedure which according to an
assessment made retroactively jrom a medical point of view would have satisfred !he
need ojlreatment in a less ha:ardous way; (2) defects in the medico-technical products
or hospilal equipment used in the perjormance of an examinalion, care, treatment or
similar measure, or improper use lhereof,- (3) an incorrec! diagnosis; (4) transfer oja
contagious substance en[ailing injection in connection with an examination, care,
treatment or similar measure; (5) accidents in connection with an examination, care,
treatment or similar measure or during a palient transport or in connection with afrre or
olher damage to health care premises or equipment; or (6) prescription or provision of
pharmaceuticals in contravention ojregulations or instructions. When considering the
right to compensation in accordance with the frrstparagraph,items 1 and 3, the guiding
principle of ac[ion applicable is lhat of an experienced specialist or other experienced
practitionerwithin the field. There is no right to compensation in accordance with item
4 of the frrst paragraph in lhose cases where the circumstances are such !ha! the
injection must reasonably be tolerated. In that connection regard shal! be paid to the
nature and degree ojseverity of the illness or injury which the measure is related to, the




Insurance Act'y and in Finland in ~2 of the Finnish Patient Insurance Act'o
3.2 Preventabiliry
After the negative criterion is applied, it is investigated whether there is a link of
causation between the treatment carried out and the injury sustained by the
patient". If this link of causation is established, the preventability or avoid
ability (Oundviklighetskriteriet, Oundgáelighedskriteriet) test is operated.
Preventability is one of the grounds of compensation under Scandinavian no-
fault Patient [nsurance Schemes.
This test consists in determining whether this injury could have been avoided,
i.e. prevented, if an experienced specialist (Specialist Rule) would have acted
differently, if defects or failure of equipment had not occurred (Equipment
Rule), or if another technique or method of treatment could have been chosen
29 "Compensation shall be paid if the injury was, on a preponderance of evidence, caused
in one of the jollowing wavs: (!) if it may be assumed that an experienced specialist in
the field in question wouÍd in the given circumstances have acted differently during
examination, treatment or the like, thereby avoiding lhe injury; (2J if the injury is due to
the maljunction or failure of lechnical apparatus, instruments or other equipment used
for or in connection with examinalion, treatmenl or the like; (2J if, on !he basis of a
subsequent evaluation, the injury might have been avoided using another available
treatment technique or treatment method that would have been just as effective in
lreating !he patient's illness jrom a medical point of view, or (3) if injury occurs as the
result of examination, including diagnostic procedures, or treatmenl in the form of
infecttons or other complications lhat are more extensive than the patient should
reasonably have to endure. Account must be taken in this respect of the severity of the
injury, the patient's illness and general state of health, the unusualness of the injury and
the genera! possibility of taking the risk of its occurrence into consideration ". Cf.
httpaluk. patientforsikringen. dWlegislationlthepatientinsuranceact. html
30 "Compensation shall be paid for bodilv injuries which are likely to result from: (lJ an
examination or treatment of a patient or other similar action [aken or neglected,
providing that an experienced health care professional would have examined, treated or
taken other similar action in respect of the patient in another manner and would thereby
probablv have avoided the injury; (2) a deject in the equipment or device used for an
ezamination, trealment or olher similar action; (3J an Infectton which originatesfrom an
examination, treatment or other similar action, unless the patient has to tolerate the
injury in view of the predictabiliry of the infection, !he severity of the injurv sustained,
the nature of the disease or injurv that was being [reated and the patient's overall
health; (4) an accident which is connected with an examination, treatment or other
similar action, orjrom an injury occurredduring the transfer of lhe patient; (SJ afrre or
olher similar damage affecting either the premises where the patient is being treated or
the equipment used for the treatment; (6) delivery of pharmaceuticals contrary to the
provisions of laws or decrees or regulations; (7J an examination, treatment or other
similar action, providing that the action has resulted in a permanent, severe disease or
injury, or death, and the consequence can be considered unreasonable in view of the
severity of the injury, the nature of the disease or injury that was being treated, the
patient's overall health, the rariry of the injury and the extent of risk in individual
cases " Translation of Mikkonen ín DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 199.
31 Cf Scction 6
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(Alternative Rule)12. These three rules were systematised by Danish literature
and this method can be extended to the other Scandinavian patient insurance
schemes. These rules are explained below.
The test in older Swedish literature consisted on whether the injury could be
compensated if it was inappropriate from a medical point of view, or if it was
deemed appropriate, if the injury could not have been avoided if the patient had
been treated as effectively in another way". It must be noted, however, that in
some circumstances unavoidable injury can be compensated under the scheme,
as can be seen below'".
The assessment of the preventability of the injury looks similar to the standard
of care in the negligence model. However, in this latter model, the preventability
of the injury is assessed ex ante, according to the facts and knowledge of the
treatment provider at the time medical treatment took place, while in no-fault
patient insurance schemes it is assessed ex post (the doctrine of
facitrcesonnementet (hindsight). The injury is deemed preventable, if in
hindsight, at the time the Patient Insurance Association investigates the injury,
with the ex post facto knowledge of the development of the underlying illness
and the consequences of treatment, it results that, had the skill of the
experienced specialist been used, the injury would have been prevented35. In a
Swedish case, a patient treated by a physiotherapist acquired an injury related to
the underlying malfunctioning in the kneecap. Some treatment was necessary
though, and the patient gave informed consent before treatment began. The
Patient Insurance Board ascertained that had this malfunctioning been known at
the time of treatment by a specialist physiotherapist (specialist rule, see below in
3.3), an alternative treatment would have been carried out (alternative rule, see
below in 3.5). The injury was compensated7ó.
Pichler points out some criticisms to preventability as an access criterion. This
considers the concept too fluid, too immaterial and somewhat casuistic. There
are too many "if's" and conditional tenses in their fattispecie. Though abstract,
these concepts have proven to work, and decisions of Patient Insurance Boards
have delimited their scope adequately".
3.3 The Specialist Rule (specialistregeln, specialistmálestokken)
According to the Specialist Rule, compensation is awarded if it can be presumed
that if the optimal care and skill of the best specialist, within the treatment
32 Pichler ( 1994), 329; Oldertz ( 1989), 24; Hellner (1985), 709; Erichsen ( 2001), 360,
Grunfeld ( 2002), 70.
33 Oldertz ( 1989), 21; Hellner ( 1985), 711.
34 Cf. Section 5.
35 Dute in Dute~F'aure~ICoziol ( 2004), 464; Hellner ( 1985), 71 l; Pichler (1994), 341.
36 PSN 44~1977 cited by Hellner ( 1985), 71 l.
37 Pichler ( 1997), 188.
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options available, had been employed, the injury would not have materialised3e.
This rule is broadly used in regards to wrong diagnosis and treatment
omissions39.
At a first glance, the specialist rule appears similar to the standard of care in the
negligence model'o. Yet, the specialist criterion differs from the standard of care
in negligence systems, in the sense that it is culpa neutral. The healthcare
provider's conduct is compared to that of the best specialist possible, instead of
- as it is the case in a negligence system - that of a comparable healthcare
provider. A patient's claim is therefore awarded more easily in a no-fault
system. The decisive difference between the standard of care in negligence and
the specialist rule consists of the aforementioned ex post evaluation of the
preventability of the injury under the doctrine offacitrcesonnementet.
Illustrations. In a Swedish case, a patient had had a tumour in the axils for over
20 years. When the patient underwent surgery, a nerve was injured. The tumour
proved, after the surgery, to be benign, and the patient received compensation,
as a good specialist, had he known with the benefit of hindsight that the tumour
was benign, would not have can-ied out the surgery, as it would be unjustified".
In the Danish case Vestre Landsrets dom af 7. November 2001, compensation
was awarded to a patient that underwent surgery in a provincial hospital, and
because of a complication, his foot became paralyzed. It was held, that had he
been operated in the neurosurgery department of a general hospital, specialised
care would probably have avoided the complication".
In another Danish case, a cracking occurred in the femur in connection with an
artificial hip replacement operation. Worsening of that condition occurred, and
was found to be linked to the operation. However it was not recognized under
the specialist rule because an experienced specialist would not have acted
differently. Nor was it shown that the patient's discomfort could have been
avoided by choosing another treatment, according to the alternative rule".
38 ~2 (1.1) DPL; ~2 (2.1) FPL ~6 (l.l). SPL differs from DPL and FPL as the judgment of
the specialist skill is tested according to hindsigh[ (faci[rcesonnement). In the Swedish
scheme, the test is whether if, according to the data available atter the injury has
happened, the experienced specialist would have been able to prevent the injury, whereas
in the Finnish and Danish schemes, that test is reported to the data that presumably
would be known by the specialist at the time the injury occurred. Cf. Erichsen (2001),
360; Pichler (1994), 338; Grunfeld (2002), 70.
39 Erichsen (2001), 362.
40 Bernat (1998, 122; Danzon (1994), 210.
41 PSN 47~1976 cited by Hellner (1985), 71 I.




In yet another Danish case, an experienced laboratory technician would not have
left the patient outside without supervision afrer she had become unwell when a
blood sample was taken. As a consequence, the patient fainted and sustained an
injury to her jaw and teeth".
3.4 The Eyaripment Rule
The equipment rule, (Apparaturregeln), applies to injuries caused by
defectiveness or failure of treatment equipment, instruments and devices. This
topic will be developed below".
3.5 The Alternative Rule
Under the alternative rule (Alternativregeln), compensation is awarded if the
injury could have been avoided should another treatment technique or method,
available at the time, with an equivalent effectiveness, was used instead of the
treatment that was carried out4ó. Three conditions must be fulfilled"':
i) at the time treatment was performed, an alternative
technique was available;
ii) at the time treatment was performed, that technique was
considered as equivalent to that which was performed, and
iii) in hindsight it can be assessed that, most probably, had the
alternative technique be used, the patient would not have
suffered that injury.
The manner in which this rule operates is rather complex, and the most
problematic issue is ascertaining whether or not the alternative method is
equivalent to the method chosen. The effectiveness of treatment, the impact of
treatment on the patient, as well as risks involved'", must be taken into
consideration"`'.
Illustrations. In the Danish case cemented prothesis with equivalent alternative,
a patient suffering from progressive osteoarthritis in his hip underwent un-
cemented hip replacement surgery. In the aftermath, the patient suffered intense
pain his thigh. An X-ray examination revealed a reaction around the hip
prosthesis. The patient was then submitted to a new surgery to replace the
existing prosthesis by a cemented one. The Patient Insurance decided that,
44 U2003.1286Ij; http:Iluk.patientforsikringen.dk~legislationljudgements.htmlttid3291598.
45 Cf Chapter 3 (4).
46 ~2 (1, 3) DPL; ~6 (1) SPL. Cf Grunfeld (2002), 75; Eyben (2002), 31; Pichler (1994),
343; Erichsen (2001), 363.
47 Grunfeld (2002), 76.
48 ln SPL the risks of the alternative method must not be higher than those of the chosen
method.
49 Grunfeld (2002), 76; Píchler (1994), 345.
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though treatment was performed wíth the optimal specialist standard according
to Specialistregeln, it could be reasonably presumed that injury could have been
avoided if a cemented prosthesis was inserted in the first place, if that would
have been seen as an alternative equivalent to the un-cemented prosthesis. That
injury was therefore compensated under ~2 (1,3) DPLso
In another Danish case, an injury caused by a drug used for medical treatment
was not compensated according to the alternative rule or the specialist rule,
because an experienced specialist would not have chosen another treatment
method".
In a third Danish case, the loss ofsight caused by alternative treatment of cancer
~vas covered by the alternative rule, as carrying out conventional chemotherapy
could have prevented the injurys'.
4 Defective Input
4.1 Defective input as a factual basis of treatment injury
Defective input contributes very often to treatment injurys'. Modern medicine
resorts to a large extent to sophisticated high technology that heightens
efficiency of treatment, as well as the risks involved". The use of inedical
products such as drugs, vaccines, biological products (blood derivates, tissues,
organs) brings significant risks to patients". A common mistake in hospital
settings involves defective or unclear labelling of drugs, as well as their storage.
4.2 Hospital Acquired Infections
Frequently problems concerning installations, where treatment is performed, can
become the factual basis of treatment injury: this is the case of nosocomial or
hospital acquired infections in installations where medical treatment is
performeds`. Some of these pathogenical agents are drug-resistant.
50 Cementeret hofteprotese med ligeva;rdigt altemativ, 95-1452 1996 Ársb. Cf. Grunfeld





53 1 do not deal with issues regarding products liability, i.e., per se defectiveness of
products, but liability emerging from the duties of treatment providers regarding the use
and maintenance of such equipment or products.
54 Conde (1994), 14; Castelletta (2002), 2; Viney (1997), 108; Pereira (2003), 2; Danzon
(1994), 3; Manuel (2001), 19; Sage (2001), 227; CMO (2000).
55 Lambert-Faivre (2000), 728.
56 Cf. Chapter 1 (3).
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The main conditions that increase the risks of contagion of hospital-acquired
infections are57:
invasive diagnosis or treatment;
prolonged internment;
use of invasíve devices such as intravenous cannulae, urinary
catheters;
surgery;
immunosuppressive treatment such as corticosteroids, chemo-
therapy, transplant immunosuppressant therapy;
antibiotic treatment;
exposure to pathogens transmitted by healthcare workers (like the
MRSA), other patients or the environment.
Preventive measures can be taken in order to reduce the impact of hospital-
acquired infections in a hospital, but the risks arising from these infections can
never be completely eliminated. Such preventive measures may consist of
minimising time between admission and surgical procedures, choosing
appropriate surgical prophylaxis, isolation facilities, screening procedures,
namely of Methicillin-resistant S. Aureus (MRSA), effective hospital cleaning
and desinfection, etcsa.
In Britain approximately 150~0 of all patients acquire develop hospital-related
infections. France has a very advanced system for screening, prevention,
solution and compensation of hospital-acquired infections, that includes central
and regional agencies59, but still, in France the probability of contracting a
serious infection after complex surgery is 330~0. In France, an average of 40,000
nosocomial accidents a year are reported, resulting in 18,000 deaths, twice the
amount of road accidents, which means a morbidity rate of 66 per ten thousand,
and a mortality rate of 3 per ten thousand resulting thereofF". However, in
Denmark only 20~0 ofpatients contract a hospital-acquired infectionb'.
57 Cf. BannisterBegglGillespie (2000), 416; NAO ( 2000).
58 Cf. BannisterBegglGillespie (2000), 416.
59 Centres intercégionaux de coordenation de la lutte contre les infections nosocomiales;
Comíté technique national des infections nosocomiales}. Cf L. 1413-14; R. 711-1-1 ff.
Code de la Santé Publique.
60 France: road accidents: 1,27 per ten thousand; domestic accidents 0,67 per ten thousand.
It must be bore ín mind, that statistics can vary, perhaps not because of statistical
occurrence of the nosocomial infec[ion cases, but because of the statistical perception of
these infections.
61 Kouchner 2002; Cascào 2004, 97; Lambert-Faivre (2000), 724; Tabouteau (2002), 317.
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4.3 The approach to compensation of injury related to the use of defective
equipment in Negligence Systems
The different systems differ in how they address liability for treatment injury
that has the use of defective equipment, devices or material as a factual basis.
According to the traditional position of negligence systems, injury emerging
from the use of defective input is only compensated if the treatment provider
breached its standard of care while operating and maintaining treatment
equipment.
However, there is a trend in many negligence systems towards a more stringent
liability of treatment providers for treatment injury emerging from the use of
defective equipment. For instance, in Germany, the burden of proof is shifted
provided that the defectiveness of the equipment, device or material could have
been prevented`2. In Spain, strict liability has been frequently imposed in this
situationR', while in Portugal fault is presumed in case of use of equipment
considered dangerous by nature, unless the treatment provider proves that all
care was used to prevent injury (e.g. X-ray equipment)~`.
4.4 The approach to compensation of injury related to the use of defective
equipment in Scandinavian systems
In Scandinavian Patient Insurance Schemes, treatment injury caused by a defect
or failure in technical equipment, instruments or other devices used in
connection with examination or treatment, is compensated according to the
Equipment Rule (Apparaturregeln)R5. The responsibility is totally objective, and
no criterion must be met regarding the causes underlying the defect or failure~.
4. S The approach to compensation of injury related to the use of defective
eguipment in the French system
In France it is traditionally considered that the treatment provider is under an
obligation de résultat de securité linked to the use of inedical products and
devíces, which results in a presumption of fault of the treatment provider~'.
62 BGH NJW 1978, 584; OLG Hamm NJW 1999, 1787. Cf LaufslUhlenbruck (1999), 902;
Gehrlein (2000), 52; Katzenmeier (2002), 423.
63 STS 26-OS-1997 (RAC 879I1997); STS O1-07-97; STS 21-07-97. The latter judgments
imposed strict liability upon the treatment provider applying art. 1, 25, 26 and 28 LCU.
64 Cf Art. 493 (2) Código Civil; DiaslNlonteiro ( 1984), 38; MonteiroNeloso (2001), 176.
65 ~2 (l,2) DPL; ~6 (1,2) SPL; ~2 (1,2) FPL. The Swedish act includes the incorrect use of
equipment.
66 Grunfeld (2002) 75; Pichler (1994) 347; Oldertz ( 1989) 23; Erichsen (2001) 362; Dufwa
(1997) 69; Lahti (1994) 212.; Hellner (1985) 709; Brahams (1989) 79.
67 Regarding the use of defective medical devices: Cass. lre civ., 9Il I11999: D. 2000, 117
note P. Jourdain; JCP G 200Q, II, 10251, note P Bruin; Cass. Ire civ., D. 1968, 654 note
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There are some doubts whether the obligations of result developed by case law
regarding the use of defective equipment are still valid after the changes in the
law operated by the 2002 reformb"
The Code de la Santé Publique states that the use of defective medical products
is one of the exceptions to the fault principle, and as such, treatment providers
are strictly liable for the use of those products. Jourdain~9 argues that medical
devices and equipment are included in the broad category of inedical products as
the law defines it, and that as such, treatment providers are strictly liable for
injuries caused by defective equipment, devices and instruments'o. However,
Lambert-Faivre, while holding the existence of a strict liability of treatment
providers for the use of defective equipment, sets that strict liability on the
grounds of the doctrine of responsabilité médicale du fait des choses utilisées ou
fournies".
4.6 The approach to compensation of injury related to hospital-acquired
infections in Negligence systems
The position of traditional negligence systems on hospital-acquired infections is
similar to the more general position on the topic of defective input. Negligence
in providing a hygienic environment must be proven by the plaintiff.
However, in Germany, there is a shift of the burden of proof to the treatment
provider, who must prove that he took all the adequate hygienic measures to
prevent hospital-acquired infections in the premises72.
In Spain, if the patient proves that if she was not infected before admission, it is
presumed that the infection occurred at the hospital, and therefore the hospital is
held liable. This presumption cannot be rebutted".
4.7 The approach to compensation of injury related to hospital-acquired
infections in Scandinavian systems
In Scandinavian Patient Insurance schemes, injury resulting from hospital-
acquired infections can be normally compensated according to the avoid ability
rules, provided that it can be reasonably presumed that they could have been
prevented. If the injury caused by the infection could not have been prevented,
René Savatier. CC Lambert-Faivre (2000) 728-736; Castelletta ( 2002) 108; Tabouteau
(2002) 257; Art. L.l 142-1 Code de la Santé Publique.
68 Jourdain (2002), 88.
69 Jourdain (2002), 89.
70 Art. L. 5311-1 Code de la Santé Publique.
71 Cf Lambert-Faivre (2004), 813.
72 BGH NJW 1991, 1541; BGH NJW 1999, 3408.
73 SAP Madrid 5-10-1995(RACa421~1996).
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the patient can still be compensated according to the reasonableness rule", if that
injury is deemed unendurable. Injury resulting from such infections must be
rare, serious, and be excessive relatively to what the patient should reasonably
be expected to tolerate.
The main criterion to adjudicate injuries under the reasonableness rule is the
disproportion between the nature of treatment performed and the injury suffered
as a consequence thereof.
4.8 The approach to compensation of injury related to hospital-acquired
infections in the French system
The French system is very sensible to the problem of compensation of hospital-
acquired infections. The awareness and surveillance of the national healthcare
system, as well as the fact that such infections cause more accidental deaths than
vehicle, working and domestic accidents certainly contribute to that sensibility.
Hence, case law in France tended to impose a presumption of fault in case of
hospital-acquired infections based on an obligation determinée de résultat75.
The only defence that the treatment provider could oppose was the endogenous
character of the infection, i.e., that the patient carried the infective pathogenic
agent, which is quite difficult to prove.
After the 2002 reform, this case law has been confirmed. According to the Code
de la Santé Publique, treatment providing organisations are liable for injury
caused to patients by hospital-acquired infections, unless they prove that the
infection had an external cause'~. This is one of the exceptional situations where
treatment providers are held strictly liable for injuries caused to the patient: the
treatment providing organisation bears the burden of proving that an external
cause- for instance, the patient being infected before admission- caused the
injury".
While the initial system of the Loi du 4 mars 2002 established that the
compensation of injuries caused by hospital-acquired infections would be borne
74 ~2 (1,4) DPL; ~6 (3) SPL; ~2 (1,3) FPL. Cf Grunfeld (2002) 78; Mikkonen (2001) 347;
Oldertz (1989) 23; Dufwa (1997) 71.
75 Cass. ]re civ., 29I06I1999, Staphilocoques dorés, J.C.P. 1999.IL10138 rapport Sargos,
Gazette du Palais, 29-30 oct. 1999, 37 : "Attendu qu'un médecin est tenu, vis-à-vis de
son patient, en matière d'infection nosocomiale, d'une obligation de securité de résultat,
dont il ne peut se libérer qu'en rapportant la preuve d'une cause étrangère. "; Cass. lre
civ., 21~OSI1996, D. 1997, Som. P. 287 (arrët Bonicci); C.E. 9112I1988, arrêt Cohen;
C.E. 1~03I1989, arrêt Bailly; C.E. 14~06I1991, arrêt Maalem. Cf Lambert-Faivre (2000)
723; Castelletta (2002) 109; Jourdain (2002) 90.
76 Art. L. 1142-1 Code de la Santé Publique: "Les établissements, services ou organismes
sousmentionées sont, responsables des dommages resultant d'infections nosocomiales,
sauf s'ils rapportent la preuve d'une cause étrangère".
77 Jourdain (2002), 90; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 784.
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by the treatment providers and their insurers under the principle of fault, due to
the pressure of the insurance companies, the system was changed in December
20027e. Since this revision, the treatment provider is only liable for injuries
caused by hospital-acquired infections up to a ceiling of 24a~o permanent
incapacity. The compensation of more serious injuries is borne by the ONIAM,
the national agency in charge of compensation of inedical adverse events, under
the principle of solidarity79. The ONIAM has an action of recourse against the
insurer of the treatment-providing organisation, if that organisation violated
bluntly its duties regarding the prevention of hospital-acquired infections~.
5 Treatment Accidents
S.1 Negligence Systems
Injury emerging from medical treatment often results from adverse events that
occurred irrespective of the fact that treatment was carried out impeccably.
Sometimes, such medical accidents cause dramatic consequences.
They are not traditionally compensated by negligence systems, which require
that a breach of the healthcare provider's duty of care to the patient concurred to
the materialization of the injury in order to award that patient compensation.
This is related to the fault principle: casum sentit dominus, i.e., losses should lie
where they falL Thus, injury caused by adverse events due to chance, or aléa
therapeutique, are not traditionally compensated by negligence systems, unless
there is a sound reason to pass on that loss to the treatment providera'. As such,
in negligence systems, insofar as the treatment provider carried out treatment
flawlessly, the losses emerging from the injury should be borne by the patient.
These will probably be covered by social security, which operates according to a
different rationale while awarding compensation82.
5.2 Scandinavian Systems
Scandinavian Patient [nsurance Schemes compensate medical mishaps in the
framework of the reasonableness rule (rimelighedsregeln), whenever these
injuries are unavoidable. Unendurable injury resulting from such mishaps must
be rare (e.g. the Danish patient insurance uses a 20~o probability as a rule of
thumb), serious, and exceed what the patient can reasonably be expected to
tolerate.
78 Loi no 2002-1577 du 30 décembre 2002 relative à la responsabilité civile médicale. Cf.
Lambert-Faivre (2004), 825.
79 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 825.
80 Art. L. 1 142-17 Code de la Santé Publique.
81 Katzenmeier (2002), 153; Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 42.
82 Faure and Hartlief in Magnus (2003), 230.
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The main criterion to adjudicate injuries under the reasonableness rule is the
disproportion between the nature of treatment performed and the injury suffered
as a consequence thereof'.
.5.3 French System
The evolution of the compensation ojtreatment accidents. French case law and
doctrine was very sensible in the last two decades to the problems posed by non-
faulty individual medical accidents, the aléa thérapeutique.
The following two leading cases operated a shift in the case law of the
administrative jurisdiction, and such accidents could be compensated provided
that some conditions were met"':
the treatment performed is recent and its consequences are not
well known, or treatment risks are well known, but considered
exceptional;
the injury is iatrogenic, i.e. is not related to the underlying health
condition or its evolution and
the injury suffered by the patient is of extreme seriousness.
The first leading case: Arrêt Gomez. In this case, a 15 years old patient woke up
from spine correction surgery as a paraplegic. The surgery he had undergone
was a recent therapy, the risks of which were not perfectly known. It could not
be proven that surgery was not performed flawlessly. The patient was
compensated, as the court considered that a recent therapy was performed, the
risks of which were not well known, and that its adoption was not imposed by
vital reasons, and caused extremely serious complicationsB7
The second leading case: Arrêt Bianchi. In this case, the patient was
administered an iodine contrast product during a diagnostic examination called
artheriography. While treatment was seamlessly executed, an obstruction
secondary to the exam, an exceptional but nevertheless risk immanent to this
intervention, caused the patient the paralysis of the inferior members, intense
chronic pain, and sphincter dysfunction. This caused him to become dependant
from the constant help of another person. The court compensated this patient, as
the execution of treatment was the direct cause of this iatrogenic injury, which
can be qualified as extremely severe~.
83 ~ 2 (1,4) DPL; ~2 (1,7) FPL. The reasonableness rule only applies to infections under
SPL. Grunfeld ( 2002), 78; Mikkonen (2001), 350; Erichsen ( 2001), 364.
84 Moreau (1997), 17; Lambert-Faivre ( 2000), 718; Paley-Vincent (2002), 175; Tabouteau
(2002), 226; Saison (1999), 67.
85 C.A. Lyon, 21I12I1990, R.C.A. 1991, 151, Arrêt Gomez.
86 C.E. 9I1211993, D. 1994, somm. 65 obs. P. Bon et P. Terneyre, arrêet Bianchi.
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The Status after the 2002 reform. In the aftermath of the 2002 reform of French
medical liability, adverse events that are not attributed to faulty treatment and
that do not fit into the two situations where strict liability is imposed- hospital-
acquired infections, use of defective products or instruments and clinical trials-
can be compensated under the principle of solidarity"'.
Medical adverse events (accidents médicaux) not attributable to fault can be
compensated by the ONIAM, the central agency of compensation of inedical
adverse events, provided that they meet the following requisites"":
i. The adverse event is the outcome of preventive, diagnostic
or therapeutic treatment actions;
ii. The adverse event does not result from negligent treatment;
iii. As a result of the adverse event, the patient has suffered
abnormal consequences in light of her health status and its
normal development and
iv. The magnitude of the injury suffered by the patient is
above a threshold of gravity set by the law.
The seriousness threshold was set at 24a~o permanent disability, or a working
disability of one month. The statutory instrument that set the threshold covers in
detail specific categories of injury that also qualify for compensation under the
principle of solidarity"'. The threshold of 240~o has been criticised, as it excludes
as much as 950~0 of the victims from obtaining compensation~.
6 Breach of the Duty to Inform
6. I The dury to inform and the doctrine of informed consent
lt is a well established principle in most European legal systems that medical
treatment cannot, unless in exceptional circumstances, be lawfully carried out,
unless the patient has given consent to it, after having been appropriately
informed of his healthcare status, the nature of the treatment, the risks involved
in the proposed treatment, the alternatives to it, as well as the consequences of
refraining from any treatment91. According to article 5 of the Oviedo Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine, "An intervention in the health field may
only be carried out after the person concemed has given free and ínformed
consent to it. This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as
87 Art. L. 1 142-1, II Code de la Santé Publique.
88 Art. L. 1 142-1, II Code de la Santé Publique.
89 Décret no 2003-314 du 4 avril 2003.
90 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 778.
91 Cf Art. 705 PELSC (2005).
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to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and
risks"'~.
The normative rationality of the duty to inform is the protection of the autonomy
and right of self-determination of the patient. The objective of the duty of the
treatment provider to disclose the aforementioned information to the patient is to
allow him to take an autonomous, sound and informed choice about the
therapeutic strategy to be adopted91. The breach of this duty can have
disciplinary, criminal and liability consequences.
6.2 The breach of the duty to inform in negligence systems
In negligence systems, a breach of the duty to inform is a ground for liability of
the treatment provider. Very often patients injured by a medical adverse event
will invoke the breach of this duty in order to be able to invoke a less stringent
standard of proof concerning the sub-standard quality ofthe treatment.
In England, an injured patient can seek compensation for the breach of the duty
to inform either under the tort of battery or under the tort of negligence. Under
the tort of battery, the treatment provider's duty to inform is discharged by
merely informing the patient about the nature of the treatment. The treatment
provider does not need to inform the patient about any risks of treatment or
alternatives to it'". As such, according to KennedylGrubb, the role of the tort of
battery in modern medical law is virtually vestigial and of symbolical deterrence
to doctors completely ignoring the autonomy of their patients95. Of far greater
importance to the liability system are the consequences of the breach of the duty
to inform under the tort of negligence. In thís tort, the duty to inform is a part of
the general standard of care. The treatment provider must disclose as much
information as a responsible body of doctors would disclose~`. This standard
reproduces the general Bolam test: the treatment provider will not be held liable
insofar as a reasonable body of inedical opinion, even if not a majority stream,
would have opted not to disclose that information97. The physician must disclose
all information about significant risks needed to enable the patient to determine
92 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine signed in Oviedo, 4th April 1997.
93 Brazier (2003), 107; Laufs~ilhlenbruck (1999), 459; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 760.
94 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257; Hills v Potter [1983J 3 All ER
716.
95 KennedylGrubb (2000), 672.
96 Sidaway v Board of Govemors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871, [1985J l
All ER 643.
97 Bolam v. Friern H.M.C. [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586.
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which course should he adopt9S. The doctor is allowed to exercise appropriate
discretion in choosing what information to disclose99.
The patient bears the burden of proof that he was informed by the treatment
provider. It is very rare that the issue of informed consent is raised in a
negligence claim in England and Wales'~.
In Germany however, the breach of the duty to inform (Aufklárungspflicht) is
one of the pillars of the medical liability system. Liability for breach of the duty
to inform can either emerge from tort (~823 BGB: Rechtswidrrge
Kórperverletzung)'~' or from breach of a contractual duty to inform in the
framework of the treatment contract'oZ.
The patient must be informed about the illness, its seriousness, the process of
treatment, its risks and side effects, so that he can decide whether or not to
undergo the proposed treatment'o'. The risks that must be disclosed are those
related to possible complications or side effects, whose seriousness can affect
the decision of the patient whether or not to undergo treatment. The information
must be tailor-made: besides all frequent risks, even rare risks that can seriously
affect that specific patient must be disclosed'~. The less urgent the treatment is
from a medical point of view, the more far-reaching the duty to inform is
(Kriterium der Dringlichkeit)'os
The treatment provider can only withhold information from the patient in
exceptional circumstances, when that information can seriously endanger the life
or health of the patient (therapeutic privilege). The case law of the BGH is very
strict and inflexible on this issue'~`.
Finally, the physician bears the burden of proof that it has disclosed all the
relevant information to the patient, and that the patient consented to treatment'o'.
98 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771; KenneddylGrubb 2000, 694.
99 Kennedy~Grubb, 1999, 701.
100 Grubb in Mrkesinis Deakin (2003), 325.
101 BGH NJW 1980, 1905.
102 BGH NJW 199Q 2929.
103 BGH NJW 1972, 335; Gehrlein (2000), 125; Laufs~[Jhlenbruck (1999), 465.
104 BGH NJW 1980, 1333; BGHZ 77, 74 - NJW 1980, 1901; Laufs~Uhlenbruck (1999),
471.
105 Laufs~[Jhlenbruck (1999), 471.
106 Laufs LJhlenbruck (2000), 479; BGHZ 29, 46, 56 - NJW 1959, 811 - JR 1959, 418;
BGHZ 29, 176,182.
107 BGH NJW 1992, 2351. Cf. also Giesen (2001), 248. A similar solution exists in Austria,
cE Bernat (1998), 1 I8; In Spain cf STS 28-12-98 (RJ 1998~10164), STS 13-04-99 (RJ
1999~2583) and STS 19-04-99 (RJ 1999I2588); and Portugal art. 340~2 CC; Pereira
(2000), 454; DiasRvtonteiro (1984), 39. In the Netherlands, though the burden of proof
lies in principle with the patient, it can be shifted to the treatment provider by
interpretation of art. 7:466 (2) BW. Cf, Giesen (1999), 37.
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The reason why the breach of the treatment provider's duty to inform is so
relevant in German medical liability law is primarily linked to the patient
friendliness afforded by the facilitation of the burden of proof, together with an
objective yardstick concerning the depth of the information that must be
disclosed and limited exceptions to the duty. This is a stark contrast with the
English system, and explains the virtual irrelevance ofthe breach of the duty to
inform in that system: there is no shift of the burden of proof and the treatment
provider may exercise appropriate discretion in choosing what information to
disclose.
6.3 The breach of the duty to inform in Scandinavian nofault systems
Patients in Scandinavian countries have a right to be informed about their health
status, the nature of the treatment, its risks and alternatives'oe. The breach of this
duty, besides bringing forth disciplinary consequences, can be a ground for
liability in tort'oy.
However, while analysing the no-fault Patient Insurance statutes of the different
Nordic countries, it is striking that no reference whatsoever is made to the
breach of a duty to inform the patient as an access criterion to compensation
under the scheme. On a first glance, it can appear to be - as Bernat concludes -
"a major deficiency of the system that it does not compensate for adverse
consequences of treatment if the patient has not given free and informed
consent""o. But, a deeper analysis of the mechanics of the Scandinavian patient
insurance schemes can show why the breach of a duty to inform is not an access
criterion to compensation, and why it is a non-issue in these systems.
If treatment was considered necessary and was carried out perfectly, the fact that
the patient was not informed is considered irrelevant as the injury would be
compensated irrespective ofthe patient having been informed or not if the injury
could have been prevented under the specialist rule, the equipment rule or the
alternative rule"'. The injury is compensated under the scheme if an alternative
treatment would exist that might have prevented the adverse event in case it was
used instead of the one that was carried out"Z. As Hellner points out, it is very
rare that a patient brings forth a claim for breach of the duty to inform if
108 Cf. for instance H11so- och sjukvárdslag ( 1982: 763), the Swedish Health and Medical
Care Act; ~S and ~6 of the Finnish Act on the Status and Rights of Patients (1992:785).
109 Cf DahlmanlWendel ín Faure~ICoziol (200]), 189. A claim in tort before a court of law
based on the breach of a duty to inform was brought once, and the claimants succeeded
not because of the breach of a duty to inform, but because the injury was deemed
negligent irrespective of the breach: Kerstin H., [1990] NJA, 442 cited by Wendel in
DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 382.
110 Bemat ( 1998), 124.
111 Cf Chapter 3 (3).
1 12 Cf. the previously Swedísh case PSN 4411977 cited by Hellner ( 1985), 711.
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everything goes well"'. It is also pointed out by Wendel"' and by Lahti"', that
even in claims in tort, courts in Sweden and Finland, when deciding on behalf of
the patient, give compensation on the basis of the lack of quality of treatment,
not on the basis of lack of consent.
Summing up, the breach of a duty to inform is not an issue in Patient Insurance
Schemes, though it has a residual importance in tort litigation. The access
criteria related to the preventability of the injury will virtually allow for the
compensation, if in hindsight an alternative treatment would have prevented the
injury, irrespective of informed consent having been given or not.
6.4 The breach of the duty to inform in the French system
The breach of the duty to inform is recognised by French law as grounds for
compensation of inedical injury since as early as 194216. The treatment provider
must inform the patient about his healthcare condition, proposed examination,
treatment, its advantages, consequences and normally predictable frequent or
serious risks, alternatives and consequences of abstaining from treatment"'. In
case of aesthetical or unnecessary treatment (from a strictly medical point of
view), full disclosure ofall known risks is necessary1e.
The resort of the treatment provider to the therapeutic privilege is very limited in
French law. The only exception is in the domain of psychiatric treatment19. The
burden of proof rested traditionally on the plaintifP20, who had to prove a
negative fact (not having been informed) of facts that took place in a private,
oral meeting with the treatment provider'Z'. In 1997, a shift of the burden of
proof to the treatment provider was established by the Arrêt Hédreul in order to
113 Hellner (1985), 719.
114 Wendel in DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 382.
1 I S Lahti (1994), 213.
I 16 Arrêt Teyssier, 28~01~1942, D.C. 1942, 63.
I 17 Cf Art. L. 11 I 1-2 CSP: "Toute personne a le droit d'être informée sur son état de santé.
Celte information porte sur les différenles investigalions, traitements ou actions de
prevention que sont proposes, leur utilité, leur urgence, éventuelle, leurs consequences,
!es risques fiequents ou graves normalement prévisibles qu'ils comportent ainsi que sur
les autres solutians possibles, et sur les consequences prévisibles en cas de refus". The
case law existent before the 2002 codification already formulated the duty to inform in
the same fashion: Arrêt Le Quang, Cass Civ. 1 re 14IO1I1982; Cass. Civ. 1 re 7I10~1998,
J.C.P. 1998.IL10179. Cf. Lambert-Faivre (2004), 753.
I l8 Cass. Civ. lre, 17I1 ]I1969, Gaz. Pal. 1970.1.49; Cass Civ. lre, 17I0211998, R.C.A. 1998,
166.
119 Cass. Civ. lre 15 juillet 1999, D. 199 Som.com., 393, obs. Penneu; Cass. Civ. ire,
23~05~2000, 905, rapport Sargos. Cf Lambert-Faivre (2004), 754.
120 Art. 1315 (1) Code Civil.
121 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 757.
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eliminate the probatio diabolica, which the patient had to bear122. This doctrine
was later incorporated in the 2002 codification'Z'. The breach of the duty to
inform engages the liability of the treatment provider under the doctrine ofperte
d'une chance de guérison ou de survie123. This facilitated regime of the breach of
a duty to inform significantly increases the chances of an injured patient to
obtain compensation.
6. S Summary
The models differ in the liability consequences of the breach of a duty to inform.
While in Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes it is a non-issue, in
the French model and in the negligence model (in Germany, and to a lesser
extent in England and Wales) it allows for a facilitated access of an injured
patient to compensation, though the patient must still have suffered an injury
causally connected to the medical treatment in order to qualify for
compensation.
The patient's facilitated access to compensation on grounds of the breach of a
duty to inform raises some scepticism, however. It is seen by Lambert-Faivre as
a"false alibi to compensate a medical adverse event"125. Also Hellner expresses
his scepticism about this shortcut to compensation by stating, " it is very rare
that a patient brings forth a claim for breach of the duty to inform if everything
goes well"126.
7 Causation
7.1 The difficulties of establishing causation in medical liablility
Another requisite for access to compensation is the existence of a link of
causation between an action or an omission from the treatment provider and the
injury sustained by the patient. This link of causation is an essential requisite for
compensation of treatment injury, and most claims for damages do not succeed
as patients most often fail to prove this requisite. Proving causation is often the
most significant hurdle for the patient'Z'.
122 Arrët Hédreul, Cass. Civ. lére. 27I02~1997, J.C.P. 1997.IL22942. This doctrine was
further adopted by the Conseil d'éta[ for the administrative jurisdiction: C.E. 5~01~2000,
J. C. P. 2000. II.10271.
123 Art. 1111-2 C.S.P. rnfrne.
124 Cf. Chapter 3 (7.5).
125 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 758.
126 Hellner (1985), 719.
127 Brazier (2003), 162.
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It is difficult to establish the link of causation between medical treatment and the
injury sustained by the patient. Factual causation is very difficult to determine,
even for experts'~e. Medicine, while no longer in the dark ages, is still not a
perfect science, and not all causes, processes and effects can be perfectly
understood.
There are two sets of causal processes happening when treatment is carried out:
]. Original health condition (ailment) ~ normal development of the
health condition;
2. Diagnosis of the health condition ~ treatment or absence of
treatment ~ consequence of treatment or of the absence of
treatment.
When treatment is performed, these two sets are interlinked: the objective of
treatment is to try to avoid an unfavourable normal development of the illness. It
is in most cases very difficult to identify whether the consequences were caused
by performance of the treatment, by the natural development ofthe illness, or by
interference from external causes, such as environmental or fortuitous events'~'.
Illustration. The classical illustration for the exposed can be found in the English
case Wilsher v Essex ANA"~: a premature baby was submitted to premature birth
care in a special baby care unit in a hospital. Treatment had prevented him from
death or brain damage, however he succumbed to an illness that often affects
premature babies, RLF, an incurable retina affection that caused him blindness
to one eye and impaired vision in the other. His parents filed a lawsuit against
the hospital, as due to a breach of duty of care (confessed and established)
during a diagnostic intervention. The failure in the execution of the
diagnosis~monitoring led to the administration of a much higher than needed
oxygen supply. The experts considered this as an adequate cause to the
materialisation of the injury suffered by the baby. However, experts pointed out
that the same ailment often affects premature babies that have not been
artificially administered oxygen. Other causes often are the cause for such
injury, such as apnoea, hypercarbia, intraventricular haemorrhage, patent
ductus arteriosus, etc.
7.2 Loss of a chance ofhealing
Other difficult causation problems exist when the patient has lost a chance of
being healed, due to the absence of treatment or delayed treatment. Due to the
absence of or delay in the administration of inedical treatment, the patient lost
128 Grubb in Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 319.
129 Grubb in Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 318; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 148.
I30 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1988] 1 All ER 871, [1988] AC 1074 (HL).
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the possibility of avoiding injury that occurred due to the normal development of
the illness"'
For instance, it was, in a French case, impossible to trace a direct causation link
between a delay of treatment and the necrosis and subsequent need of
amputation of patient's foot"-.
The same happens in the wrongful life cases like the famous Affaire Perruche in
France"', where a direct link of causation between defective diagnosis of
Rubella in the pregnant woman and the birth of a handicapped child is also
absent.
In a similar English case, Hotson v East Berkshire Area Healh Authority"', the
patient, a 13 year old, fell from a tree (four meters) to the ground. In the hospital
his knee was X-rayed, but no injury was noticed. After severe pain, the boy was
taken back to the hospital, his injury identified and emergency treatment was
carried out. His injury eventually developed into avascular necrosis, which
resulted in a deformity that led eventually to limited mobility when he was 20
years old. The trial judge considered that had the injury been promptly
diagnosed and treated, that treatment would have a 250~o probability of avoiding
the permanent disability. The trial judge awarded the plaintiff 250~0 of full
compensation, but the House of Lords eventually overturned the judgment in the
appeal, and the plaintiffdid not obtain any compensation15.
7.3 Causation in Negligence systems
In negligence systems the patient bears the burden of proving the existence of a
link of causation between the adverse event and the injury sustained. In the law
of England and Wales, the patient must prove the following'~:
latrogenic causation: that injury was caused by medical treatment
and not the underlying illness or its natural development;
That medical treatment was the exclusive cause of the injury: "but
for" the negligent medical treatment camed out, the injury would
not have happened "';
The damage is not remote18.
131 Brazier (2003), 163.
132 Cass.Civ. Ire, 8I07~1997, JCP éd. G. 1997, [I, 22921, rapp. SARGOS.
133 Arrêt Perrouche, Cass. Civ., 26 mars 1996; Cass. Civ. 17 Il II2000.
134 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Healh Authority [1987] AC 750.
135 Cf. Brazier (2003), 165; Grubb in Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 321.
l36 Grubb in Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 319.
137 Barnett v Chelsea 8c Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428.




The standard of proof of causation in English law is based on the criterion of the
balance of probabilities. If it is more probable than not that the negligent act
caused the injury, it is deemed that it has caused the injury"y. Though the
standard of proof of causation is not apparently very high, Clerk and Lindsell
point out "the extreme difficulty posed in actions for medical injury in
determining how and why the claimant's injuries were caused (...) is
nevertheless not held to justify departure from the normal rules in causation""o.
In addition, the higher courts have traditionally the policy objective of
controlling the costs of the NHS in compensating injured patients"', and as such
to prevent the financial impact of "stretching" rules on causation, using the
wording of Atiyah"~ "'.
This is illustrated by the English case Barnett v Chelsea 8c Kensington Hospital
Management Committee"'; the casualty officer did not duly admit a patient who
was complaining of abdominal pain to the casualty unit of a hospital. That
patient died five hours later of Arsenic poisoning. The trial judge held the
defendant had been negligent, as the standard of care had been breached, as
further examination of the patient's condition should have been carried out,
possibly having saved the patient's life. However, the court returned a verdict
favourable to the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff (the deceased's
wife) had failed to prove that there was a high probability that, had the patient
been timely admitted, diagnosed and treated, his death would not have occurred.
In some occasions the House of Lords shyly accepted a less stringent standard of
proof of causation. In McGhee v. National Coal Board"' the plaintiff cleaned
furnaces in a brickwork factory. He was exposed to abrasive brick dust. Due to
the lack of washing facilities, the plaintiff could not wash himself before he
cycled back home. He eventually contracted dermatitis. The employer was
considered to be negligent in not providing washing facilities, though the patient
could not prove on the balance of probabilities a link between that negligence
and the dermatitis, i.e. that the existence of adequate washing facilities would
have prevented the illness. Medical evidence showed that brick dust could be the
cause of the dermatitis and that the fact that the delay and physical effort of the
plaintiff cycling back home unwashed added materially to the risk that the
patient would develop the dermatitis. Despite this evidential gap, the House of
Lords accepted the plaintiff's claim, being satisfied with the negligence added
materially to the risk of contracting the dermatitis.
139 Lunney~Oliphant(2003),195.
140 ClerklLindsell (2000), 8-64.
141 Lord Hoffmann in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 89, CA.
142 Atiyah (1997), 45.
143 Cf. also Brazier (2003), 164.
144 Barnett v Chelsea 8c Kensing[on Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428.
145 McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] ] WLR 1.
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However, the doctrine McGhee was downsized and virtually neutralised for
some time"c until it was recuperated in Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral"', a case
where the plaintiffs contracted mesothelioma due to professional exposure to
asbestos dust. A similar evidential gap existed: the negligence ofthe employer in
exposing the workers to asbestos dust could not, on the balance of probabilities,
be attributed to one specific employer. The court decided on behalf of the
plaintiffs, adopting a less stringent standard of proof under those specific
circumstances, accepting the mere "material contribution to the risk". It is,
according to Grubb, unlikely that this case will have a significant impact in the
medical liability system, due to the "narrowness of the exception to the
traditional test""~.
Awards in proportion to the probability of a causal link are not accepted in
English law: in the previously mentioned case Hotson v. East Berkshire Hospital
Authoriry"y, while the trial judge had awarded the plaintiff a proportional award
of 250~0, which was quashed by the House of Lords, thus invalidating the
prospects of reduction of the standard of proof of causation under the doctrine of
a loss of a chance. This doctrine was further upheld in Gregg v. Scott'~ and in
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd's' 's'
In Germany, there are two causation tests. First of all, a link of causation
between the sub-standard medical treatment and the primary injury (ki)rperliche
Primtxrschddigung) must be established (Haftungsbegrundende Kausalitiit),
according to ~286 ZPO"' 15' A second test consists of the link between the
primary injury and secondary or consequential injuries (Haftungsausfiillende
Kausalit~it)155. The first test of causation (Haftungsbegrundende Kausalitiit) is
the more relevant for this section.
The plaintiff must prove that, had he received adequate treatment that complied
with medical standards, he would not have sustained the primary injury. [n case
of diagnosis, the patient must prove that had he been correctly diagnosed, the
primary injury coud have been totally or partially prevented'~. The standard of
proof is high (Vollbeweis)'s', however it not necessary that causation is
146 Grubb in MarkesinislDeakin ( 2003), 320.
147 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 89, CA.
148 Grubb in arkesinis~Deakin ( 2003), 320.
149 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Healh Authority [1987] AC 750.
I50 Gregg v. Scott [2002] WECA Civ. 1471 CA.
I51 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 89, CA.
152 Cf Brazier ( 2003), 166.
153 ZPO: Zivilprozessordnung. Code of Civil Procedure.
1 g4 GeitllGreiner ( 1999), 96.
155 ~287 ZPO.
156 GeiBlGreiner(1999), 105.
157 ~286 ZPO. Cf. Gehrlein ( 2000), 31; GeifilGreiner (1999), 105.
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exclusive: it is enough that the medical treatment was one of the causes of the
injury sustained by the patient1Se.
It is recognised by case law and literature that it can be difficult for the patient to
establish causation. However, in some exceptional cases the standard of proof is
eased (Beweiserleichterung):
primafacie evidence (Anscheinbeweis);
fully controllable risks (Voll beherrschbare Risiken);
inexistent or incomplete clinical files (Dokumentationsmángel);
gross negligence (Grober Behandlungsfehler).
Under the doctrine of Anscheinbeweis, the standard of proof to be discharged by
the plaintiff can be lowered, if the injury is caused by a typical, expected,
consequence of a specific causal process according to medical experience. The
effect of the Anscheinbeweis is to burden the treatment provider with the proof
that the causal process was atypical159. The burden of proof of that atypical
nature of the causal process is however not difficult to satisfy, considering the
fact that in medical science typical, predictable, causal processes are the
exception. As such, this doctrine has a low influence in medical liability
litigation, and its application is limited'~. The doctrine was for instance applied
in a case where the plaintiff has contracted HIV from his wife, who was infected
by a blood transfusion'b', or when a dentist damaged the contiguous tooth to the
one being extracted by applying too much force'bZ. In both cases the plaintiffs
obtained compensation.
The burden of proof of the patient is facilitated in case of those risks affecting
the safety of patients ín a hospital, clinic or other health-care providing
institution, which can be prevented by effective management of the organisation.
This alleviation of the burden of proof happens only in exceptional
organisational faults163, such as deficient supervision of inexperienced doctors'64;
accidents due to bad surveillance by hospital staff, e.g. patients falling from a
bed165 or a patient falling into a swimming pool in a psychiatric clinic'~. The
burden of proof is also alleviated in case of use of defective equipment167. When
the hospital lacks adequate hygiene measures and patients suffer injury thereof
the burden of proof is alleviated, and in case that the patient contracts a hospital-
158 BGH NJW 1997, 1482. Cf GeiD~Greiner (1999), 105; Medicus (2000), 166.
159 GeiLiiGreiner (]999), 108; Gehrlein (2000), 94; LaufsilJhlenbruck (1999), 900.
160 Gehrlein (2000), 95.
I61 BGHZ 1 14, 284.
162 OLG Káln VersR 1992, 1475.
163 Geió~Greiner (1999), I 14; Gehrlein (2000), 103; LaufslClhlenbruck (1999), 902.
164 BGH NJW 1998, 2736; BGH NJW 1985, 2193; BGH NJW 1993, 2989; BGHZ 88, 248-
NJW 1984, 655.
165 OLG Ktiln, VersR 1990, 1240.
166 OLG Kóln VersR 1992, 1517.
167 BGH NJW 1994, 1594; BGH NJW 1978, 584.
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acquired infection, the burden of proof shifts to the hospital (Beweislastumkehr),
which must prove that it has taken all necessary hygiene measures to prevent the
injury ~68.
According to the doctrine of Dokumentationsmiingel, if a specific medical
treatment action is not recorded in the clinical log, or if the record is incomplete,
there is circumstantial evidence that that step in treatment was not carried out
according to the medical standards: that specific medical action is presumed not
to have been carried out adequately169.
Finally, the burden of proof as to causation is shifted (Beweislastumkehr) if the
treatment provider acted with gross negligence while carrying out treatment
(grobe Behandlungsfehler)"o, though the gross negligent treatment must be in
abstract a probable cause for the injury.
There is no definition of gross negligence, and this doctrine is applied in a
casuistic fashion"'. Some illustrations of gross negligence:
- a doctor applied an injection dressed in normal street clothing
without disinfecting his hands"Z;
- an orthopaedist failed to notice an evident tumour in the kneecap
and carried out meniscus surgery on the patient instead"';
- excessive radiation dosage while carrying out radiotherapy of a
cervical carcinoma";
- an ophthalmologist who did not measure the eye blood pressure to
verify the evolution of a Glaucoma in an aged patient15;
- the failure to diagnose meningitis in a small child who had high
fever for several days, loss of weight and no control of bodily
movements 16;
- a general practitioner who does not recognise a malignant
melanoma on an aged patient, wrongly diagnosing it as a mere
wart"'.
If liability is sought by the patient under the grounds of a breach of duty to
inform, it ís necessary to ascertain the hypothetical decision that a patient would
have taken had he been duly informed. The burden of proof is shared between
168 BGH NJW 1971, 241; BGH NJW 1999, 3408.
169 GeiLilGreiner (1999), 1 I5; Gehrlein (2000), 99; Laufs~Uhlenbruck (1999), 910.
170 BGH NJW 1992, 754; BGH NJW 1987, 705; BGH NJW 1983, 2080; Gei[3lGreiner
(1999), 116; Gehrlein (2000),106; Katzenmeier (2002), 439; Laufsl[Jhlenbruck (1999),
905.
171 GeifilGreiner(1999), 116.
172 OLG Dusseldorf NJW 1988, 2307.
173 OLG Dusseldorf, 19.5.1988- 8 U 53186 apud Laufs~Uhlembruck (1999), 1393.
174 OLG Frankfurt VersR 1994, 1474.
175 OLG Hamm VersR 1979, 826.
176 OLG Oldenburg NJW-RR 1997, 1117.
177 BGH VersR 1985, 886.
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the patient and the treatment provider. The treatment provider must show that
the patient would have chosen to undergo the treatment anyway if he had been
correctly informed about its immanent risks. On the other hand, while the patient
must substantiate that he would have had plausible reasons to doubt whether or
not to undergo treatment (Entscheidungskonflikt), had he been dutifully
informed and able to take a seasoned choice. The test is not objective: it is not
the choice of a reasonable patient, but rather the personal choice of that specific
patient1e.
Summing-up, while in English law the standard of proof of causation, "more
probable than not" does only know some very limited exceptions, in the German
system the patient's burden to prove the causation (and fault) is facilitated in
several circumstances.
7.4 Causation in No-Fault Patient Insurance Systems
In order for a patient to obtain compensation for injury resulting from medical
treatment according to the conditions of the no-fault patient insurance scheme, it
ís essential that a link of causation between that treatment and the injury be
established. The main principle of causation is that the injury has an iatrogenic
origin, i.e., that it is caused by medical treatment, or that medical treatment (or
its absence) contributed to the materialisation of the injury. Any injury caused
by the underlying illness itself or its natural development is in the risk sphere of
the patient"'. For instance, in a Finnish case, a 48-year-old worker was treated
for a damaged medial collateral ligament on his left knee. The patient was not
satisfied with the fact that he still had a significant restriction of movement in
his knee and brought a claim to the Patient Insurance Association. The treatment
was performed perfectly, and it was deemed that the cause of the limited
movement of the knee was the underlying illness: the rheumatoid arthritis that
the patient suffered from for 20 years180 Similarly an infection of an open
fracture (it is overwhelmingly more probable that it is caused by the normal
development of the underlying ailment than by treatment conditions), or the
heart attack of a hospitalised patient without being connected to a treatment
action, are not compensated as there is no link of causation18'.
The standard of proof of causation consists of a preponderant probability in
Sweden18- and of a significant probability in Denmark'e'.
In Finland, if there are doubts whether or not a link of causation exists, it is
presumed to exist'~.
178 Gehrlein (2000), 161.
179 Erichsen (2001), 358; Hellner (1985), 710.
I80 Case cited by Brahams (1989), 82.
181 Erichsen (200] ), 358.
182 Espersson (2000), 5; Pichler (1994), 315.
183 Pichler (1994), 318.
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Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes are often criticised because
excluding the need to prove fault is not really a significant advantage if the
patient must still prove causation. In fact, proving causation is usually the most
difficult requisite for liability in negligence systems, much more difficult than
proving negligence itself. However, about IO times more claims are rejected
because causation was not established in negligence systems compared to no-
fault insurance schemes.
The major difference between negligence systems and no-fault insurance
schemes is that, though the patient is in both types of systems in principle
burdened by the proof of causation, in fact he does not really have to prove
anything directly. The Patient Insurance Association acquires of its own motion
all the relevant information and evidence while investigating the claim. Its
claims handlers, aided by forensic medicine experts, analyse in depth the causes
and processes that led to the injury, as well as the way medical treatment was
carried out. They weigh the different probabilities and take a decision based on
statistical data and medical experience185. As such, there exists no direct burden
of proof to be discharged by the patient, due to the inquisitorial nature of the
claims procedure'"6. In addition, the patients do not have to face the dífficulty
and the cost of gathering evidence and hiring medical experts.
7. S Causation in the French System
In French law the patient bears the burden of proof that treatment was the sine
yua non condition of the injury she sustained'~'. The standard of proof is high: a
direct link of causation must be established with certainty1Re. In addition, the
seriousness of the fault incurred by the treatment provider is no ground for a
reversal of the burden of prooP"`'. The requirement that a link of causation be
established is common to the two compensation regimes: liability on grounds of
a negligent treatment and compensation of non-faulty adverse events under the
principle of solidarity''".
However, patients can still obtain partial compensation under the doctrine of the
loss of a chance (perte d'une chance de guérison ou de sztrvie), in the proportion
of the degree of probability of the contribution of treatment to the extent of the
injury. This doctrine applies to cases where the patient failed to prove causation
with certainty, but the treatment provider's defective performance has deprived
184 Finnish trm~aux préparatoires, S 13 apud Pichler (1994), 325.
185 Pichler ( 1994), 315.
186 Danish travaux préparatoires, S.9, apud Pichler ( 1994), 316.
187 Lambert-Faivre ( 2004), 147.
188 Cass. Civ. ]re, 8I07I1997, Bu1L Civ. 239, 160; Cass. Civ. Ire, 30~09~1997, D. 1977, IR,
217.
189 Galand-Carval in Faure~ICoziol ( 2001), 115.
190 Rachet-Darfeuille in Dute~Faure~Koziol ( 2004), 252.
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the patient of some of his chances to avoid the injury19'. It applies in cases of
wrong diagnosis, such as a mistake in the diagnosis of a fracture'`'Z; or failure in
diagnosis a haematoma in the spine whose development caused paraplegia''". It
also applies when it is necessary to establish a link of causation between the
breach of a duty to inform and the injury'y".
According to Lambert-Faivre, determining the link of causation is a delicate
deductive exercise based on evidences and presumptions that must be executed
by the judges, who must decide if negligence was the exclusive cause of the
injury, in which case the treatment provider is held fully liable, or if it was one
of the causes, in which liability will be adjudicated according to the estimated
quota of its contribution to the injury'ys. This doctrine was considered by
Savatier as "a paradise for undecided judges"'`~.
As it was pointed out before'y', as a consequence of the 2002 reform, patients
have now their task of establishing causation facilitated due to the central role of
the regional commissions of conciliation and compensation of inedical adverse
events, which investigates, aided by its experts, the circumstances that caused
the injury, with no costs for the patient. Furthermore, if the injury was only
partially caused by faulty treatment, that proportion of the damages is covered
by the insurer of the negligent treatment provider, the other quota can be
compensated by the national office for compensation of inedical accidents, if the
requisites for compensation under the principle of solidarity are met""
7.6 Summary
In the negligence model, there are two main reasons why causation is such a
heavy hurdle for the injured patient to overcome. One is the standard of proof:
the patient must prove that, on the balance of probabilities, it is more probable
than not that the injury was caused by the negligent medical treatment. The two
negligence systems analysed differ in how stringent the standard ofproof is. It is
not alleviated in England~Wales except in very limited circumstances, and the
cause must have been an essential determining factor to the injury. On the other
hand, in Germany the standard of proof is alleviated or the burden of proof
shifted to the treatment provider in case of prima facie evidence, fully
controllable risks, gross negligence and deficient clinical records. In addition,
the cause must not be exclusive, and a material increase of the risk is a sufficient
l91 Paley-Vincent (2002), 108.
192 Cass. Civ. Ire, 14I12I196S, Bu1L Civ., 707.
193 Cass. Civ. 1 re, 25~1 I11997 apud Paley-Vincent (2002), 1 I 1.
194 Cass. Civ. lre. 8I07~1997 JCP 1997, ll, 2292; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 758).
195 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 734.
196 Paley-Vincent (2002), 86.
197 Cf. Chapter 2 (3).
198 Art. L. 1 142-18 Code de la Santé Publique.
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condition for causation. However, the second element of the hurdle is common
to these two systems: the patient must actively prove the link of causation,
which is difficult as the patient does not control most of the relevant
information, and expensive, as he will have to bear the costs of expertise.
In Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance systems, the legal prescription of the
standard of proof of causation is similar to the one in force in most negligence
systems: preponderant causation. However, in practice, it is assessed in a more
flexible and patient-friendly fashion. In addition, the patient does not have to
actively prove causation: that task is carried out ex o~cio by the claims
investigators of the Patient Insurance Associations, aided by forensic medicine
experts, with no cost for the patient.
In the French system, irrespective of whether the injury is compensated
according to the fault principle or according to the solidarity principle, the
patient needs to prove the causal link between the medical treatment and the
injury with certainty. If it fails to show a causal link with certainty, he can obtain
partial compensation in proportion to the probability of the treatment having
contributed (or hypothetically contributed to prevent) the injury. In the aftermath
of the 2002 reform, the centralised claims pre-screening and handling office will
make the patient's task easier to prove causation, as it gathers ex oj~cio the
relevant evidence, and provides the forensic medicine expertise.
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Prevention of Treatment Injury
1 Introduction
Liability emerging from healthcare treatment is normally associated with two
goals: compensation of injury suffered by the aggrieved patient, as well as
prevention of future injury to patients.
Liability law traditionally associates prevention with accountability throughout
deterrence: the threat that a healthcare professional will be held liable if he
performs substandard treatment will lead him to stay within the gauge of
reasonable care, otherwise he will bear the hard financial (and other)
consequences of liability and thus internalize the externalities caused by its lack
of due care.
The aim of this chapter is to explain the causes that lead to the occurrence of
adverse events in medical treatment, how can they be prevented, and how do the
analysed systems address prevention, both in individual practice and in hospital
settings.
The causes of inedical adverse events are quite complex. While identifying the
adequate cause of an injury can be quite straightforward in the case of individual
medical practice, in collective medical practice (hospitals, clinics, etc.)
identifying said causes and preventing them is much more complex. It is of
crucial importance to establish a distinction between active and latent errors.
While active errors happen at the level of the front-line operator (the man
holding the "smoking gun": a doctor, nurse, etc.) and their effects are felt almost
immediately, latent errors are related to underlying institutional and structural
factors, such as poorly designed or inadequate installations, faulty maintenance,
bad management decisions and poorly structured organisations'.
Technological risks related to medical equipment, risks related to the premises
where treatment is provided, risks linked to the distribution of work between
hospital staff, both on a vertical level (chain of command) and on an horizontal
level (teamwork), as well as organisational risks are the main reasons behind the
complexity at the institutional level~.
I VincendReason (1999), 41; Kohn et aL (2000), 55; CMO (2000), 21.
2 Pfliiger (2002); 128.
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ln the previously analysed New Zealander case of Dr. Yogasakran', the
anaesthetist was left alone after surgery to fulfil his duty of post-surgery
surveillance'. Against the medical standards, all the other nurses and physicians
abandoned the theatre. The anaesthetist, Dr. Yogasakran, was fatigued (surgery
was long and he was the only anaesthetist in that provincial hospital). The
patient began to chew the endotracheal tube (i.e. the tube that administers
oxygen to the patient) and entered into a state of cyanosis. Facing a situation of
emergency, Dr. Yogasakran decided to administer the patient the analeptic drug
dopram in order to reanimate the patient. However, in the shelf where dopram
was supposed to be, there was by mistake the inotropic drug dopamine, of very
different properties. Then that drug was administered to the patient the patient,
who eventually died as a consequence of the administration of that drug. This
case is an example of how several etrors, active and latent, individual and
organisational contributed to the decease of the patient.
In yet another series of cases examined previously, the infamous well-known
Vincristine cases, which are considered the "Air Crash" in NHS Hospitals in the
UK, severa] different causes contributed to the recurrence of adverse events of
extreme gravity. At least 14 incidents with the same contours have happened in
the UK since 1975.
In one of these cases that resulted in litigation, a pre-registration doctor injected
the cytostatic drug vincristine (also known as Oncovin) in the cerebrospinal fluid
instead of the methotrexate, causing the patient's agonising deaths. The House
officer misunderstood his role in the procedure, believing that he was only
supposed to monitor the lumbar puncture, while the pre-registration assumed
that the HO would be supervising the whole cytotoxic medication administration
procedure. Both were convicted of manslaughter, though the Court of Appeal
overturned the conviction.
Even after this much publicised case, yet another vincristine accident occurred,
in similar circumstances. The senior registrar who should have administered the
drug was off duty; a nurse brought in the vincristine to the theatre by mistake
and a registrar who has never administered chemotherapy injected the drug
intrathecally instead of intravenously while being advised over the telephone by
a specialist registrar to administer the drugs sent to the theatre.
Many different factors contributed to the intrathetical (spinal) administration of
a chemotherapy drug instead of intravenous, resulting in the agonizing death of
patientsfi:
3 Cf Chapter 1 (3).
4 R. v. Yogasakran (1990] 1 NZLR. For more details on this case, cf. MerrylSmith (2001)
12. Cf Chapter 1 (3).
5 R. v. Prentice and another, R. v. Adomako, R. v. Holloway [1993] 4 All ER 935.
6 Cf. CMO (2000), 25; CMO ( 2001), 47 MerrylSmith ( 2001), 19.
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communication failures;




inadequate protocols regarding the administration of high toxicity
drugs;
bad supervision ofjunior doctors;
problems in the chain of command;
inappropriate delegation of tasks;
lack of training;
administration of drugs by professionals with no oncology
experience;
goal conflict between ward and theatre duties.
2 Individual Errors
2.1 Cognitive errors
A considerable number of inedical adverse events have their origin from the
individual mistakes of the healthcare professional involved. Cognitive
psychology is a great contribution when trying to give an explanation as to why
do they happen. Most errors result from incorrect mental activity'. According to
Merry and McCall Smithe, "an error is an unintentional failure in the
formulation of a plan by which it is intended to achieve a goal, or an
unintentional departure of a sequence of inental or physical activities from the
sequence planned".
Another definition for error derives from the results of the 1991 Harvard
Medical Practice Study on the incidence of adverse events and negligence in
hospitalized patients9 and the 2000 Report of the Institute of Medicine (USA)'o:
"An error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as
intended ( i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim
(i.e., error of planning). An adverse event is an injury caused by medical
management rather than the underlying condition of the patient. An adverse
event attributable to error is a preventable adverse event. Negligent adverse
events represent a subset of preventable adverse events that satisfy legal criteria
used in determining negligence ( i.e., whether the care provided failed to meet
7 Leape (1999) 25; Kohn et aL (2000), 54.
8 MerrylSmith (2001) 74.
9 Brennan et aL (1991 a).
10 Kohn et aL (2000) 28; Cf Chapter 1(3).
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the standard of care reasonably expected of an average physician qualified to
take care of the patient in question)".
Cognitive errors can be skill-based, rule-based or knowledge-based. The first
category of errors occurs as a result of an anomaly in automatic mental activity
consisting of a slip or lapse. Rule-based errors relate to the wrong rule being
chosen while solving a problem, or a wrong application of that rule (misapplied
expertise). Finally, knowledge-based etrors happen when the problem-solver
faces a novel situation for which he does not have pre-stored schemata to
address the problem"
2.2 Skill-based errors
Skill-based errors (slips, lapses) happen when something goes wrong in
automatic unconscious activity, such as routines, due to a distraction. The most
common variant of this class of error is attentional capture that usually happens
when there is a change in the routine. Instead of the ABCDE routine, the plan
changes to ABCFG, and the error happens in the last two steps of the process:
DE steps are followed instead of FG'Z.
Other types of skill-based errors are description errors, consisting of the right
action being performed on the wrong object, and loss of activation errors when
a temporary memory loss occurs.
Psychological precursors, i.e. endogenous circumstances like overwork, stress,
fatigue, sleep deprivation, boredom, burnout, frustration, uncertainty, anxiety,
anger, alcohol, drugs, as well as exogenous factors, such as the working
environment, greatly increase the risks that a slip will occur".
Skill-based errors are common during the execution of the technical aspects of
treatment. As an example, in a French case, a surgeon due to lack of attention
confused a nerve with a vein and cut the nerve instead of the vein". Other
frequent slip relates to forgotten medical materials left inside the body of the
patient after surgery".
2.3 Rule-based errors
Rule-based errors occur when the wrong rule is chosen while solving a problem,
or when that rule is not correctly applied (misapplied expertise). An example of
a rule-based error is frequency gambling, quite common in medicine or in other
11 Leape ( 1999), 26; MerrylSmith ( 2001), 75.
12 Leape ( 1999), 26; MerrylSmith ( 2001), 75.
13 Leape ( 1999), 26.
14 Cass. lre civ., 25IOSI1983, unpublished, cited by Castelletta ( 2002) 123.
15 OLG K61n, 8.3.1989-27 U 2189, VersR 1990, 1244 (L).
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activities subject to overwork. In this situation, the professional, faced with a
certain situation, will tend to address it by using a rule known to have worked on
many previous similar situations, without establishing beyond doubt if the
circumstances are really equivalent. Physicians incur frequently in this common
type of etror during the diagnosis phase of treatment1ó.
In a French case, a young skier collided with another skier and fractured the
femur. The resort physician prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs and did not
deem an x-ray exam necessary, as the trauma did not seem serious enough, and
such a fracture was rare amongst young adults".
In a German case, a doctor was held liable as he treated a patient for
haemorrhoids and anal fissures and did not examine further in order to detect
rectum carcinoma'".
2.4 Knowledge-based errors
When no pre-programmed schemata or rules exist in a particular, novel
situation, the problem-solver will have to enter attentional control mode, i.e., it
will have to reason in order to solve an original problem. This category of errors
of deliberation is more complex.
These errors are related to the lack of knowledge or to incorrect evaluation of
the seriousness of the problem. Mistakes usually result from vitiated reasoning
processes such as":
- biased memory (biased towards over-generalisation or
commonplace);
- availabiliry heuristic (selection of the first information coming to
mind);
- coning of attention (concentration on a single source);
- confirmation bias and overconfidence (use only of infotmation
that supports the thesis, refutation of information that denies ít);
- reversion under stress (leamt behavioural patterns are replaced
with older familiar ones albeit inappropriate).
Errors of deliberation are quite complex, as the novel situation will demand a
procedure based on trial and mistake. Here the professional abilities of the
healthcare provider play an important role in ascertaining her culpability in
negligence systems. In these systems, she will only be held liable insofar as she
16 MerrylSmith (2001), 83.
17 CA Paris, Ire ch, 13~1211996, Gaz. Pal. 1998, I somm. 68, note Vray.
18 OLG Dusseldorf, Urteil vom 14.06.1984-8 U 155181, VersR 1986, 893 (L).
19 Leape (1999), 27; MenylSmith (2001), 86.
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breached her standard of care, whereas in no-fault systems compensation of the
injury emerging from that error is granted insofar as the error was preventable.
3 Institutional Errors
3.1 Introduction
Though an individual physician very often provides treatment, it is most usually
performed through collective practice in the framework of a treatment-providing
organisation such as a hospital or a clinic. This sort of practice brings, by its
very nature, risks that some errors will happen.
Mishaps on the institutional level can be attributed to vertical work-sharing,
horizontal work-sharing and defective organisationZ". Some of the errors
committed during treatment in hospitals are latent errors, i.e. accidents waiting
to be triggered: "while an operator error may be the proximal cause of the
accident, the root causes were often present in the system for a long time. The
operator has, in a real sense, been set up to fail by poor design, faulty
maintenance or erroneous management decisions21'. Adverse events usually
happen when latent errors are combined with, or sprung by, active individual
errors.
3.2 Work-sharing and Chain of Command
Vertical work sharing consists of the hierarchic distribution of tasks within a
hospital (chain of command). The professionals at a higher rank are responsible
for reducing communication risks, setting procedure guidelines and monitoring
those underneath them in the chain of command like nurses, junior doctorsZ-.
Horizontal task sharing consists of the co-operation between healthcare
professionals with different specialities. Accidents often happen because of
defective co-operation between surgeons and anaesthetists during surgery in the
pre- and intra-surgery phases~'.
A recunent error derived from vertical work-sharing relates to defective
supervision ofjunior doctors by experienced doctors, ranked higher in the chain
of command.
Misgivings in supervision of junior healthcare professionals, errors in the chain
of command, inappropriate task delegation, and conflicts between ward and
20 Petry (2001), 40.
21 Leape (1999), 28; VincendReason (1999j, 40; Kohn et aL (2000), 55; CMO (2000).
22 Petry (2001), 40; Pfluger (2002), 128.
23 Pfluger (2002), 160.
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theatre duties were recurrent in the Vincristine cases in England. Accidents
involving inexperienced unsupervised doctors are also frequent in GermanyZ'
and France-`.
3.3 Defective organisation
Many errors leading to treatment injury happen as a result of defective design of
hospital organisation. Risks are involved in the choice, training and monitoring
of staff; choice, surveillance, maintenance and stock management of inedical
equipment, products, devices and instruments; procedures regarding the prompt
admittance of patients; record keeping; surveillance of patients; hygiene and
security of premisesZ`.
According to Vincent and Reason, "The accident sequence begins with the
negative consequences of organisational processes (decisions concerned with
planning, scheduling, forecasting, designing, policy-making, communicating,
regulating, maintaining, etc.). The latent failures so created are transmitted along
various organisational and departmental pathways to the workplace (the
operating theatre, the ward, etc.), where they create the local conditions that
promote commission of errors and violations ( understaffing, high workload,
poor human-equipment interfaces, etc.)"".
This is the "Swiss Cheese" model of causal processes in organizational
accidents, as explained by Reason28. According to this model, injuries happen, as
the risks materialise throughout an accident trajectory that manages to evolve
and circumvent the successive layers of preventive measures, such as defences,
barriers and safeguards, by means of the holes in the "cheese". Such "holes" are,
according to Reason, a result of both active failures and latent conditionsZy.
4 Accountability through deterrence
4.1 Deterrence as an incentive to safery
One of the aims of professional liability law consists of deterring negligent
conduct, i.e. preventing professionals from engaging in sub-standard levels of
care'o. The threat of negligence liability being imposed induces professionals to
24 BGHZ 88,248-BGH VersR 1984, 655-NJW 1984, 60 Lymphknotenexstirpation. Cf.
Pfliiger(2002), ]35.
25 Castelletta (2002), 205.
26 Tabouteau (2002), 222; Petry (2001), 42.
27 VincendReason (1999), 42.
28 Reason (1990), 208; Reason (1997), 9.
29 Reason (1997), 12.
30 Brazier (2003), 244.
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take precautions against possible harm". Thus, professional liability law is
considered to have a boosting effect on the quality of the professional service,
and in this case, on the quality of treatment, thus reducing the chances that
iatrogenic harm will materialise.
The deterrent effect can be observed at the individual level, i.e. the careless
healthcare provider is held liable and is bound to pay damages to the aggrieved
patient, or his insurance policy will be aggravated because of the adverse event.
That practitioner as well as her peers will have an incentive to engage in practice
according to the leges artis. It can as well happen at the collective level, as
hospitals will have incentives to reduce organisational and defective input risks
in order to escape the costs of liability, either by paying damages, or by an
aggravation of collective insurance policy if liability is thus channelled.
4.2 The critics
This view of prevention focused on deterrence is recently being increasingly
criticised by many academics and practitioners in healthcare as unfit to address
the real world of healthcare'j. It appears, according to the critics as just a
theoretical model with no empirical confirmation in the real world of
contemporary healthcare.
According to Dewees et aL", "the tort system, from an input perspective
quantum rules under deter medical injuries causing death, and claims initiation
rates suggest that only about one in eight negligently injured victims initiates a
claim and only one in 16 such victims receives any payment. The ability of
many defendants to pass on liability costs to patients andlor health insurers
further weakens the deterrent incentives brought to bear on individual
physicians. Moreover, many medical injuries appear to be preventable only at
the organisational level, although current doctrine in many jurisdictions largely
immunises institutional providers ofhealth care from liability"
Treatment providers can channe) the financial cost of liability to insurance,
claims initiation rates are low, and rarely do patients succeed in obtaining
compensation from medical adverse events. As such, individual treatment
providers can be under-deterred by the negligence system because of the moral
hazard caused by the availability of insurance if the risk is not adequately
differentiated and experience rated'". The Harvard Medical Practice Study III
backs up this premise: "Medical-malpractice litigation infrequently compensates
31 Olsen (1999), 1029.
32 Brazier (2003), 244; Mulchey~Rosenihal (1999), 6; CMO (2000), 20, 77.
33 Dewees, Don et al., Explortng [he Domatn of Accrdenl Law: Taking the Facts Seriously
(1996), apud KennedylGrubb (2000) 570.
34 Faure in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 48.
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patients injured by medical negligence and rarely identifies, and holds providers
accountable for, substandard care"75.
According to an English study, a person centred approach as opposed to a
holistic systems approach, though alluring from a managerial and legal
perspective is not well suited to the healthcare or other high technological
activity environments. The blame culture encourages the underestimation of the
extent to which problems are not due to individuals, but the environment in
which they operate16. In addition, other deterrents exist in many professional
activities, such as disciplinary and~or criminal sanctions. Atiyah shares this
vision of the inefficiency of deterrence in the tort system".
Though the critics are particularly stringent as regards the efficiency of the
deterrent effect in individual professional liability, some authors point out that
there are administrative and insurance incentives to hospitals and clinics on the
financial level'". Reformists counter-argue with the idea of prevention through
risk management in a clinical transparency setting, pointing out that it has been
successful in countries like Finland or Sweden19.
Achieving safety and quality throughout a holistic, systems approach, in the
sense that a good organisational culture and clinical transparency are the key
towards an adequate prevention strategy, is the cornerstone of modern critics to
the classical approach'o. According to Mikkonnen"', patient injury claims files
are used for the prevention of injuries, in the sense that all feedback received and
experience gained is taken into account in future operations. This author
considers that "the Finnish compensation system does not look for fault and
negligence; instead of looking for culprits, the system seeks to find the main
reasons behind the injuries".
5 Prevention through risk management and learning from failure
5.1 Prevention methodology
Some human activities are extremely safe, such as nuclear power production and
air transportation. They have been rendered safe, because the magnitude of the
risks involved forced them to engage in preventive measures able to reduce their
inherent risks. Importing some of their lessons to the arena of inedical mishaps
35 Brennan~et aL (19916).
36 CMO (2000), 20, 77.
37 Atiyah (1997), 162.
38 Brazier (2003), 245; Chapman (1990), 557.
39 Leape (1999), 33 ; Lahti (1994), 210; Dufwa (1997), 58.
40 CMO (2001), 58; ISO 9000IIS0 IWA 1:2001 Standard.
41 Mikkonen (2002), 119.
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is very useful, and their contribution rendered possible the implementation of
successful safety measures in some intrinsically risky medical activities such as
anaesthesiology and radiology"Z.
There are four steps in the pro-active prevention of treatment accidents:
identification of errors and error reporting; drafting of protocols and guidelines
that avoid the materialisation of errors; implementation of safeguard measures,
and elimination or reduction of psychological precursors"
5.2 Identification of accidents and error reporting
Identification, statistical processing and careful analysis of mishaps and near-
misses is an essential condition to understand the problems and an unavoidable
starting point to solve said problems. By leaming from failure, the data that can
be obtained that, when compiled, can be of crucial importance to other hospitals
and institutions dealing with hospital risk management. A sample data set is
proposed by an English Department of Health report":
What happened (event, severity, people, equipment involved)?
Where did it happen (location, ward)?
When did it happen?
How did it happen (immediate or proximate causes)?
Why did it happen (root causes)?
What impact did the event have?
What factors did, or could have, minimised the impact of the
event?
In negligence systems, access to this information is very difficult, due to the
adversarial and repressive character of individual negligence45. The system,
besides being unable to deter an individual as mentioned above, makers the co-
operation between healthcare professionals in the discovery of trut more
difficult, as those healthcare professionals logically fear self-incriminating
themselvesSó. According to Kohn et al., "The potential for litigation may
sometimes significantly influence the behaviour of physicians and other health
care providers. Often the interests of the various participants in furnishing an
episode of care are not aligned and may be antagonistic to each other. In this
environment, physicians and other providers can be cautious about providing
information that may be subsequently used against them. Thus, the prominence
42 Cascáo (2004); Leape (1999), 22; Vincent~Reason (1999), 41.
43 Leape (1999), 33; CMO (2001), 58.
44 CMO (2001).
45 Brazier (2003), 246.
46 CMO (2000), 80; CMO (2001), 60.
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of litigation can be a substantial deterrent to the development and maintenance
of reporting systems"".
Altemative resolution of disputes, complaínts and apologies procedures as well
as no-fault systems contribute effectively to obtaining their precious co-
operation. In fact, the possibility of obtaining active co-operation between the
healthcare professionals involved in the treatment accident makes possible a
more thorough investigation of their causes, allowing the compilation of
statistics and the development of research projects targeted at prevention of
those accidents"". In the Scandinavian no-fault schemes, it is not unusual for the
doctors involved in the misshaped treatment to help the patients out in filling in
the compensation claim's introductory forms'`'.
Transparency in investigation and the refusal of the "blame culture" are essential
conditions in establishing a pro-active prevention policy in regards to hospital
safety: good clinical governance`~.
5.3 Error correction strategies
The second step consists of defining strategies targeted at correcting errors51
These consist of inethods of reducing reliance on immediate memory;
improvement of access to existing information; standardisation of procedures,
techniques, notations, human interaction systems; maintenance, surveillance and
screening of inedical equipment, devices and premises; ergonomic
improvements as well as continuous training of staff in new safety
developments5-.
Reviewing the safety environment, reviewing clinical practice, purchasing for
safety, automation in order to reduce error, safety briefings and risk simulation
are some of the recommendations of an English studys'.
5.4 Safeguard barriers
The third step consists of establishing safeguard barriers. Since it is impossible
to completely eliminate medical errors, it is necessary to create mechanisms that
block the error before it affects patients. Efficient methods are whistle blowing,
reporting and redundancy (i.e., duplication of procedures)".
47 Kohn et al. (2000), ] 09.
48 Mikkonen (2002), 119; Lahti (1994), 210; Dufwa (1997), 58.
49 Espersson (2000), 5.
50 MerrylSmith (2001), 127; Atiyah (1997), 138.
S I Leape (1999), 34.
52 Mikkonen (2002) 121; CMO (2000).
53 CMO (200]), 55.
54 Leape (1999), 35; VincenUReason (1999), 42.
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S. S Elimination ofpsychological precursors
Psychological precursors are circumstances, either of endogenous or exogenous
nature, that affect healthcare professionals and can significantly increase the risk
that those professionals may eventually commit errors leading to adverse events.











use of alcohol andlor drugs
inadequate working environment.
Measures such as good schedule and working regulation management can
reduce these risk factors55
6 Conclusion
In medical law there are two different sorts of incentives that the legal system
can give. On the one hand, the law can privilege hard incentives, "sticks",
according to a strategy of promoting accountability through deterrence,
according to the premise that "the foresight of being held liable ex post will
induce the healthcare provider ex ante to take efficient care"~. On the other
hand, the law can privilege soft incentives, "carrots", by shielding healthcare
professionals from personal liability, shifting the responsibility of preventing
medical adverse events to the hospital and to regulation. These two approaches
can be combined and their advantages and disadvantages balanced.
The consequence of the deterrence approach is that individual practitioners and
hospitals will presumably be more careful while carrying out treatment,
presuming that liability is adequately enforced, and that the moral hazard of
insurance is reduced by a correct experience rating of the premiums'. However,
the dynamics of the procedure and the fault-based system can lead to a defensive
55 Leape (1999) 35.
56 Faure in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004), 9.
57 Faure in Faure~ICoziol (2001), 299.
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"blame and silence culture " '" which prevents a transparent assessment of the
causes of adverse events. In addition, when human and organisational factors
contributed to the adverse event it is sometimes unclear who was responsible.
This is true especially when a healthcare professional is the man holding the
smoking gun, the proximal cause of the injury when a latent root cause of an
institutional nature is triggeredsy.
The law can also give healthcare providers soft incentives: such as shifting
liability totally or partially (recourse in case of gross negligence) from the
individual providers to the hospital and encouraging non-litigious alternative
resolution of inedical disputes procedures. The advantages of this approach are:
(i) practitioners have an incentive (they will not be blamed) to report adverse
events and near misses, with no necessity of being defensive; (ii) many risks can
only be effectively controlled by top-level decision makers; (iii) it helps the
prevention of risks by learning from failure. However, individual practitioners
can be under-deterred; the financial consequences of institutional liability can be
burdensome for small hospitals in competitive healthcare markets; independent
professionals acting independently within the framework of a hospital may not
be satisfied with a hierarchical framework of their activity and there are
migration costs linked to the change of the organisational culture of the
hospitals~.
Concerning the negligence model, in the English~Welsh legal system most
healthcare is provided in the framework of the National Healthcare Service
(NHS), and this institution, not the individual practitioner, is the liable partyb'.
Recently some shifts took place in order to improve the safety of patients in
EnglandlWales: the clinical governance strategy decided by the NHS in the
report An Organisation with a MemorybZ, the implementation of the NHS
Litigation Authority, responsible for handling clinícal negligence claims, and the
acceptance of the recommendations of the Woolf report~' fostered a shift towards
a change in the culture, including explanations and apologies to patients, open
communication between hospitals and patients, pre-action protocols and
alternative dispute resolutionh'. In Germany there is no institutional liability,
unless for injuries caused directly by the hospital, though there is a facilitation of
proof under the doctrine of Organisationsverschulden~'. However, there are
alternative mechanisms for the resolution of inedical disputes (Gutachten-
58 Atiyah (1997), 138; MerrylSmith (2001), 68; Mulchey~Rosenthal (1999), 6.
59 Cf. Chapter 4 (3).
60 Cf CMO (2000); Kohn et al. (2000), 109.
6l CMO (2001).
62 CMO (2000).
63 Woolf Report (1996).
64 Kennedy~Grubb(2000).
65 Cf, Chapter 1(3,6) and 3(7,2).
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komissionen; Schlichtungsstellen der Landesdrztekammern)~. In England and
Wales the two sets of incentives are combined.
In Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance systems, the individual practitioner is
shielded from liability, and compensation is provided by non-experienced rated
dedicated insurance. Practitioners involved in adverse events have an incentive
to report adverse events and near misses, and the information obtained is used
by the healthcare regulators to elaborate safety guidelinesó7. The deterrent effect
on medical practitioners was not significantly reduced by the adoption of the no-
fault model, as institutional liability of the hospital existed before. However,
there was no deterrence at the institutional level due to the moral hazard effect
of insuranceóe. The Patient Insurance Association has a recourse action in tort
against the hospital in case of gross negligence, but has no such action in other
cases69.
Institutional liability is the rule in France, in case of treatment carried out in a
hospital, unless the individual practitioner acted with gross negligence (faute
détachable du service)'o. The fault principle was kept in the 2002 reform due to
its deterrence potential. The reform also introduced a non-litigious claims pre-
screening and handling procedure, which has the potential to favour clinical
transparency and learning from failure. The reform also introduced a dense
regulation on the safety ofthe healthcare system".
Summing-up, the proportion in which the two sets of incentives the law gives to
the prevention of inedical adverse events are combined varies in the different
compensation models. The systems also vary because of the influence of
country-specific public healthcare regulation about organisation, safety and
funding of the healthcare system.
66 HansislFlart (2004), 5.
67 Dufwa (1997), 58; Lahti (1994), 210; Mikkonnen (2002), 119.
68 Arsberatning 2003, 124 (Denmark); Erichsen (2001), 356.
69 ~8 DPL; ~9 FPL; ~20 SPL.




Compensation of Treatment Injury
1 Anatomy of iatrogenic injury
In case a patient suffers personal injury arising from medical treatment, i.e.
iatrogenic injury, if the medical mishap was not fatal, the aggrieved patient will
be in a position where the law should compensate damages the patient is entitled
to' .
The injured patient is in a particularly vulnerable position, as he has suffered
damage to his physical and~or psychological health. First, he has incurred in
several expenses emerging immediately and directly from the accident, the
damnum emergens, such as medical expenses to treat the adverse consequences
and consolidation of the injury until settlement of the claim. Second, still within
the scope of pecuniary damage, the patient has, incurred before settlement ofthe
claim (or will presumably incur in the future) in costs to substantiate and present
the claim, as wetl as the costs involved in care provided by a third person,
prosthetic, palliative and other such equipment, etc. Thirdly, as a consequence of
the accident, the patient may see its future revenue reduced by a decrease in her
activity in case of a protracted or permanent handicap, lucrum cessans.
Besides economic loss, the patient has, as a consequence of the treatment injury,
been damaged in one of her most important personal assets: her physical (and~or
psychological) health. The patient may be entitled to compensation for pain and
suffering (pretizim doloris), loss of amenities of life, loss of a faculty and loss of
expectation of life.
Though damages typically are the remedy for treatment injury, another
important remedial instrument consists of explanations and apologies. Empirical
studies and statistics suggest that a considerable amount of patients does not
pursue a malpractice lawsuit after receiving a satisfactory explanation and
apology~. In this chapter I will briefly describe the losses that patients may incur
due to medical injury, as well as how the system deals with the compensation of
those losses.
1 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 39.





Pecuniary damage or economic loss consists of the expenses incurred by the
injured patient as a result of the accident. They can be linked to the direct,
immediate effects of the accident, or be protracted throughout time.
Compensation for pecuniary damage is anchored in the reasoning that, the
patient's economical-patrimonial status after the accident should not be
decreased as a result of the accident.
In the several models analysed, this category of damages tends to be
compensated in full, bearing in mind the concrete situation of the injured person.
In France or the Scandinavian countries, the amount of compensation is indexed
to a schedule of disabilities (barème)J, whereas in others such as England and
Wales, the court will assess it5.
Hospitalisation and other subsequent treatment. Patients victimised by treatment
injury will incur expenses related to further treatment needed in order to remedy
or consolidate the consequences of the accident, insofar as possiblefi. As such,
the patient may recover reasonable medical expenses she has incurred'. It is not
always possible to remedy or even to consolidate, but nevertheless expenses are
incurred. Likewíse, the patient will probably, in particular in case of more
complex or severe injuries, have to pay extended or recurrent future healthcare
expenses.
Prosthetics, Equipment, Ergonomics. To correct or mitigate the consequences of
the accident, patients often bear costs regarding prosthetics (artificial limbs,
teeth, implants) and ancillary equipment having an ancillary or palliative effect
(wheelchairs, adapted locomotion vehicles, work and leisure equipment). Also,
in case of serious permanent handicaps, architectural restructuring of the home
or workplace of an injured patient may be necessary. Receiving compensation
for such expenses enables the patient to recover a certain amount of quality of
life and amenities that she has seen reduced by the consequences of the
treatment accident.
3 Though the contents of this section are not essential to the conclusions of the book, 1
have decided to include them in order to give the reader an overview of the categories of
damages and the method ofcompensation of injuries sustained by patients.
4 Cf Brazier (2003) 193, MarkesinislDeakin, Lambert-Faivre (2000) 175, Oldertz (1989)
29, Brahams (1989) 84; Mikkonen (2001) 351.
5 Brazier (2003) 193, and also Ward v. James [1966] I QB 273, CA, in [he sense that some
uniformity must be acheived by the judicial evaluation of damages.
6 Brazier (2003) 193.
7 MarkesinislDeakin (2003), 814; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 177.
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Care of handicapped people. In case of a patient becomes handicapped, the
services of a third person, such as a nurse, may be essential to maintain or
palliate the life quality of a seriously handicapped victim of treatment injury.
The costs integrated in this category usually consist of periodical payments to an
independent service provider, or a nursing home".
Lost revenue. A patient who suffered treatment may lose revenue- actual and
prospective- she would have earned, if she had not sustained medical injury.
These may resutt from a temporary incapacity or from a permanent incapacity.
Loss revenue usually consists of loss of professional revenue, but may also
entail a loss of company profits9. It is, however, problematic to ascertain the
amount of lost revenue in the case of loss of non-professional revenue (e.g., a
handicapped child), as an appraisal of their potential future income is
speculative'~. It is also difficult to carry out an accurate assessment due to many
variables such as the predictable life expectancy of the injured patient, the
expected duration of his career, employability, inflation, etc". Compensating this
category of losses is vital to assure that the patient's life quality is not reduced
because of the accident, and that her economic status is not reduced.
2.2 Non economic loss
According to Lambert-Faivre, while economic loss is conjugated with the verb
to have and relates to patrimonial rights, non-economic loss is conjugated with
the verb to be, and relates to the dignity of the human being1z.
Non-economic loss consists primarily of pain and suffering (pretium doloris),
comprising the nervous shock of the injured patient, her trauma, as well as
consequential psychological or psychiatric pathologies".
Usually also the following categories ofnon-economic loss are compensated:
loss of amenities of life;
loss of a faculty;
loss of life expectancy;
aesthetical loss;
loss ofsexual and reproductive functions".
8 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 184; LunneylOliphant (2003), 836; Markesinis~Deakin (2004),
816. Cf. the English cases Donelly v. Joyce [1974] QB 454 and Hunt v. Severs [1993]
QB 815.
9 MarkesinislDeakin (2003), 820; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 197.
10 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 201.
11 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 821.
12 Lambert-Faivre (2000), 210.
l3 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 827; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 215.
14 MarkesinislDeakin (2003), 828; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 221.
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Non-economical loss is always difficult to compensate from an objective point
of view, as it relates to immaterial, non-fungible amenities. It is impossible to
quantify objectively the price of pain, of an eye or limb. Its compensation tends
to have a satisfactory role and rather symbolical value in most European legal
systems15.
Awards for non-economic loss can significantly vary from country to country.
For instance, in Europe, average awards for quadriplegia vary between E55,000
in the Netherlands and E333,000 in England1ó. Compensation of this category of
losses can significantly increase the global amount of compensation, though in
an unpredictable scale".
Though a general principle in all European countries, doubts arise on whether or
not this loss should be compensated. On the one hand, as the losses are non-
economic, they cannot be accurately be replaced with money, and hence it is
irrational to compensate them in an arbitrary way. On the other hand, resources
for compensation are scarce, the costs of compensation are spread to consumers
and society, and as such, it is excessive to compensate them. Arguments in
favour of compensation of non-economic loss point out the solace and palliative
function of compensating such losses, as well as the fact that they are not
eligible for coverage by welfare or first party insurance1e.
2.3 Fatal treatment injury
In the unfortunate case where the patient dies, compensation will cover burial
expenses. In addition, family members and other persons depending from the de
cujus may be entitled to damages for bereavement'v
3 The Compensation Method
When it comes to compensating the patient, an important issue that arises is
whether damages should be paid in a lump sum, or according to scheduled
periodical payments.
3.1 Lump Sum awards
In negligence systems, damages are usually awarded in the form of a lump sum,
involving the sum of all the losses, economic and non-economic, incurred by the
aggrieved patient.
I S Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 827; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 215.
I6 Rogers (2001), 295.
17 Brazier (2003) 194.
18 Rogers (2001), 204; Atyiah~Cane (1999), 135, 141.
19 Markesinis~Deakin (2003), 833; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 293.
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The lump sum award system has several disadvantages"'. First of all, once
compensation is awarded, damages can only with difficulty be reviewed if the
health status of the patient deteriorates or improves, as estimation of future
losses can only be approximate. Another caveat is that estimation of damages
can only take place after the consequences of the injury have consolidated,
which means that final adjudication of compensation can significantly be
protracted in time.
Moreover, from an economical point of view, there are circumstances which are
difficult to predict, such as inflation, can severely cut the utility of a lump sum
award to the patient. Likewise, a wrong financial application of the lump sum
can leave the patient unprotected, or he see part of his rent deriving from the
application of the lump sum capital consumed by taxes. Finally, awarding a
lump sum only roughly bears in mind the normal life expectancy of the patient:
this can result in overcompensating some patients21.
3.2 Periodical Payments and Structured Settlements
The direct, immediate losses emerging from treatment injury, as well as those
incurred by the patient before settlement, are adequately covered by a lump sum.
However, in the case of future losses, or loss of revenue, the patient's damage
does not consist of a lump sum, but rather of the loss of an income stream2'. As
such, in this category of situations, a regime of periodical payments appears to
be more apt to compensate patients.
In structured settlements, the defendant, after an initial capital award to cover
the losses referred to in the previous paragraph, instead of paying a lump sum,
invests the damages award in an annuity for an investment fund on the patient's
behalf, in order to meet her needs over time. The structured settlement scheme
allows for revision according to the patients' concrete needs, and elapses after
her demise.
This approach results in lower risk and lower administrative costs for the patient,
is less expensive to the defendant, usually replaced by an insurer, as it will be
closer to the real magnitude of the damages, and it will cut costs as the insurer
can negotiate the financial packages in bulkZ'.
20 Atyiah 1999, 108; Brazier (2003) 196.
21 LunneylOliphant (2003), 808; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 201.
22 Hedley (2000), 321.
23 Brazier (2003), 197; LunneylOliphant (2003), 810.
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4 Comparison of how the different models compensate treatment
injury
4.1 Access to Compensation
Many empirical studies point out that in negligence systems adverse events are
seriously underreported, claims initiation rates are low, and the number of
patients obtaining compensation low. According to Danzon2', the claims
initiation rate is of 1 out of 10 victims of adverse events, out of which 400~0
patients prevailed in the lawsuit. Another high profile inquiry, the Harvard
Medical Practice Study25, has shown that "medical malpractice litigation
infrequently compensates patients injured by medical negligence and razely






Ne li ent adverse events 27.60~0
Claims filed er adverse event 13.80~0
In England, the newly created NHS Litigation Authority reported a similar
situation, as can be read from the following table27.
24 Danzon (1991), 55. This author carried out an empirical study in Califomia between
1975-1978. For a comparison between several empirical studies in the USA, cf. Kohn et
al. (2000), 215 ff.
25 Brennan et al. (1991a) and (1991b). This s[udy was based on a random sample of 31,429
patients hospitalized in New York State (USA) in 1984 with statewide da[a on medical
malpractice claims.
26 Brennan et aL (1991b).
27 CMO (2003), 60; NAO (2001), 8. The NHSLA handles 42"~0 of the claims. The
remaining claims are handled by solicitors advising the specific hospital trust, and data
on claims is fragmented and difficult to assess.
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NHS Liti ation Authori 1995-2002
Estimated adverse eventsl hospital
admissions l 00~0
Average Medical malpractice Claims
er ear
3768
Abandoned b the Patient 280~0
Settled out of the court 470~0
Won in court b the claimant 20~0
Won in court b the NHS lo~o
Yet to ad'udicate 22a~o
A low claims rate is equally reported by a German study from the Robert-Koch
Institut Statistisches BundesamtZ", that estimates that out of 40,000 estimated
negligent adverse events, 12,000 were compensated.
While statistical data on adverse events and claims initiation rates in negligence
systems is usually approximate, based on estimations, extrapolations from
samples, Scandinavian systems present accurate data, due to transparency and
centralised claims handling. The data shows that notwithstanding some country-
to-country variation29, the ratio of patients that present claims for compensation
and who are compensated is higher in Scandinavian countries than in others'~.
Sweden (2003) Finland (2003) Denmark
2003
Total claims 9156 7548 3414
Claims per
100,000 inh. 102 144.59 63.25
Claims
compensated 450~0 350~0 440~0
oro
In France, according to Lambert-Faivre", under-reporting of adverse events and
claims initiation was traditionally low before the reform fostered by the
aforementioned Loi du 4 rnars 2002.
28 HansislHart (2004), 7. In this report, data was extrapolated from data provided by the
insurance company DB Wintherthur and American data on adverse events.
29 The lower number of claims in Denmark while compared with other Scandinavian
schemes is related [o the higher injury seriousness threshold, and is still twice the number
ofclaims that existed before the 1999 refortn.
30 Dute in DutelFaure~fCoziol (2004), 461; Erichsen (2001), 359; Pichler (1994), 375.
31 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 701.
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France (Lambert- Total Per 100,000
Faivre inhabitants
Estimated adverse
events 2000 10,000-20,000 16.21-32.42
Average yearly
reclamations for
adverse events 3070 4.98
1994-2003
Average yearly
lawsuits on the merit
of the claim (1990- 620 1
1992
In Belgium, the current situation corresponds to the normal pattern of
underreporting and low claims initiation rate72.
Belgium Total Per 100,000
inhabitants
Estimated adverse
events 1994 4000 38.48
Reported adverse
events 1994 1994 19.18
Claims abandoned or
that do not follow
suit 1994, estimated 750~0 -
However, the enhanced entitlement of patients to compensation in the
Scandinavian model is not translated forcefully into a high global cost, as can be
inferred by the following charts. Though the global costs rise, as has been the
case in Scandinavian countries, the cost level of the compensation system does
not appear to be linked to the aetiology of the model, but rather with
considerations such as legal tradition and method of assessment of damages, as
can be inferred from the high system costs in the UK.
4.2 Damages awards
Economic loss, either immediate or future, obeys in all models to the principle
of full reparation, regardless of their aetiology. The differences in the amount of
compensation from country to country tend to vary according to the purchasing
power, income, costs of healthcare, method of assessment of damages (barèmes
32 Proposition de loi organisant Pindemnisation des accidents médicaux sans faute
médicaleNVetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van medische ongevallen zonder medische
fout, 3-213I1; Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaat; 19~09I2003, pages 4 and 12.
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or determination by judges and~or jury), and legal tradition. Likewise, awards
for non-economical loss tend to vary from country to country, irrespective of the
aetiology of the model, according to the importance given to the solace function
of this category of damages.
It is difficult to obtain access to comprehensive information on the amounts of
compensation paid in the different countries, as in many countries damages are
awarded according to a case-by-case approach. It is thus difficult to do a
systematic study of the amounts of compensation.
It is possible however to obtain a superficial comparative picture of the extent of
damages awards from reports and casebooks. Faure~ICoziol edited a collective
casebook on the compensation of inedical treatment injury, having as a starting
point a collection of six cases decided by German courts. It was then asked from
several national reporters how would their national systems predictably
compensate the injury in the different cases, and how would damages be
calcul ated".
In one of the cases analysed, a baby had suffered injury of extreme seriousness
because of negligent behaviour of the doctorlhospital when the baby's mother
was in labour. The infant became permanently handicapped, suffering from
"severe cerebral movement deficits in the sense of tetraplegia with highly
irregular patterns", a hip luxation on both sides preventing him to sit or walk by
himself. The court held the defendant liable". The German court determined
damages for the several categories (economic loss, loss of earnings, and pain
and suffering) in the amount ofE 1,175,99575.
The English reporter only mentions how much damages would be awarded for
pain and suffering: E163,613 to E199,404'h, though in a very similar case, all
items of compensation included, the patient recovered around EI million".
According to the Swedish reporters, the patient would receive E79,762 lump
sum and E24,031 per year after his 215` birthday, excluding expenses related to
subsequent medical treatment, prosthetics, equipment, ergonomics and
customised care, which are not dealt with in the preliminary decision of the
claim'". The French reporter compares the problem case with the decision of a
similar case in France, where the patient was awarded E1,627,963 including
33 Faure~Koziol (2001).
34 Case 5, Faure~ICoziol (200]), 22.
35 Faure~ICoziol (2001), 26.
36 Rogers in FaurelKoziol (2001), 238.
37 Hollie Calladine case, cited by Brazier (2003), f96. The same author mentions that in
some cases damages awards for medical injury exceeded E4,200,000. The highest
damages awards ever paid by the NHS for a medical liabiliry case were E10 million plus
a structured settlement of E350,000 per year CMO (2003), 38.
38 Dahlman~Vendel in in Faure~iCoziol (2001), 200.
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medical costs, permanent nursing, ergonomics, permanent handicap, pain and
suffering, aesthetical prejudice an loss of amenities, but not the cost of
adaptation of the domicile, which evaluation was postponed to a later moment'''.
Though the amount of damages paid under the Danish patient insurance scheme
does not figure in the report, in a similar case, according to the rules of
calculation of damages of the Danish Patient Insurance, the patient would
receive awards amounting to around E495,500, excluding medical costs'o.
Damages awards paid by Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes are
not below those of the tort system of that country, with the exception of Sweden,
where the maximum amount of damages for an accident suffered by a patient
has a cap of E871,116". In fact, the patient insurance laws refer to the law of
torts in regards to the calculation of damages4z. Second, the compensation
awards are not as low that they could be in breach of Article 6 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for
denial of tort remedies, as Jones suggests". For instance, in 1998 in Sweden,
compensation awards varied between EI 10 and f805,700, and the average award
was ê9,050". Damages awards in general are, by comparison, lower in
Scandinavian legal systems than in many other European countries, though the
awards given by the Patient Insurance are similar to those in Scandinavian tort
law. An important fact is, that in Scandinavian countries healthcare is cost free
for patients, and social security is very far reaching, covering the costs of
nursing and ergonomics equipment'S. Also in the French model, compensation of
medical accidents in light of the principle of solidarity obey to the general rules
of fault-based liability in that two-step model'~. The average payments per point
of permanent incapacity for the several categories of personal injury can be
consulted in Lambert-Faivre. The average compensation of a person with a
permanent handicap of more than 800~o is E1,057,200".
4.3 Costs of the Compensatron System
Usually in negligence systems the exact magnitude and distribution of costs is
difficult to estimate, as not enough accurate information on the provider level is
39 CA Paris, lre civ. 7I0711998, Bull. Civ. I, 239 in Galand-Carval in in FaurellCoziol
(2001), 121.
40 httpaiuk.patientforsikringen.dklProcedurelttid3903961.
41 According to ~] 0 SPL the ceiling for each accident is 200 times the basic index of prices
(basbelopp). The index for 2005 is SEK 39,400 (E4,355).
42 Mikkonen (2001), 353; Westerh~ll (1993), 74.
43 Jones in Dute, Faure, Koziol (2004), 182.
44 Wendel in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004), 383.
45 Wendel in Dute~FaurellCoziol (369).
46 Castelletta (2002) 80.
47 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 273.
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available, as it is highlighted by Fenn, Hermans and Dingwall`" or the Belgian
Reform Proposal'y. Until the beginning of the activity of the NHS Litigation
Authority, information of sufficient quality about adverse events in hospitals
was not available. The magnitude of the costs is usually only estimated by
sampling, as the Harvard Medical Practice Study and Danzon's Califomia
Studies point out'o
It is as such difficult to evaluate with certainty, which is the cheapest system.
The following chart compares the cost of compensating patients with the number
of claims and of compensated claims. Though the table illustrates the aspects
related to the cost and the reach of a system, it cannot be regarded as a fully
trustworthy picture of the problem. One of the reasons is that it is based on data
originating from different sources, and obtained through different methodologies
and from different years. Though there is full transparency and availability of
exact and continuous data from the Scandinavian systems, data from other
countries is based on projections and extrapolations carried out by academic or
governmental studies limited to specific periods. Lack of transparency and
publicity or dispersion of sources makes obtaining aggregate exact data difficult
or impossibles'.
In addition, the costs presented here are difficult to compare due to the different
levels of aggregation of the data, and mostly exclude extra costs incurred by
national healthcare systems in subsequent treatment of injury sustained by the
patient52. Moreover, compensation provided by social security to patients is not
included in this table. The data sources are very different.
Data from England was obtained from publications of the Department of Health,
the National Audit Office and the NHS Litigation Authority57. However, some of
the data is incomplete, and the costs presented in the table are those from the
National Health Service hospitals only (though NHS hospitals are virtually a
monopoly of hospital care) and thus exclude private medical care.
Data from Germany is based on a 2004 report from the Robert-Koch Instituts'.
This study poínts out that there are no global statistics for occurrence of adverse
events, claims rates and costs. The figures presented here are estimations based
48 Fenn et aL (1994), 389.
49 Proposition de loi organisant !'indemnisation des accidents médicaux sans faute
médicale~Wetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van medische ongevallen zonder medische
jout, 3-213i1; Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaat; 19t0912003.
50 Danzon (1991), 55; Brennan et al. (1991a) and (19916).
51 On the obstacles of obtaining data in the UK, cf. Fenn et aL (1994), 389.
52 This factor would increase the presented cost by E5.81 per capita in the iJK. Cf DH
(2000), viii-




on samples obtained from arbitration courts, public institutions and more in
particular the insurance company DB Winterthur.
Scandinavian countries regularly publicise their exact results in detail, and
information is easily obtained from the Internetss. It must be highlighted that
these figures are exact data, not estimations.
Data from France is data from the S.H.A.M., the institution that insures public
hospitals in France, and is processed by Lambert-Faivresb. Finally, the figures for
Belgium are those estimations provided by the travaux préparatoires of the
ongoing reforms'.
Given the disparateness of the sizes of the countries compared in this table,
figures are presented in proportion to the population58. Costs are presented in a
cost per inhabitant base, as adopted by Dutesy. Claims rates are presented in a per
hundred thousand inhabitants base, which is the most common standard in
statistics while considering the occurrence of an event as related to the total
population.
A very important remark in the data concerning France and Belgium is that they
do not reflect yet the effect of the reforms carried out or in plan. They do not
provide the reader with an answer as to the efficiency or cost of the dualistic
modeL However, they highlight a previous situation of low patient access and
cost control by limiting claims, possibly valid claims. This was one of the
reasons for the reform.
55 Sweden: URL: ~httpalwww.lof-forsakring.com~;
Finland: URL:~http:llwww.vakes.filpvkh;
Denmark: URL:~http:~lwww.patientforsikringen.dkh .
56 Lambert-Faivre (2004), 841.
57 Proposition de loi organisant I'indemnisation des accidents médicaux sans faute
médicale~Wetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van medische ongevallen ~onder medische
fout, 3-213i1; Sénat de Belgique~Belgische Senaat; 19I09I2003, page 4 ff.
58 Figures on population were obtain from EUROSTAT.
59 Dute in DutelFaurelFCoziol (2004), 461.
102
Compensation of Treatment Injury
Country Cost (E per Claims per Compensated
capita) 100,000 Claims per 100,000
inhabitants. inhabitants.
England 11 20 5
1998-9
Germany 4 27 8
1999
Sweden 4 106 45
1999
Finland 3 134 47
1999
Denmark 4 54 17
1999
France 0.6 5 -
(average
1994-2003
Bel ium 0.5 15 4
4.4 Administration and litigation costs
A remarkable difference between the models emerges from the costs related to
the settlement of a claim for medical injury. These preponderant items in the
tertiary costs of compensation`~ of inedical injury consist on costs of litigation
and costs expertise.
Costs related to litigation and administrative overhead are higher in negligence
systems than in no-fault systems, as a consequence of the non-litigious
characteristic of the procedure and the fact that a dedicated institution with its
own expertise is in charge of the settlement of the claims. They are the
percentage of the global cost of the compensation system that is consumed in
handling, processing and litigation, i.e. not in payment of damages to victims`~'.
The following table shows the tertiary costs in some European countriesbZ. The
figures for the Scandinavian countries are exact figures, whereas those for
England and Belgium are estimations.
60 Calabresi (1970).
61 Barendrecht et al (2004), 99.
62 Pearson Report, ~669 ff.; Jones (2004), 183; Dute in DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 462;
Danzon 1994, Myths and Realities, 453; Proposi[ion de loi organisant t'indemnisation
des accidents médicaux sans jaute médicale~Wetsvoorste! tot schadeloosstelling van










The higher administration costs in negligence models tends to be higher due to
the litigious and protracted claims settlement procedure, involving legal fees,
attorney fees and high costs of expertise. The ex oj~cio settlement of claims in
Patient insurance models, as well as their integration of a panel of experts
drastically cuts the costs in this category. Likewise, the new French model has
the potential to achieve the same level of efficiencyfi'.
4.5 Thresholds
Another main difference between the models analyzed is the existence of
thresholds. While in negligence systems, all injuries qualify for compensation
under liability law, regardless of their severity, the other models opt for limiting
the global costs of compensation to injury above a certain threshold of severity~.
Regarding the No-Fault model, in Sweden, the threshold is set as such: injuries
causing 30 days of working incapacity, those causing 10 days of extension of
hospitalisation, those causing irreversible damage and those causing the death of
the patient qualify for compensation under the scheme. The severity threshold is
E76.29. In Finland ~3 FPL contains a general clause establishing that minor
injuries are not to be covered by the scheme. The threshold was set casuistically
at E84.10. In Denmark, ~5 (2) DPL sets the bagatelle injury threshold at E1346.
The threshold was E2692 before the 1999 amendment of the DPL. After the
amendment, average number of claims raised by 1~3 and costs doubled. The
bagatelle threshold is much higher (around 17 times more) than in the other
Scandinavian schemes, and that disproportion was criticisedbs
In the French model, the threshold for compensation regardless of fault
according to the principle of solidarity is set at the level of 240~o permanent
disability, as allowed by Art. L.1121-1-II~.
63 Art. L-142 CSP; cf Castelletta(2002) 172.
64 Notwithstanding the possibility of opting for filing a lawsuit according to the Law of
Torts in the Scandinavian model, or a normal lawsuit for liability for faulty [reatment in
France according to the provisions of Art. L.l 121-7.
65 Erichsen (2001), 359; Pichler (1994), 376; KrenchelBroberg, (1995).
66 Castelletta (2002), 170.
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In those models thresholds have the function of limiting compensation to serious
injuries (though in practice virtually any injury is severe enough to overcome the
threshold set by the Swedish and Finnish construction), thus reducing the costs
of the system and focusing on compensating preferentially the most serious
injuries.
4.6 Conclusions
It is traditionally argued that alternative models of compensation of treatment
injury provide lower awards of damages than negligence models. The reader has
been presented throughout this chapter with arguments that deny a direct
connection between the characterisation of the compensation model and the
damages award, influenced by other factors. No significant model specific
difference in awards could be noticed.
Tertiary costs, such as administration and litigation costs are lower in the
Scandinavian model and have that potential in the French model. This reduction
in costs is due to the non-litigious settlement of claims as well as logistic and
organizational features of the procedure and the institutions administering it. In
the Scandinavian No-Fault model and in the French model, insofar as the
compensation of inedical accidents under the principle of solidarity is invoked,
access to compensation is, to a varying extent, limited to serious injury sustained
by the patient, notwithstanding her right of redress according to the traditional
liability system. More patients have access to compensation in the Scandinavian
systems.
The costs of the compensating patients increase with the implementation of a
patient insurance scheme, but tend to stabilize in a controlled, predictable and
sustainable fashion. While in the UK between 1990-2000 the costs increased by
7500~05', in Sweden in the same period claims raised by SOo~o6e. In the UK, where
the several legal systems are based on the negligence model, global costs are in
average threefold the Scandinavian countries, nine times more patients being
entitled to compensation.
It can be inferred that the type of the model of compensation does not allow us
to conclude that any of the models reduces the bulk cost ofcompensation. It can
be concluded though, that the two models alternative to negligence reduce the
marginal cost of compensating one more patient. There is no clear trade-off
between enhanced entitlement to compensation and the principle of full
compensation.
67 CMO (2003), 9.
68 Erichsen (2001), 367.
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Medical Liability in the 21St Century
I Introduction
Throughout this book the reader has been presented with information about why
and how medical accidents happen, how different legal systems address the
prevention and compensation of these unfortunate events, and how well they
fare in achieving that purpose.
However, the objective of this book is not just to present the reader with plain
facts, however useful they are to a legal professional, a healthcare professional, a
researcher or a lawmaker. The final aim is to compare the advantages and
disadvantages of the several contrasting systems, identify shifts in these models,
point out their contribution to the discussion, and finally identify a set of
guidelines that can improve the compensation of injury caused by medical
treatment.
Regarding the initial research question, how is medical injury compensated in
European countries, we have seen that three trends, three models exist in
Europe. The negligence or malpractice model is present in most European
countries, as well as in most countries over the world. The Scandinavian no-fault
patient insurance model exists in Scandinavian countríes. Finally, a dualistic
compensation model was implemented in France. A similar legal regime is
being debated by the Belgian legislature.
The second research question was set to give an answer as to which of these
models, if any, is more adequate to compensate medical injury. In this last
chapter, I proceed with the analysis and evaluation of these three models
according to an evaluation grid. Though the three models address the problem of
medical accidents in different ways, we will see that none of the three is clearly
the "best". Each model has both advantages and disadvantages. Due to the
influence of local settings and diverging policy preferences, merely impulsively
importing an existent model does not seem like a realistic approach.
2 The Evaluation Grid
The evaluation grid I will use to benchmark the three systems covers three
different dimensions. Firstly, the systems are analysed according to the impact
of the compensation procedure on the satisfaction of patients and healthcare
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providers, as well as its effects on the quality of the patient-healthcare provider
relationship. The second evaluation dimension consists of how well does the
system achieve the aim of preventing treatment injury. Finally, the third
dimension assesses the costs of the compensation system, their structure and
how they are distributed. For each dimension, I use several more concrete
criteri a.
These dimensions were chosen to benchmark the compensation models, as they
provide a good global picture of the problems that concern medical injury, its
prevention and compensation. The satisfaction of patients and healthcare
professionals with the compensation system, as well as the continuation and
quality of their relationship is a very important criterion in this dimension, as it
depicts how efficient, reasonable, humane and swift the procedure is to the
parties involved. It is a factor that has a decisive impact on the costs, the
preventive effect and the acceptability of a compensation system, and hence is
used here as one ofthe evaluation criteria.
The evaluation of the satisfaction of patients (I) involves several criteria that are
more concrete. Entitlement to compensation (1) relates to how broad the access
of patients to compensation is. The more patients are entitled to compensation,
the more satisfied patients are with the system. Another criterion considered, the
impact of the procedure (2), is also relevant to the satisfaction of patients, which
is lowered by factors such as procedural hurdles, long and expensive procedures
and uncertainty of its outcomes contribute to dissatisfaction. Finally, the quality
of compensation (3), in the sense of full compensation for the damage suffered,
is important to the satisfaction of those patients who are entitled compensation.
The satisfaction of patients is a very important policy preference and its absence
is very often the source of criticism by the legal and the public opinion.
The satisfaction of healthcare professionals (4) evaluates their approval or not of
the compensation system. These professionals have important interests that are
affected by the compensation system, and dissatisfaction can lead to negative
consequences in the administration of healthcare and the costs of the system.
Healthcare professionals and hospitals are also likely to engage in higher costs
and lower output medical practice if they are held liable too easily and~or too
often.
In addition, the relationship between the doctor and patient (5) may suffer as a
consequence of the injury, exposing the patient to a lack of procedural evidence
to substantiate her claim, and possibly even to risks to her healthcare related to
interruption of that treatment by that professional or hospital. The continuation
and the quality of this relationship is important to the healthcare condition of the
patient, and is also a condition to achieve better prevention of adverse events, as
well as a climate of trust between patients and healthcare professionals in
general, that largely benefits the quality of healthcare.
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How well does a compensation model fare in preventing treatment-related injury
from happening (II) is another dimension chosen as a benchmark. Prevention of
medical injury is one of the goals of liability law and is has a decisive impact in
the quality of healthcare, an ever-present objective of any policy decision. The
evaluation grid assesses two criteria in the prevention dimension: the
accountability of healthcare providers (6) and risk management (7).
Finally, the costs of the system ( III) build up the third criterion. No change or
reform of a compensation system can be thought ofwithout bearing in mind how
would it affect the costs of the system. Similarly, higher probable costs are an
incentive to inactivity. The costs of the system play a decisive role in its design.
Calabresi' divides costs in three categories:
primary costs, i.e. the net damages awards paid to victims of
accidents plus the costs of preventing accidents;
secondary costs, i.e. the costs of spreading costs through the
injurer and society (costs of insurance, social security) and
tertiary costs, i.e. administrative costs inherent to the liability
system (litigation, expertise, transaction).
I use, on the one hand, the sum of the share of prímary costs that consists of
damages awarded to victims and the tertiary costs as parameters for the
evaluation of the compensation system. I chose not to follow the Calabresi
method thoroughly for several reasons. On one hand, the share of the primary
costs related to the prevention of accidents could not be backed by empirical
evidence. On the other hand, analysing the secondary costs of inedical injury
would significantly enlarge the scope of this dissertation, as it would have been
necessary to deeper research the impact of insurance and social security in
medical liability. However, the share of primary costs that consists of damages
awarded to victims and the tertiary costs are very relevant evaluation
parameters. The first because it gives a reasonable idea of how high the global
costs are; the latter as lower tertiary costs are an estimate of the efficiency of the
system.
The three dimensions articulate in the form of a triangle. The satisfaction of
patients and healthcare professionals, and quality doctor-patient relationship
illustrate the humane, intimate face of the compensation system in action, and
point out how good the compensation system is from the perspective of those
who experience it in action. Secondly, the prevention of treatment injury and the
quality of healthcare are important policy preferences. The quality and safety of
the healthcare system draw the awareness and concern of public opinion and




the system determines decisively the policy preferences that are the foundation
of the compensation system, the base of the triangle.
These evaluation dimensions and their more concrete criteria were chosen
because they provide the reader with a good insight upon the models for
compensation of inedical injury and how they work in practice. Likewise, some
of these assessment criteria, and their relevance within each system help to
highlight some policy preferences that can eventually lead to the choice of the
"best" system under the specific local settings.
Each model is appraised according to the several dimensions and criteria in the
evaluation grid. The blank grid is structured as follows. The several systems will
be appraised according to the different criteria, and the grid will be filled in with








The appraisal of the systems according to the different evaluation criteria will be
explained in the text. This evaluation has the limitations that some of its
conclusions are based on the balance of subjective opinions of authors expressed
in literature, national reports in comparative casebooks, government reports and
travaux préparatoires, and sometimes are not backed by hard evidence. This is a
limitation of doing legal research in a topic where not all empirical data can be
acquired in a systematic way, and legal science meets political and economic
rationales. Nevertheless, I believe that an imperfect evaluation is better than
none at all, even if these problems lead the evaluation to be somewhat of a
subjective nature.
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I Satisfaction of Patients and Healthcare Professional and Quality of
their Relationship
A. Satisfaction of Patients
If inedical injury occurs, the patient is the first to suffer. She suffers both
physically and mentally, endures pain and incurs expenses resulting from further
medical treatment, vindication of her rights as a patient, etc. The patient's
quality of life and financial resources are reduced by virtue of the medical
related injury, unless the consequences of the accident are remedied, totally or
partially, either by the mechanism of liability law, or by the effect of social
security benefits~.
2 Magnus (2003), 280; Faure in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004), 66 and Faure~Iartlief in




(1) Entitlement to Compensation
According to Faure', liability law only compensates the injury sustained by a
patient insofar as it can be established that it was caused by treatment, in
contrast with social security that provides compensation to patients irrespective
of the existence of a relationship between treatment and injury. Thus, access to
compensation will depend upon whether or not the injury sustained by the
patient meets the requirements set by the law. These requirements are the access
criteria'.
In negligence systems, these are normally the existence of a duty of care owed
by the healthcare provider vis-à-vis the patient, the breach of said duty of care by
lack of compliance with the standards of the medical art, a línk of causation
between the breach of duty of care and the injury, and finally the existence of
damages. These are the elements that, according to Markesinis and Deakin,
"together make up any successful negligence claim"6.
The record of negligence in providing patients access to compensation is not
brilliant. The aggrieved patient (or her bereaved family) bear the burden of proof
of breach of duty of care and causation, as well as the costs of litigation under
uncertainty, due to the unpredictable nature of inedical litigation. The
unpredictability of the system is related to the nature of inedical treatment and
its inherent risks, the difficulty of establishing causation and fault. According to
Brazier', the dividing line between negligence and no negligence is paper-thin.
In negligence systems, adverse events are seriously underreported, claims
initiation rates are low and rare, and few patients obtain compensation, whereas
Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes enable more patients to access
to compensation, which is the main policy preference of those systemse.
Whereas in Sweden in the 1970's, before the introduction of the no-fault patient
insurance scheme, liability law under the Patientskádelag compensated less than
ten patients in average per year, 1014 were compensated in 1975, the first year
after the reform. This claims rate increased moderately as the population became
increasingly informed about the insurance scheme'.
3 Faure in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004), 67.
4 Cf. Chapter 3.
5 Cf. Chapter 3 (2).
6 MarkesinislDeakin (1999), 69; Penneau (1996), 22; Laufs~Uhlenbruck (1999), 853;
Jourdain (2002), 87; Art. L. 1 142-1 Code de la Santé Publique.
7 Brazier (2003), 241.
8 Cf Chapter 4 (4).
9 Danzon (1994), 204; Landstingsf2srbundet, UtvBrdering, Tabelle la, S.63, apud Pichler
(1994); Wendel in DutelFaurelKoziol (2004), 383; Dute in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004),
461.
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Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes, which compensate treatment
injury insofar as it could have been prevented or if their gravity is
disproportionate to the treatment performed'~ gives many more patients access to
compensation". It cannot however be ignored, that no-fault patient insurance is
criticised because of the vagueness and lack of clarity in the formulation of the
access criteria. Bearing in mind that no system could afford a full coverage of
treatment related injury, it is difficult to draft precise and sufficiently objective
criteria to sort out under which circumstances an injury is eligible for
compensation without resorting to the culpa criterion12. The access criteria have
a vague appearance, are complex in their operation, and as such, are criticised
for not providing the needed legal certainty".
Another reason for criticism related to the one mentioned before, is the fact that
causation must still be proven. From the legal science point of view, this is by
far the most powerful critic to Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance schemes.
Though the obstacle of establishing fault is removed and replaced with a
different set of criteria to qualify injury eligible for compensation, causation
must still be established, which would still be an obstacle in claim settlement.
According to the critics, in the end, just removing the barrier of fault would not
solve any problem in medical liability, as it is more difficult to establish
causation than fault".
However, causation is interpreted in practice in a flexible way, favourable to
patients: a reasonable probability that the injury was caused by treatment
suffices. Causation is evaluated according to a practical approach, and the staff
of the Patient Insurance Boards takes in account the overall circumstances, the
statistical probabilities, the timing of events and practical experience derived
from analysis of similar situations15.
Notwithstanding the evident uncertainties in the black letter rules regarding the
access criteria, the "law in action" shows that some legal certainty is achieved in
practice in the decisions of the patient insurance boards.
In France, as a follow-up of the reform fostered by the Loi du 4 mars 2002, two
devices were created in order to enhance the access of patients to compensation.
Firstly, this dualistic regime distinguishes between negligent medical adverse
events, compensated regardless of fault, and medical accidents, compensated by
a dedicated fund under the principle of solidarity, insofar as the fortuitous
10 Cf. Chapter 3 (3).
I I Cf Chapter 5(5).
12 Pichler ( 1997) 188.
l3 Cf Chapter 3 (3).
l4 Pichler (1997) 193, CMO (2003) 106, Mann ( 1989) 10.




accident caused a permanent disability threshold of more than 240~0". Secondly,
an amiable procedure for claims handling and resolution of disputes was set up",
under the auspices of regional compensation and conciliation commissions,
steered by the ONIAM, the national office for compensation of inedical
accidents. One of the main objectives of the reform was to enhance the
protection of patients18. The reformed system has the potential to foster this
objective, though is still early to have a solid empirical basis to ascertain its
performance19.
The system defined by the Belgian reform proposal follows the footsteps of the
French model, though the gravity threshold demanded for compensation of
medical accidents irrespective of fault is set at 15oro permanent incapacity or 6
months temporary incapacity. This threshold is significantly lower than the level
of 240~0 of the French system- a fact that can potentially lead to a more far-
reaching entitlement of patients to compensation. Similarly to the French
construction, an alternative resolution of disputes mechanism is to be eventually
set upZO.
Summing up, in this particular aspect, the access of patients to compensation of
medical treatment related injury is better in no-fault patient insurance schemes
than in negligence systems. In fact, this was the preponderant policy preference
behind the reform in Scandinavian countries. Though the French reform has the
potential to enhance patient's access to compensation, it is too early to ascertain
the impact of the reform. One of the criticisms that was pointed out before
concerns the significantly high threshold adoptedZ', 240~0, which according to
Lambert-FaivreZZ, excludes 950~0 of the victims of inedical adverse events from
compensation under the principle of solidarity. In this category the negligence
model is evaluated as very unsatisfactory (--), the no-fault model as very
satisfactory (-~f), and the French model as potentially satisfactory (-~).
(2) Impact of the Procedure
Another aspect of the compensation system that affects the status of the patient
after injury has occurred is the procedure. In the aftermath of the injury, the
patient is in a fragile physical status. She is affected by deficient information
regarding the circumstances that led to the occurrence of the injury, as well as
l6 Art. L. 1142-1 CSP; Décret no. 2003-314 du 4 avril 2003.
17 Art. L. 1 142-5; R. 1142-5 CSP.
18 Rachet-Darfeuille in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004); Lambert-Faivre (2004), 709.
19 Cf. however the 2003 and First semester 2004 activity reports at URL:
~httpllwww. oni am. fr~.
20 Cf Chapter 5(4); Décret no. 2003-314 du 4 avrr12003, Art. 15.
21 Article I of the Décret no20003-314 du 4 avril 2003 relatif au caractère de gravité des
accidents médícaux, des affections iatrogènes et des infections nosocomiales, J.O. no 81,
SI4I2003, 6114.
22 Lambert-Faivre (2002), 1371. Lambert-Faivre (2004), 710.
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the prospects for recovery from that injury. In addition, patients often experience
a lack of financial support. This can be aggravated by the procedure necessary to
obtain compensation (adversarial nature, litigiousness, fonn, length, financial
hurdles, procedural hurdles, expertise, etc.).
In a pure negligence system, if the parties cannot agree on a settlement,
compensation of treatment injury is normally decided by a court of law,
according to the applicable law of torts or contract. The procedure is said to be
litigious, adversarial, sluggish, uncertain, expensive and stressful. The nature of
this procedure has a significant impact on its actorsZ'.
One of the risks of adversarial and litigious procedures is double-victimisation.
After having already been victimized by the injury it has suffered in relationship
with treatment, the patient runs the risk of being victimized again by the legal
system. Thus, it is not a surprise that many injured patients refrain from seeking
legal solace for their injury, as the obstacles seem insurmountable24. The ínjured
patient fights alone against a medical establishment backed by insurance
companies supported by efficient legal and expert advisors25. However, some
patients are backed up by first party insurance, healthcare insurance or social
security. Moreover, in many countries, patient associations have been formed;
they sometimes act as a counterbalance, providing legal and medical expertiseZb.
The compensation procedure in Scandinavian no-fault systems does not take
place before a court of 1aw27. The patient files the reclamation with a patient
insurance consortium by means of a standard form. Then, the patient insurance
consortium processes the claims, concluding by giving a recommendation to the
insurer. This recommendation can be appealed to a Patient Insurance Appeals
Board. The system is fast and cost-free to the patient2e. Furthermore, the
procedure in no-fault patient insurance is non-adversarial and non-litigious, and
the claim is adjudicated according to an investigation of the circumstances of the
case based mostly on written evidence. These features of the procedure help to
reduce the chances of double victimisation, though not totally excluding them.
23 Cf. Chapter 2(I); Brazier (2003) 240; CMO (2003) 14; Penneau (1996), 121; Viney
(1997), 107; Danzon (1994).
24 Proposition de loi organisant 1'indemnisation des accidents médicaux sans faute
médicaleNVetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van medische ongevallen zonder medische
fout, 3-213I1; Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaar, 19I09I2003, page 12; Fagnart (1997),
43; Dewees, Don et aL (1996) apud KennedylGrubb (2000), 570.
25 Vansweevelt ( 1996) apud Proposition de loi organisant I'indernnisation des accidents
médicaux sans faute médicalelWetsvoorstel tot schadeloosstelling van medische
ongevallen zonder medische fout, 3-213~1; Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaat;
19I09~2003, page 10.
26 E.g. Patients Association in the LJK, URL:~httpalwww.patients-association.com~ or
Lidème in France, URL: ~httpa~asso.lideme.free.fr ~.
27 Cf Chapter 2 (2).
28 Brahams ( 1989), 85; Mikkonen (2001), 351.
115
Chapter 6
If a party does not agree with the decision of the Patient Insurance Board, it can
appeal to arbitration or to a court of law. The procedure in a Patient Insurance
scheme does not demand the intervention ofan attorney or the advice of inedical
experts on behalf of the patient. Likewise, the simplicity of the several steps of
the procedure is manifest. The complaints form includes a summary of the
procedure and the access criteria to the system, and clear instructions how to
complete it. Each decision of the institutions involved in the claim settling is
accompanied by instructions on the further steps, including in case of refusal of
a claim, the appeal channels available.
Finally, the procedure is swift, due to the dedicated architecture of the board and
removal of obstacles to access information. The procedure is intensely
computerised and the institutions have their own experts.
However, there are some criticisms to the fast track simplification of the
compensation system and the disapproval of malpractice litigation. According to
Pichler29,there is a lack of institutional legitimacy in the compensation procedure
in no-fault patient insurance schemes, as it is not in the protective sphere of
judicial control. Danzon goes further by asserting that the rights of patients are
limited by the simplification of procedures due to its inquisitorial nature'o.
In the French model, regional commissions were created to handle claims,
mediate and distribute claims to the adequate instances, in particular by
identifying which injuries qualify for compensation under the principle of
solidarity in case of inedical accidents. Likewise, the commissions seek pre-trial
settlement of disputes between patients and insurers, in case of fault based
liability". The commissions equally provide expertise to injured patients. A
similar system is set by the Belgian draft'Z.
Summing up, the best record in promoting a more simple, non-litigious,
gratuitous and swift procedure for compensation of treatment injury belongs to
the Scandinavian no-fault patient insurance, though in exchange for some lack
of judicial protection". The mediation and claims handling administrative
structure in-built in the French construction is potentially able to achieve good
results, though the empirical backing of this assumption is not yet present due to
the novelty of the model.
29 Pichler (1997), 206.
30 Danzon ( 1994b), 460.
31 Cf Chapter 2(3); L. 1142-14 CSP; Castelleta (2002), 172; Jourdain (2002), 86;
Lambert-Faivre (2004), 707; Laude (2002), 104.
32 Cf. Chapter 2(3); Proposition de toi organisant 1'indemnisation des accidents médicaux
sans faute médicate~Wetsvoorstel tot schadeloosste(ling van medische ongevallen zonder
medische fout, 3-213I1; Sénat de BelgiqueBelgische Senaat; 19i0912003, art 15.
33 That is not precluded, should the patient bring her claim to a court of law under tort law.
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However, in most negligence legal systems reforms were carried out in recent
years inspired by legal systems where compensation of treatment injury is
operated in an alternative resolution of disputes. For instance, in many German
Lánder mediation and arbitration are common by the Gutachterkommissionen or
Schlichtungsstellen der Landesárztekammern, who received 9800 cases and
solved 6300 cases in 1999". [n the Netherlands the same happened in the
framework of the Geschillencommissie ZiekenhuizenJS. Likewise, in England the
Woolf Report on access to justice (1996) as well as the creation of the NHS
Litigation opened way for the procedural reform in English medical liability
law, privileging claims handling, alternative resolution of disputes, and more
willingness for a fair settlement by the NHS. Thus, a double-victimising,
expensive, long and hurdle-intensive procedure should not be considered as a
keynote of negligence systems. In this category the negligence model is
evaluated as unsatisfactory to mediocre (-~f) varying depending upon the
existence or not of alternative resolution of disputes concerning medical injury,
the no-fault model as satisfactory (f), and the French model as mediocre (t).
(3) Full Compensation
Normally in negligence systems, the patient is entitled to full compensation for
all her damages, pecuniary and non-pecuniary alike'~. Negligence systems are
reputed for providing patients full compensation of all immediate losses, future
treatment expenses, loss of income, pain and suffering, funeral expenses,
bereavement damages, etc. On the other hand, the Scandinavian styled patient
insurance schemes are criticised for not providing patients full compensation".
Though in no-fault patient insurance schemes the principle of full compensation
is followed, the gross amount of compensation is reduced throughout many
mechanisms such as thresholds on the value of the claim (albeit low in Finland
and Sweden)3e. Likewise, there are ceilings in damages paid for bereavement,
support of dependents and future loss of income and deduction of sums already
paid by social security or healthcare insurance. Additionally, the level of awards
for non-pecuniary loss in Scandinavian countries is humble while compared
with many European countries'y. Compensation is usually split between a lump
sum covering the expenses the patient has suffered, and subsequent periodical
settlements'~. Awards for non-economic loss can significantly vary fi-om country
to country" and can significantly increase the global amount of compensation42.
34 Castelletta (2002), 163; Hansisif Iart ( 2004), S.
35 URL: ~http:llwww.sgc.nl~.
36 Cf. Chapter 4 (4).
37 Koch and Koziol in DutelFaure~ICoziol ( 2004), 426; Faure in DutelFaurelKoziol (2004),
64; Faure in Faure~ICoziol (2001).
38 Cf Chapter S (4).
39 Cf Chapter 5 ( 4); Danzon ( 1994), 455; Dute in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 459.
40 Cf Chapter S ( 3); Oldertz ( 1989), 29; Brahams ( 1989), 84; Mikkonen (2001), 351.
41 Awards for quadriplegia can vary between ESS,000 in the Netherlands and E333,000 in
England. Cf Chapter S ( 2); Rogers (2001), 295.
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Under the French system, the patient is entitled to full compensation", though
the Belgian draft does not provide for compensation for non-economic loss in
case of inedical accidents compensated under the principle of solidarity".
Summing up, all systems analysed compensate patients according to the
principle of full compensation. Negligence systems provide the patients who
prevail in their lawsuits a higher compensation award than Scandinavian no-
fault patient insurance schemes. In the French model, damages awards are
calculated according to the general rules for compensation of personal injury set
by liability law. However, the less generous damages awards granted by
Scandinavian legal systems do not relate to the no-fault compensation system for
injury emerging from medical treatment, but rather to legal tradition. Rules on
calculation of damages in Scandinavian systems are the same that exist in the
law of torts of those countries and both are subject to the same rules on full
collateral offset, schedules (barèmes) and conservative awards for pain and
suffering'S
In this category the negligence model is evaluated satisfactory (f). In
Scandinavian no-fault systems the rules for the assessment are essentially the
same as in tort: damages awards in negligence claims in Scandinavian countries
are modest, even in case of a claim in tort for personal injury. If the model
would be ported to other countries with a tradition of paying more generous
damages awards, it is unlikely that full compensation could be given to injured
patients. Thus, the no-fault model is evaluated as unsatisfactory (-) in this
category. The French model as satisfactory, as damages awards are generous
(t).
B. (4) Satisfaction ofHealthcare Professionals
This evaluation category reflects the supportability and the impact of the
financial sanction and the procedure on the healthcare provider. Citing Wu, the
doctor is a second victim06. She is affected by emotional anguish that befalls a
healthcare professional involved in an adverse event or a mistake. She is also
exposed to the potential conflict of interests between her duties towards the
patient, her career and economic interest, and her mistrust of the liability,
disciplinary, and~or criminal law, in particular if the system may potentially
scapegoat her".
42 Brazier (2003) 194.
43 L. 1142-14 CSP; Lambert-Faívre (2004), 161, 822.
44 Cf. Chapter 5 (2).
45 Cf. Chapter 5 (4).
46 Wu (2000), 726.
47 MerryRvfcCall Smith (2001), 9.
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In a negligence system, the nature of the procedure is not in conformity with the
interests of healthcare professionals either. The same uncertainty that affects a
patient's chance of success in a claim, affects healthcare professionals similarly,
as their professional reputation is publicly scrutinized during a protracted lapse
of time by a court of law as well as by their peers. This can lead to anxiety,
stress, loss of status and esteem in the community or among their peers,
contributes to loss of time and attention from the healthcare professionals or
other staff involved in the accident from their professional duties'". Atyiah infers
that very often professionals and hospitals settle claims immediately in order to
avoid this effect, even if their culpability is not clear'y.
Likewise, the procedural stress and anxiety may constitute a psychological
precursor that can influence the performance of the healthcare professional in a
detrimental way, creating a higher risk of future accidentsso. This is also, to some
extent, the other half of the coin of prevention seen as deterrence: because of the
bad legal experience, the doctor may indeed be more careful in the future.
Having to endure a court procedure, and the prospected resulting negative
societal effects may act as an effective deterrent both vis-à-vis the targeted
doctor and generally towards his peers.
Summing up, the interests of treatment professionals are better served under a
Scandinavian no-fault insurance scheme, the French model, or in a negligence
system, where the hospital and not the healthcare professionals are held directly
liable, and the professional is shielded from liability, totally or partially. In this
category the negligence model is evaluated as unsatisfactory to mediocre (-If),
depending upon the availability of alternative resolution disputes mechanisms.
The no-fault model is considered as very satisfactory (ff) due to the provider
friendliness of the system, and the French model as potentially satisfactory (~-).
C. (5) Impact on the Patient-Healthcare Professional relationship
The Patient-Treatment Provider Relationship can suffer significantly in the
aftermath of the accident. In order for the patient to be able to evaluate the
quality of treatment and eventually apply for compensation, as well as to enable
further treatment necessary to remedy or consolidate the consequences of the
treatment injury, the patient is often in need of information. However, in the
aftermath of the accident there is a potential risk of non-disclosure of
information essential to the patient as the treatment provider may have
incentives to withhold information or further explanation or cooperation.
48 CMO (2003) 14; Woolf Report ( 1996), 19; Fagnart (1997), 43.
49 Atiyah (1997), 25.
50 Cf. Chap[er 4(5); Merry~Smith (2001), 2 U.
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The nature of a litigious malpractice procedure seriously undermines the
continuation and the quality of the patient-healthcare provider relationship,
shifting from a humane relationship based on trust to an adversarial dynamic of
win or lose, characterized by antagonism and retention of information,
defensiveness and secrecy. This effect of the adversarial and litigious character
of the procedure precludes healthcare providers from giving explanations,
apologies or reassurance that action has been taken to prevent repetition of a
similar accident, as they engage in a defensive stance out of fear of self-
incrimination or breach of the professional insurance contracts'.
This consequence of the system seriously undermines patients' and providers'
satisfaction and the quality of the healthcare provider-patient relationship. The
patient should be entitled to a humane explanation of the circumstances and
reasons that led to the injury that aggrieved it, solace, apologies if applicable,
and the reassurance that, if something irregular happened, an inquiry on its
causes and reasons is being carried out, in order for future situations to be
prevented. Furthermore, empirical studies show that a significant number of
patients would be satisfied with reasonable explanations and apologies, and
would not follow a liability claim. For instance, a study of Vincent, Young and
Philips has shown that such a course of action would dissuade complaining
patients from taking legal action in 410~0 of casessZ.
In Scandinavian no-fault insurance systems, according to empirical evidence, the
healthcare professionals involved in the treatment that led to the injury suffered
by the patient, co-operate with her in filing the complaint. The patient receives
an explanation on what happened, according to the information that the
treatment providers know. According to Espersson, in an estimated 60 to 800~0 of
the cases, the doctor who was in charge of the treatment that caused the injury
helps the patient to fill in the forms to submit in order to obtain compensation".
Danzon states that in fact treatment providers have an incentive to support (or
more adequately placate) the patient rather than oppose him, as thus the patient
will be less tempted to present a complaint to the disciplinary boards'. This is
due to the in-existence of individual or collective accountability as regards
liability law, and to the fact that the insurance premiums are not experience-
rated. Brahams points out that, according to the Finnish Patient Insurance
Association, poor patient handling and rudeness of the doctor after the injury
occurred has triggered many claims to the board"
Summing-up, the Scandinavian no-fault systems have a proven history of
keeping the doctor-patient relationship reasonably intact due to the combined
Sl CMO Report, 14; Viney (1997), 107; Woolf(1996), 29.
52 Vincent et aL (1994), 1609-1613; NAO (2001), 25.
53 Espersson (2000), 2.
54 Danzon 1994, 459.
55 Brahams (1989) 84.
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effect of the elimination of provider-specific liability and inexistence of
experience rating of insurance premiumsw. In negligence systems, this
cooperation tends to be undermined by a conflict of interests of treatment
professionals and hospitals. Such a line of action can also be regarded as a
declaration of guilt in a litigious procedure, or may be grounds for non-
coverage, by the third-party insurance, of the damages caused by the provider.
Although no data exists until now on the virtues of the French model regarding
the continuation of a good patient-provider relationship, it has the potential of
allowing the continuation of a good patient-provider relationship. In this
category the negligence model is evaluated as very unsatisfactory ( --), the no-
fault model as satisfactory (f), and the French model as potentially mediocre
(~).
II Prevention of Treatment Injury
(6) Accountabiliry
As discussed in chapter 4, the negligence system addresses the preventive effect
of liability law through its focus on accountability and deterrence. Thus, the
healthcare professionals and hospitals have an incentive (the threat of
enforcement of liability) to engage in standard of care compliant treatment.
According to Faure, "the foresight of being held liable ex post will induce the
healthcare provider ex ante to take efficient care"5'. Likewise, public
embarrassment, as well as loss of reputation amongst peers, might be even more
important.
The deterrent effect can be observed at the individual level: if a practitioner is
condemned to pay damages to an aggrieved patient as treatment fell below the
standard of care owed to the patient, him as well as his peers will have an
incentive to engage in standard of care complying practice5e. It can as well
happen at the collective level, as hospitals will have incentives to minimize
organizational and defective input risks in order to escape the costs of liability"
However, several factors seem to soften the incentives brought by this
perspective. The randomness, uncertainty and unpredictability of the
compensation procedure evidenced in Atiyah's essay "The Damages Lottery", in
connection with the difficulties the patient has in establishing breach of duty of
care and causation, contribute to only a minority of the few lawsuits that are
56 Danzon 1994, 459.
57 Faure in Dute~Faure~ICoziol (2004), 7.
58 Olsen (1999), 1029.
59 Cf Chapter 4 (4).
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actually filed being successful~. Additionally, the fact that the healthcare
professional can channel the costs of liability to insurance, contributes to
weaken the deterrent effect on the individual level~'. It must be noted however,
that the insurance premium can increase significantly in case of an accident.
However, liability insurance is beneficial to patients insofar as they are shielded
from possible insolvency of the treatment provider.
Summing-up, negligence systems provide more incentives to individual and
institutional accountability due to the deterrent effect of liability law, which
gives incentives to professionals and hospitals to provide treatment in
conformity with reasonable care. This is also, to a lesser extent, the case of the
French model, which preserves fault as the normal threshold of entitlement to
compensationbZ. No deterrent incentives are presented by Scandinavian no-fault
compensation systems in order to promote accountability, neither on the
individual nor on the institutional level~'. In this category the negligence model
is evaluated as mediocre to satisfactory (f~f), depending upon the claims rate
and the impact of moral hazard of insurance. The no-fault model as very
unsatisfactory (--), and the French model as potentially satisfactory (~If).
(7) Risk Management
The focus on individual accountability and fault leads to a system were
individual blaming is sought, the practice known as "name, blame, and claim ".
This culture tends to oversimplify the underlying reality, and reveals a tendency
to "stretch" liability rules beyond the actions that would justify its imposition:
serious errors in violation of the standard of care. This leads to the public
conviction that healthcare professionals do not, and should not err, and if they
do, regardless of the nature ofthe error, they should be blamed and thus exposed
to the consequences of liability.
The blame culture leads healthcare professionals to catry out less risky (i.e,
defensive) treatmentb'. This defensiveness is less effective from a therapeutic
60 Atiyah (1997); Report (1978) 1326; Woolf (1996) 2; Dewees, Don et al. (1996) apud
KennedylGrubb (2000) 570; DH (2003); NAO (2001).
61 Cf Chapter 4(4); Dewees, Don et al., Exploring the Domain ofAccident Law: Taking the
Facts Seriously (1996) apud KennedylGrubb (2000) 570; Brazier (2003) 240.
62 At least concerning private healthcare providers. However, liability law does not induce
the individual accountability of healthcare professionals working in the framework of a
public hospital. Similarly, incentives on the institutional level are not likely to promote
accountability of public hospitals, the core elements of the French national healthcare
system, as they are not the entiry in charge of risk-management policy decisions. In
addition, they are financed by public funds do not compete between themselves and are
insured by the same entity, that does not rate premiums according to experience. Cf.
Tabouteau (2002), 175 ff.; Lambert-Faivre (2004), 722.
63 Cf Chapter 4 (4).
64 KesslerMlcClellan (2000), 31.
122
Medica! Liabiliry in the 21 S' Century
point of view, increases primary costs, and likewise discourages professionals
from reporting errors and whistle-blowing, for fear of potential adverse
consequences, leading to a lack of clinical transparency and incorrect
informational base, that undermines the correct assessment of treatment risks
and the establishment of prevention measuresbs. The blame culture leads to
underestimation of the extent to which adverse events are not due to individual
mistakes, but failures in the environment in which they operate~.
According to Mikkonen, no-fault patient insurance schemes "instead of looking
for culprits, seek to find out the main reasons behind the injuries167. Healthcare
professionals are not publicly scrutinized, as there is no provider specific
liability and no sanctions other than those of a disciplinary or criminal nature. In
fact, healthcare professionals are not personally blameable by the system, and
there are no incentives for hospitals either, as the insurance premium is not
subject to experience ratingó8. Koch and Koziol highlight this total lack of
incentives in no-fault patient insurance systems`i9.
However, according to reputed Scandinavian authorities like Dufwa, Lahti and
Mikkonen'~, this approach can lead to better prevention through clinical
transparency. This is because professionals and hospitals will cooperate more
actively in the procedure of investigating the case and developing databases,
guidelines and measures in order to avoid future injury of the same kind from
happening. This is the ideal setting for Leape's prevention model based on risk
management in complex organisations". This would be an incentive to whistle
blowing and error reporting, and clinical transparency induces better access to
precious information in order to improve patient safety and prevent accidents.
This appears to be primarily the case in the Finnish construction, where the
Patient Insurance Consortium has a division specialised in prevention
throughout transparency. A plain fact is that no noticeable decrease in the
quality of healthcare or standards convoyed the transition to no-fault insurance'Z.
The French system is densely regulated by the Code de la Santé Publique, and
many administrative institutions exist in order to observe, coordinate and
regulate risks like infections, quality of blood products and pharmaceutical
products, amongst others". The new system deliberately kept fault-based
liability and did not abdicate of its potential incentives; however, the lack of
65 Kohn et aL (2000) 49; Atiyah (1997), 138; MerrylSmith (2001), 129; DH (2000); CMO
(2000), 20, 77.
66 Cf. Chapter 4 (4).
67 Mikkonen (2002), 1 19.
68 Danzon (1994), 460.
69 Koch and Koziol in DutelFaure~ICoziol (2004), 439.
70 Lahti (1994), 210; Dufwa (1997) 58 ; Mikkonen (2002), 119.
71 Leape (1999), 33.
72 Cf. Chapter 4 (5).
73 Tabouteau (2002), 175 ff.
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individual accountability unless in case of gross negligence has the potential to
encourage system transparency".
Summing up, prevention throughout risk management based on clinical
transparency is better achieved by no-fault compensation systems than
negligence systems, as there are incentives to induce healthcare professionals to
report adverse events and to cooperate in the investigation and compensation
procedures that follow the occurrence of an adverse event". In some negligence
systems a shift towards prevention throughout a risk management approach can
be observed, in particular in England, due to an effort of the NHS to improve
quality, which was rendered possible by the lack of individual first line liability,
while keeping intact the fault principle. The French model has the intention and
the potential to achieve the same objective as the no-fault systems concerning
risk management throughout clinícal transparency, though the reform is still too
recent to evaluate its effectiveness. In this category the negligence model is
evaluated as mediocre (f), the no-fault model as satisfactory (}) and the French
model as potentially satisfactory (f).
III The Costs of the Compensation System
(8) Sum of the damages paid to patients and tertiary costs
As shown before, the portion of primary costs consisting of the net damages
paid to patients added to the tertiary costs varies significantly in the different
systems7ó. With the exception of England, negligence systems" are as expensive,
or cheaper than Scandinavian no-fault compensation systems. However, the
Scandinavian model compensates more patients.
Summing-up, the sum of the costs of paying damages to victims and the tertiary
costs is normally higher in no-fault compensation systems than in negligence
systems, though in the latter costs vary significantly7e. No data is available for
the French system, as the reform is very recent'y. In this category, the negligence
model is appraised as mediocre (t) and the no-fault mode] as unsatisfactory (-).
The costs of the French model are yet unknown.
74 Cf Chapter 4 (4).
75 Cf Chapter 4 (5).
76 Cf Chapter 5 (4).
77 The data relating to France and Belgium is anterior to the reform in France.
78 E.g. in England, these are much higher than any other system analysed.
79 Data presented for France and Belgium refer to the period before the reform.
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England il 20 5
1998-9
Germany 4 27 8
1999
Sweden 4 106 45
1999
Finland 3 134 47
1999
Denmark 4 54 17
1999
France 0.6 5 -
(average
1994-2003
Bel ium 0.5 15 4
(9) Tertiary costs
As seen before~, tertiary costs related to litigation and administrative overhead
are higher in negligence systems than in no-fault systems, as a consequence of
the non-litigious characteristic of the procedure and the fact that a dedicated







The French system can potentially reduce tertiary costs due to the claims
handling procedure introduced by the reform, though no empirical data is
available yet to confirm this premise. In this category, the negligence model is
appraised as unsatisfactory (-) and the no-fault model as satisfactory (f). The
costs of the French mode) are yet unknown.
80 Cf. Chapter 5 (4).
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3 A Roadmap for Reform
3.1 Conclusions
Throughout this book, [ described three models of compensation of inedical
injury: negligence, no-fault patient insurance and the French model. As
mentioned before"', and as results from the evaluation carried out, none of the
systems analysed can be considered perfect or clearly superior. Furthermore,
several factors intervene in the compensation model prevalent in a specific legal
system. These local settings are related to cultural, economical and financial
reasons. Other factors that influence the compensation of treatment injury in a
more dynamic fashion are the policy preferences of regulators.
As Zweigert and K~tz point out, the comparatist must carry out a critical
evaluation of the systems analysed. Sometimes the conclusion is that one system
81 Cf. Chapter 6( I).
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is superior to the others, or that the different solutions are equally valid, or that a
sound choice is hard to make. Other times the comparatist "may be able to
fashion a new solution, superior to all others, out of parts of the different
national solutions"e'.
This latter is the outcome of the book: after the evaluation of the existing models
for compensation of inedical injury, [ will provide the reader with some
guidelines that can ideally lead to a shift of inedical liability towards a fairer,
swifter and more cost conscious prevention and compensation of injury
emerging from medical related injury.
3.2 Local Settings and Polrcy Preferences
Local settings are variables of a cultural nature (consensus, conflict, religion,
jurisprudence, legal science, individualism, solidarity), economical (laissez-
faire, welfare, competition in healthcare markets, competition in insurance
markets, structure of healthcare, ownership of the hospital) or financial
(resources, financing, tax levels).
These factors interact with policy preferences while shaping the compensation
system. For instance, in England, there is no competition in the most significant
part of the healthcare market, as the majority of hospitals are publicly owned,
and it is a rich liberal economy. The public sector is undergoing restructuring
and the main policy preferences are cost reduction, risk management and better
access of injured patients to compensation while maintaining high damages
awards. In Scandinavian countries, society is one of consensus; citizens are
conscious and well informed. They are risk avert and demanding consumers.
Most hospitals are publicly owned, and there is no competition in healthcare or
insurance markets. A hallmark of the welfare state, social security and social
benefits are broad and taxes are high, public finances stable. The polícy
preference has been to enlarge access of a broad number of patients to
compensation for medical injury. In France a good, mostly public, healthcare
system coexists with a strong insurance lobby. Consumers are demanding and
well informed, and the public administration is an active regulator. The policy
preferences were to increase safety in healthcare by preventing medical
accidents and increasing the access of patients to compensationei.
3.3 Guidelines
While the negligence model is imperfect, it is still dominant in most of the
world. In this book I do not advocate a major reform by implementing a
Scandinavian styled no-fault patient insurance system.
82 Zweigert~[C6tz (2000), 47.
83 Kouchner (2002); Jourdain (2002).
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Though the no-fault model has many considerable advantages, it also some
disadvantages, as seen before. In addition, the specific local settings and policy
preferences that exist in the Nordic countries, such as a consensus culture, far-
reaching sociai security, economical and financial robustness, and insurance and
health-care market settings, don't make the model portable without significant
adaptation to a non-Scandinavian country. Nor do I suggest a reform inspired by
the very interesting and innovative French system, whose impact is still not
backed by hard empirical evidence. As such, I have opted to advocate a more
realistic, less risky, and more consensual reform, by outlining two guidelines as
"no regret" options for the reform of the negligence model. Their objective is to
lessen the disadvantages of this model.
These guidelines were chosen for the following reasons: they are improvements
to the liability system that present no significant disadvantages, because of their
acceptability from a policy point of view and because they are not seriously
affected by local settings.
Finally, I will test the predictable effect of these guidelines on the liability
system by appraising them according to the dimensions and the criteria of the
evaluation grid. If a negligence system where the guidelines are implemented is
not appraised negatively in any of the criteria of the evaluation grid, and if it is
appraised positively in more than the half of the criteria, the quality of the
guidelines is validated.
Guideline I Towards non-litigious compensation and apologies
procedu res
General Considerations
A trend in contemporary justice is the shift from formal litigious judicial
settlement of disputes to informal, more agile informal alternative resolution of
disputes. Mediation, conciliation and arbitration are becoming increasingly
frequent tools in private law, labour law and social law.
Compensation of treatment injuries does not escape this trend. The reader has
already seen how the Scandinavian Patient Insurance addressed the settlement of
claims through resource to an independent third party responsible for the
settlement of claims. It was also pointed out how the French device established
triage authorities to sort out between classical negligence claims and claims
based on standard of care compliant medical accidents that enable the patient to
be compensated according to a collective compensation scheme.
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Many negligence systems shifted recently to altemative resolution of inedical
injury claims. In Germany, there are in several Liinder conciliation and
mediation commissions, the Gutachterkommissionen or Schlichtungsstellen der
Landesdrztekammern, who received 9800 cases and solved 6300 in 1999~. They
are normally organised by the medical professionals' associations and they aim
at solving malpractice claims in a non-litigious fashion.
In the UK, the NHS operates, since April 1995, a Litigation Authority, that is
charged now with the practical implementation of the conclusions of the Woolf
Report on the reform of the civil justice system. This Litigation Authority
handles clinical negligence claims seeking a fair outcome for both the claimant
and the NHS. After this reform, approximately 950~0 of settlements of claims are
reached "out of court"85.
Swift, more humane, less complex procedure
Swiftness, humanity and reduced complexity are hallmarks of a non-litigious,
non-adversarial settlement of claims emerging from medical injury. Classical
formal judicial resolution of inedical personal injury claims has shown that the
excessive length of the proceedings, its adversarial nature, and costs inherent to
complexity and acquíring evidence lead to many adverse consequences.
A patient having suffered personal injury, probably seriously handicapped is
victimised again by the system, and must invest significant time and money in
an uncertain procedure of unpredictable outcome. The patient is in a particularly
vulnerable position. Likewise, the healthcare professionals will experience
stress, as their professional reputation suffers from the antagonism inherent to
the process during an extended period.
Benefits to the Doctor-Patient relationship and to the qualiry of the healthcare
system
A litigious adversarial procedure brings as a direct consequence the deterioration
and extinction of the relationship between the healthcare professional and the
patient. This seriously undermines the discovery of the underlying reasons and
circumstances that led to the accident, as the treatment provider will withhold
important information. This leads to a defensive, opaque system, which prevents
information useful to improving the quality of healthcare and prevention of
treatment injury from being adequately harvested.
Moreover, this sad end to the relationship precludes any possibility of
explanation and apologies being provided to the patient. Empirical studies
84 Hansis~i{art (2004), 5.
85 CMO (2003), 12; Rogers in FaurelKoziol (2001) 243.
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demonstrate that a significant number of patients would not file malpractice
lawsuits if they had been presented with a reasonable and humane explanation-
and apology if needed-of what has happened, and why did it happen. Presenting
explanations and apologies is more difficult under an adversarial, litigious
procedure, as healthcare providers fear self-incrimination that could be
translated into civil or disciplinary responsibility, as well as breach of
professional insurance and labour contract conditions.
Lower Tertiary Costs
Finally, tertiary costs of litigation and administration are lower, as the
complexity of the procedure, and the time needed to settle claims is reduced.
The liquid compensation, if any, to the patient will be higher. Litigation costs to
the patient and the professional become affordable.
Guideline II Towards institutional accountability
General Consideratrons
Another conclusion of this book is that a shift towards first line liability of the
healthcare providing institution- most usually a hospital or a clinic is desirable
and that healthcare professionals should be ideally protected from individual
accountability in the liability sphere of accountability. An exception should be
made in situations where they have acted with gross negligence and
recklessness, by allowing the institution a recourse action against the healthcare
professional in these circumstances.
Transparency to the patient
One of the arguments substantiating this recommendation is that it becomes
more transparent to the patient whom he must hold accountable. Hospitals are
sometimes very complex organisations, where many different healthcare
professionals of different specialities work, and many times identifying an
individual professional may prove problematic. Likewise, at the moment the
patient has suffered treatment related injury and pretends to evaluate the quality
of treatment, she will not know exactly whether or not the accountability of that
injury can be channelled towards a specific individuaL Moreover, the institution
will always be more solvable, and be in a better position than its employees to
negotiate a bulk insurance policy.
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Risk Management through a systems approach
A~ledica! Liabiliry in the 2J''` Century
A significant share of treatment injuries sustained by patients in hospital settings
cannot be attributed to a specific individual, and derive from organisational and
structural misgivings"~. These emerge from work sharing, institutional
architecture, quality control, technological risks, nosocomial infections, and
defective organisation.
As seen above, very often different specific factors, either individual errors,
institutional errors, or individual triggering of latent errors, contributed to a
specific treatment injury, and it is impossible to prevent it unless when starting
from the top of the pyramid.
As such, it looks like liability should ideally be shifted to the institution itself, as
those accidents could have probably best been prevented at the organisationa]
level87.
Mitigating the blame culture and good clinical governance
Removing persecution and blaming of individual healthcare professionals
involved in the accident will help in finding out thoroughly the causes of
accidents and near-accidents, and enable hospitals and hospital risk management
entities to develop measures in order to prevent said accidents.
Such measures were covered in the previous chapters, and demand that
healthcare professionals be partially shielded from liability and that claims
settlement is organised according to a non-adversarial, non-litigious procedure.
In such a fashion, their collaboration is vital to a proactive injury prevention
policy based on clinical transparency and adequate information harvesting.
Testing the guidelines
Finally, I conclude by testing the quality of the guidelines in light of their
predictable effect in the negligence system. This will clearly explain why these
guidelines are adequate for the reform of the negligence system. My conclusion
is that, the guidelines will be satisfactory if, embedded in a negligence system,
that system is not appraised negatively in any of the criteria of the evaluation
grid and appraised positively in more than the half of those criteria.
86 Cf. Chapter 4.
87 Dewees, Don et al., E.zploring the Domain of Accidenl Law: Taking the Facts Seriously
(1996) apud KennedylGrubb (2000), 570.
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Testing Guideline I.~ Towards non-litigious compensation and apologies
procedures
Adopting guideline I, satisfaction of patients will be good. More patients will
have access to compensation (criterion 1), as a cost free amiable resolution of
disputes procedure will make patients more likely to seek compensation. The
adoption of the guideline would lessen the very unsatisfactory evaluation of the
negligence system from very unsatisfactory (--) to mediocre (t). The
advantages of such a procedure will greatly reduce the hurdles and victimisation
of patients by the system (criterion 2), improving the unsatisfactory~mediocre
evaluation (-~f) of the negligence system to satisfactory (f). Full compensation
(criterion 3), one of the main advantages of the negligence model is not affected
by this guideline.
The adoption of this guideline will improve the satisfaction of healthcare
providers (criterion 4) from unsatisfactory~mediocre (-If) to satisfactory (f), as
they are not exposed to the adverse effects of the procedure on her career,
reputation and time. Likewise, a system where this guideline is implemented
will facilitate a good quality of the relationship between patients and healthcare
professionals (criterion 5), improving the evaluation of the negligence system
from very unsatisfactory (--) to satisfactory (t). Regarding the prevention of
treatment injury, implementing this guideline does not affect accountability
(criterion 6), but is very beneficial to risk management (criterion 7), as more
information is obtained about adverse events and near misses can be obtained,
due to the benefits of the transparency atmosphere promoted by the non-litigious
character of the procedure, improving the appraisal of the system from mediocre
(f) to satisfactory (t)ee. Finally, a negligence system where this guideline is
implemented has the potential to be less expensive. While the costs of damages
paid to patients (criterion 8) are likely to increase as more patients will benefit
from access to compensation, tertiary costs (criteria 8 and 9) decrease
significantly due to savings in litigation, handling of claims and time, shifting
the negligence system from unsatisfactory (-) to satisfactory (~).
Testing Guideline II.~ Towards institutional accountability
Implementing guideline II does not significantly affect the satisfaction of
patients regarding the access to compensation (criterion I), the impact of the
procedure (criterion 2) and full compensation (criterion 3)av. Obviously, adopting
this guideline improves the satisfaction of healthcare providers (criterion 4), as
in this way they are partially shielded from liability, shifting the
88 Cf Chapter 4 (5).
89 However, if insurance is not available, a hospítal gives patients more guarantees of
solvability, i.e. of being able to pay compensation than an individual healthcaze provider.
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unsatisfactorylmediocre (-If) appraisal of the negligence system to a satisfactory
(f) level. On the other hand, the fact that the healthcare professional is not
directly blamed is very positive to the quality of the relationship between the
patient and the healthcare provider (criterion 5), raising the evaluation of the
negligence system from very unsatisfactory (--) to satisfactory (f).
Adopting this guideline will shift accountability (criterion 6) from the individual
healthcare professionals to the hospital, slightly lowering the appraisal of the
negligence system from satisfactorylmediocre (flt) to mediocre (t). The impact
of the guideline is crucial in order to improve the risk management aspect of
prevention ( criterion 7), by giving incentives to the management of hospitals and
clinics to develop measures aiming at preventing risks to patients, raising the
evaluation of the negligence system in this criterion from mediocre (t) to
satisfactory (f). These incentives are fostered by the adoption of this guideline
combined with the active cooperation of healthcare professionals in risk
management, thanks to a blame-free institutional environment. The costs of the
compensation system assessed by criteria 8 and 9 are not affected by this
guideline.
Summing- Up
The two guidelines proposed are complementary. A negligence system reformed
along these guidelines would predictably be rated as posítive according to more
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Chapter 1(Introduction) starts with an historical overview of the relationship
between medicine and the law. Then, the current situation of inedical liability
law is analysed, in particular the discussion about the compensation awareness
and the so-called "malpractice crisis". The chapter continues by examining what
can go wrong in medical treatment: diagnosis mishaps, mishaps in the choice or
execution of inedical treatment, insufficient surveillance, defective input,
hospital-acquired infections, organisational mishaps and accidents emerging
from medical research and novel medical techniques. Next, the key players in
the medical liability context (patients, healthcare providers, treatment providing
organisations, insurance companies and social security agencies) are identified
and their interests analysed. Afterwards, the research questions are revealed and
the methodology of the dissertation is explained. The preliminary research
question is: how is medical treatment injury compensated in Etn~opean
countries. [n the research phase three models for compensation of inedical injury
were identified: the negligence model, the Scandinavian nofault patient
insurance model and the dualistic French model. Subsequently, the main
research question of the dissertation is which of these models, if any, is more
adequate to compensate personal injury emerging from medical treatment. The
method used is the method of comparative law, interpreted in a non-restrictive
fashion.
Chapter 2(General Overview) follows by describing the main features of the
three models. The negligence model is characterised by the central role of fault,
a normally adversarial claims settlement procedure, and its deterrent effect.
Scandinavian no-fault systems are characterised by culpa neutral entitlement
criteria, enlarged access of patients to compensation and non-litigious settlement
of disputes. Finally, the French model keeps fault-based liability as a default, but
provides for compensation of serious medical adverse events irrespective of
fault, according to a non-litigious procedure.
Chapter 3(Access Criteria) explains the criteria that must be satisfied so that an
injured patient can have access to compensation. The chapter starts by
describing the standard of care that benchmarks the duty of care owed by a
treatment provider to a patient in the negligence model. In general, a treatment
provider is not held liable, insofar as he carries out treatment with the diligence
of an average, reasonable professional, according to professional standards.
Next, the preventability criterion in Scandinavian no-fault systems is explained.
According to this criterion, a patient is allowed compensation insofar as it can be
considered ex post that the personal injury would have been prevented if the care
of a specialist treatment provider had been employed or by having carried out an
equivalent alternative treatment technique instead of the chosen one. Afterwards,
access criteria in case of use of injuries related to defective equipment and
hospital-acquired infections is analysed. Regarding this aspect, in some
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negligence systems the access to compensation is sometimes facilitated, while in
Scandinavian no-fault systems and in the French model such adverse events are
usually compensated irrespective of fault. The chapter follows by describing the
entitlement to compensation in cases of serious medical adverse events not
attributable to fault (aléa therapeutique). In the negligence model, liability law
does not, in principle, compensate these adverse events. However, in some
circumstances, serious, unexpected and unendurable personal injury is
compensated in both the Scandinavian no-fault model and in the French model.
Another common path to compensation of inedical treatment injury is the breach
of a dury to inform. This happens when the patient claims that his right to give
informed consent to treatment was breached, and that had he been given an
informed choice, the injury could have been prevented. The practical role of this
doctrine in the access to compensation varies in negligence systems-from almost
irrelevant in English law to a pivotal role in German Law. It is also important in
the French model. The breach of a duty to inform is a no-issue in Scandinavian
no-fault systems. Finally, this chapter deals with the issues of causation in the
three models.
Chapter 4(Prevention of Treatment Injury) begins by explaining how individual
errors (cognitive, skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based) and institutional
errors ( work-sharing, chain of command, defective organisation) are interlinked
in medical treatment adverse events. Then two shades of prevention policy are
described: accountability through deterrence (hard incentives) and prevention
through risk management and learning from failure ( identification of accidents
an near-misses, error reporting, error correction strategies, safeguard barriers,
soft incentives). The chapter concludes with the description of how the three
models combine the two prevention policies.
Chapter 5 (Compensation of Medical Injury) explains the specificities of
personal injury emerging from medical treatment. The different categories of
damage and compensation methods are described. The chapter follows with an
explanation of how the different models compensate medical treatment injury
(access to compensation, damages awards, costs of the compensation system,
administration and litigation costs, thresholds).
Finally, in Chapter 6(Medical Liabiliry in the 21'` Century) the conclusions and
outcomes of this dissertation are revealed. Regarding the initial research
question, how is medical injury compensated in European countries, it was seen
that three different models exist in Europe. The second research question was set
to give an answer as to which of these models, if any, is more adequate to
compensate medical injury. In this last chapter, these three models are analysed
and benchmarked according to an evaluation grid. This evaluation grid
benchmarks three dimensions and some more concrete criteria. Dimension I
relates to the satisfaction of patients, healthcare professionals and the quality of
their relationship, dimension II to the prevention of treatment injury and
dimension III to the costs of the compensation system.
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Chapter 6 concludes with the answer to the second research question and the
formulation of a roadmap for reform. Though the three models address the
problem of inedical accidents in different ways, it is concluded that none of the
three is clearly the "best". Each model has both advantages and disadvantages.
Due to the influence of local settings and diverging policy preferences, merely
importing an existent model is not a realistic approach. As such, the chosen
option consists of a less risky, and more consensual reform, by outlining two
guidelines as"no regret" options for the reform of the negligence model. Their
objective is to lessen the disadvantages of this model. These guidelines are
improvements to the liability system that present no significant disadvantages.
They are acceptable from a policy point of view and are not seriously affected
by local settings. These guidelines are (1) towards non-litigious compensation
and apologies procedures bringing the advantages of swift, humane and less
complex procedures; benefits to the doctor-patient relationship and to the quality
of the healthcare system; lower administration costs and (II) towards
institutional accountability bringing the advantages of transparency to the
patient, better risk management, mitigation of the blame culture and clinical
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